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ABSTRACT 
 
My research investigated the extent to which the Nigerian media have alerted the public 
and key opinion formers to risk-related issues / conflict in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region in 
order to shape the Nigerian public policy sphere as a response to the reoccurring [1958-
2009] conflict between the government, oil host communities and independent 
multinational oil companies operating in the Nigeria’s Niger Delta region over economic 
embarrassment due to underdevelopment and environmental degradation. Drawing on the 
recent academic literature on policy agenda-setting, risk communication and trust 
communication, my research explored Research Questions on risk communication and 
risk perception linking policy agenda-setting that would be of great benefit for the 
Nigerian policy-makers, and indeed oil companies to understand. The researcher 
addressed these Research Questions through a survey [1,200 questionnaires] of Nigerians 
and interviews [10] with key people in Nigeria. These Research Questions are very 
timely and penetrating, in what has been, to date, a very under-researched area – namely, 
investigating the flows and impacts of trust-risk communication in agenda setting in a 
less-developed country. The researcher used three states in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region 
namely, Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers for the purpose of this research because conflict and 
risk issues is most pronounced in the aforementioned states due to oil exploration / 
exploitation and underdevelopment. Findings from this research revealed that the 
Nigerian media-policy-public agendas face specific problems in influencing one another 
on environmental risk issues and other facet of the conflict in Nigeria’s Niger Delta 
region. These specific problems which reflect gaps in knowledge in the Niger Delta 
conflict have now been outlined, so needing further attention and work by stakeholders in 
the public policy field with regards to the Niger Delta conflict. To this end, areas in need 
of research focus were outlined and several recommendations were made by the 
researcher which if adopted by the Nigerian government / policy makers, the media, oil 
companies and other stakeholders will help douse Nigeria’s Niger Delta conflict. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0 RESEARCH CONTEXT  
 
This research investigated the extent to which the Nigerian media have alerted the public 
and key opinion formers to risk-related issues / conflict in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region in 
order to shape the Nigerian public policy sphere as a response to the reoccurring [1958-
2009] conflict between the government, oil host communities and independent 
multinational oil companies operating in the Nigeria’s Niger Delta region over economic 
embarrassment due to underdevelopment and environmental degradation.   
 
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
 
Environmental risk issues emerged in the late twentieth century as a major concern of 
global activities of industrialisation. By the early twenty-first century, environmental 
issues started to dominate international agendas for a whole generation of political 
leaders, government officials, scientists, industrialists, Non Government Organisations 
(NGOs) and concerned citizens. The awareness of a wide range of risk issues associated 
with environmental degradation increased greatly and justifiably so (Greene, 2006). ‘The 
concept of risk is now widely used to explain deviations from the norm, misfortune and 
frightening events’ (Lupton: 1999:3). Furthermore, the risk concept assumes human 
responsibility and that something can be done to avert disaster (Lupton: 1999). This 
modernist notion of risk represented a new form of viewing the globe and the unforeseen 
consequences of industrialisation and its chaotic manifestation and contingencies, which 
have exerted a dominant and naturally unexpected influence on the difficulties and 
problems we face (Taylor-Gooby and Zinn, 2006). The concept of risk in late modernity 
has attracted intense study from social scientists - for two core purposes. First, the 
increasing complexities of modern technologies and of the organisations that govern our 
lives (Taylor-Gooby and Zinn, 2006: 2); second, alongside the proof that uncertainty and 
risk are endemic, and that contemporary technology and social organisations are unable 
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to eradicate it, it is rapidly acknowledged that risk and uncertainty also involve socio-
political questions of adequacy and of challenge. The capacity for resolution through 
technical resources alone is limited, once risk issues become politicized (Taylor-Gooby 
and Zinn, 2006). The concept of risk has generated greater empirical engagement with 
risk-oriented social theory such as risk society, the cognitive science perspective, 
governmentality position, social constructionist position and the culturalist position (see, 
Bakir, 2010). This study examined some of the risk-orientated social theories in response 
to the risk issues associated with environmental degradation in Nigeria’s Niger Delta 
region. 
 
My research questions emerged from a number of pre-existing theoretical frameworks on 
policy, risk and media; these frameworks are discussed further in chapter two. The policy 
agenda-setting literature looked into how the media influence public opinion on issues 
which gain primacy in the society, thereby constructing policy agenda frameworks 
(McCombs and Shaw, 1972). However, my study further confirmed that the policy 
agenda-setting literature offered little empirical insight into media-policy linkages in risk 
issues (Bakir, 2006). Whilst risk communication tends to rectify gaps in public 
knowledge on risk issues, research in the field of risk communication identified the 
apparent failure of the paternalistic top-down communication activities (Petts et al, 2001). 
In view of this flaw in risk communication, my study turned to the social amplification of 
risk framework (SARF) for insights into risk communication. SARF was formulated as a 
response to the disjunctures between the different parts of risk research, to rectify the 
deficit of our knowledge about the social process that can mediate between a risk and its 
outcomes (Breakwell et al, 2001). Thus, the SARF framework describes the different 
dynamic of social process underlying risk response and perception embedded within risk 
amplification and attenuation (Petts et al, 2001; Kasperson et al, 2003). However, studies 
on SARF for example the 128-hazard event study (Kasperson et al, 1992 and Renn et al, 
1992) and the qualitative research on six risk events (Kasperson, 1992) focused on 
hypothetical events rather than actual occurrences and failed to address the factors that 
influence individuals’ responses to real-life risk issues (Petts et al, 2001) which my study 
presents. Hence, Rayner (1988) argue that the framework does not give a full account of 
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the complexity and richness of individual risk-related behaviour (Horlick-Jones et al, 
2003). My research draws upon rather different intellectual roots but distinct work which 
has developed over a period of time, specifically, the pragmatic approach to assessing 
SARF that brings fresh insight in understanding the longevity of a risk-related event 
(Horlick-Jones et al, 2003) and integration of insights drawn from studies of policy 
process and socio-political and economic analysis (Gowda, 2003). The SARF mentions a 
range of social and individual amplification stations, thus, this study deemed it important 
in evaluating the utility of the framework in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region to consider the 
relationships between all of the levels of data that SARF identifies; the physical 
characteristics of a risk event, media coverage, public reaction, risk perception and 
societal impact (Burns et al, 1993 in Breakwell et al, 2001; Horlick-Jones et al, 2003). An 
increasingly studied area within this particular amplification mechanism is that of trust, 
which is imperative in risk communication (Bakir, 2006: 4). Psychometric studies failed 
to identify how individuals respond / talk about trust and why some institutions are more 
trusted than others (Petts et al, 2001). This is because they presented individuals with a 
list of institutions and particularly ask them which ones they trust the most. Thus, this 
approach formulates assumptions about lay people’s perceptions and sometimes offers 
people rather false comparisons (Petts et al, 2001). To mitigate against this, my study 
utilised a more exploratory approach to individuals’ trust in institutions that may act to 
amplify or attenuate risk issues in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region.  
 
Linking trust to risk communication determines how the media enable active citizenship. 
To appreciate the complexity of this relationship, it is useful to utilise the concept of the 
public sphere, which is centred on the relationships that exist between the media, state, 
citizens and business institutions. Inexorably, as in the case of all relationships, this 
involves the issue of trust (Boyd-Barrett, 1995). However, the underlying principle 
reinforcing this approach to communication - which aims to bring about trust through 
sharing knowledge and reciprocal understanding – ‘can be contrasted with that of its 
polar opposite, strategic action and instrumental rationality, where communication is 
goal-oriented and manipulative’ (Bakir and Barlow, 2007: 18; also see Dahlgren, 2001). 
The operational activity of commercial mass media in modern society is the drive for 
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profit, which conceives media in connection to consumers in a market rather than 
individuals in a public sphere (Butsch, 2007). Thus, as the media became commercialized 
it no longer offered access to the citizens for rational-critical debate on issues concerning 
the state (Calhoun, 1992, Garnham, 1992, 1995; Bakir and Barlow, 2007). The process of 
maintaining the public sphere is far from ideal, due to the complex nature of modern 
societies and the inevitable role the media play in the economic sphere (notably, the field 
of advertising) to survive (see Herman and Chomsky, 1988).  
 
In order to understand the contemporary complex nature of the public sphere and why it 
is far from ideal in Nigeria [apart from the economic sphere], this study turned to press 
freedom in Nigeria for insights into how media institutions have been operating since 
democracy was installed in Nigeria [1999-2010]. The assessment and evaluation of media 
structure and degree of press freedom in Nigeria depends on different factors, such as the 
types of media ownership that exist, the political system, the economy, the judiciary, 
control tactics, media pluralism and democratisation. The Nigerian media structure 
comprises private and government media ownership, which affect the degree of press 
freedom that exists at a given time. Furthermore, the type of political system that exists in 
Nigeria at a given time can also determine the degree of press freedom (Agbese, 2006). 
However, the Nigerian media have fared significantly better since democracy was 
installed in Nigeria [1999-2010] than they had during the preceding sixteen years of 
military regime. This study revealed that the Nigerian media still faces some sort of 
handicap especially in the area of freedom of information bill which has not been passed 
into law. The democratic president Yar’Adua [deceased, May 5th, 2010] who took over 
power from Obansajo on May 29, 2007 indicated that he would sign into law the freedom 
of information bill, which the Obansajo government [1999-2007] rejected. However, as 
yet the bill has not been passed. The ideal of this bill was designed to liberate and give 
Nigerian citizens, including the media, a right of access to public information (IREX, 
2007), thereby resuscitating the public sphere as citizens can get access to public 
information through dialogue, debate and discussion (Ashong and Udoudo 2008; Olusola, 
2008).  
 5 
Notwithstanding media ownership issues and the challenges to press freedom in Nigeria, 
the media are also seen to play a major role in risk communication. In an overview of 
media-risk research directions, Bakir (2010: 5) observes that such research tends to: 
 
‘highlight the media’s role in: providing risk knowledge to inform citizens; 
generating and determining public acceptability of different risks; 
motivating the public to take responsibility for, and action regarding, risks; 
and providing imaginative schemata regarding voluntary chosen risks’.  
 
However, my study identified several trends in studies of the sociology of news in risk 
reporting, not least that it is guided by journalistic institutional traditions and norms 
which have little relationship to actual threat directions. Risk reporting clusters around 
major risk occurrences, ‘ignoring multi-causal, long-term or hypothetical risks and 
influenced by commitments to balance and truth, both concepts liable to founder against 
the value-laden rocks of uncertainty when reporting risk’ (Bakir, 2008: 2: also see, Bakir, 
2010; Campbell 2008). As risk events create public reaction to risk signals such as 
interpreter, sender and receiver [risk signals are discussed further in chapter two] from 
cooperative action, it stimulates pressure and interest group member responses to 
systematically negotiate risk issues by attempting to influence policy through the media 
(Kasperson, et al, 2003; Bakir, 2006). Research into the activities of multinational oil 
companies in developing countries, especially in Nigeria’s Niger-Delta region, revealed 
that risk issues are largely associated with environmental degradation due to oil 
exploitation and exploration (Idowu, 1999; Akpan, 2008).  
 
Violation of political and civil rights have been executed mainly in response to 
demonstrations about activities of multinational institutions that produce Nigeria’s oil and 
the use made of the oil funds by the Nigerian government without developing the source 
of the nation’s wealth [Niger Delta]. The insensitivity of the government and the 
multinational oil companies to the plight of the inhabitants of the host oil communities 
have metamorphosed into an arena characterised by militants, pipeline vandalisation and 
hostage-taking of oil workers for ransom (Adedoja, 2007; Africa Action, 1999). The late 
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democratic president Umaru Yar’Adua who assumed office in 2007 continued with the 
vision of Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) which was created by the 
previous democratic government (1999-2007) and also indicated a fifteen year master 
plan for the region because of the unabated agitation (Akpan, 2008). In view of 
expanding projects in the Niger Delta, Yar’ Adua made known his intention in 2008 to 
create a new ministry - Niger Delta Ministry, which took effect in 2008 to tackle the 
unending challenges in the region (Walker, 2008; Reuters, 2008). This move by the late 
president in creating another commission, however, did prompt debate between critics; an 
activist and human rights lawyer notes that creating the Niger Delta ministry generates 
more bureaucracy that will avoid the real issues in the Niger Delta region (Akpan, 2008).  
 
Against this backdrop, this study seeks to investigate the impact of media exposure on 
policy by shaping public perception of risk about the ongoing crisis that has resulted in 
violence and underdevelopment; and by shaping policy makers’ perception of public 
opinion on the effect of risk associated with environmental degradation, which is a 
benchmark case for risk communication in the Niger Delta. This research unpicked the 
web of issues the crisis has mobilized and also explores trust, risk communication and 
policy agenda-setting.   
 
1.2 MOTIVATION FOR THE RESEARCH 
 
The motivation for this research was as a response to the conflict in Nigeria’s Niger Delta 
region over underdevelopment and environmental degradation despite the large financial 
resources that have been allocated to the Niger Delta within the last ten years of 
democracy in Nigeria. ‘The developmental challenges of the region remained 
substantially unaddressed, a development that further increased the tempo of violent 
agitations and restiveness in the region’ (Adedoja, 2007: 1). The neglect of these facts 
and the conspiracy by the corrupt government and multinational oil companies has 
increased conflicts of interest over the years. At the time of writing, the struggle for 
resource [wealth] management is most pronounced in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region due to 
the abuse and misuse of power (Osinachi, 2006).  
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The surge in militant groups and kidnapping of expatriates for ransom exacerbated the 
Niger Delta’s crisis; this recent trend of development further put pressure on the Nigerian 
government to resolve the crisis that has befallen the region. When the late president Yar, 
Adua assumed office in 2007, he made known that the development of the Niger Delta 
region was top in his priority list (Adedoja, 2007). In addition, the vice president 
Goodluck Jonathan [current president, May 6th, 2010] who is from the Niger Delta also 
indicated that his key aim is to stabilise the region’s crisis within the first six months of 
this present administration. In pursuit of this goal, the federal government constituted a 
peace and reconciliation committee with the mandate to concentrate on conflict resolution 
within the next 12 months. Prior to this, the late president noted that oil companies 
operating in the country would have to pay ‘heavily’ for oil spillage (Africa Action, 1999; 
Adedoja, 2007). In response to the motivation for this study, my research has unpicked 
the web of issues the crisis has mobilised and also explores risk-oriented social theory 
and policy agenda frameworks as a backdrop for conjuring realistic research questions. 
However, the findings from this research will add to the existing body of knowledge in 
the research community and would be of great benefit for the Nigerian public policy field 
and multinational oil companies to understand. 
 
1.3 SCOPE AND COVERAGE 
 
The enormity of conflict and risk issues is pronounced in three states in the Niger Delta 
region namely: Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers which produce a significant percentage of 
crude oil and also experience violence between the government, indigenes of oil host 
communities and multinational oil corporations. However, the researcher chose the 
aforementioned states for this study because the risk events emanating from crude oil 
exploration and violent agitation in the region seem to overwhelm policy formulation in 
the region. In addition, the aforementioned states receive more federal allocation than 
other states in the Niger Delta because they produce the most crude oil and yet experience 
utmost violence (Nwabuawele, 2008). Taking into account the enormity of conflict due to 
environmental degradation in the Niger Delta, the researcher acquired adequate 
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information from the target population in Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers State because the 
awareness of the conflict would be prevalent in these states.  
 
1.4  RESEARCH DESIGN / METHODOLOGY 
 
The main methodology for this research is that of the case study. The case study research 
methodology entails testing theoretical models or theories by applying them in real world 
situations, that is, testing if scientific theories and models actually work in real life 
scenario. Notably, case study is an in-depth study of a specific situation, ‘it is a research 
method used to narrow down a very broad field of research into one easily researchable 
topic’ (Shuttleworth, 2008: 1). The research design the researcher adopted for this study 
is the survey (quantitative / qualitative) method and interview (qualitative) method. Both 
methods will be explained below:  
 
The survey method involves the collection of data from a large or even very large 
population. Notably, through the use of a representative sample, all surveys aim to 
explain the features or opinions of a population. Embedded in sample survey are three 
distinct methodologies; sampling, designing questions and data collection. Each of these 
methods has many functions outside of sample surveys; however, if used together 
develops a good survey design (Fowler, 2002).Sampling is the procedure used in 
selecting a few (a sample) from a larger group (the sampling population) in other to form 
the basis for predicting the spread of an unknown section of information or outcome 
regarding the larger group (May, 1997; Kumar, 2005). In social science research, the 
category of the study population, the resources available and the nature of research 
question will determine the type of research instrument to use. The research instrument 
for the quantitative part of this study is the questionnaire (May, 1997). The target 
population for this study are respondents within the age of twenty-one years and above, 
and are both male and female from the selected states [Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers] in 
Nigeria’s Niger Delta region. Furthermore, for the purpose of this study, the research data 
gathered was analysed using Microsoft Excel Package and the responses from the target 
population was analysed using bar charts.  
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Qualitative interviewing is one of the most commonly used methods to obtain 
information from individuals or understand our fellow human beings in social sciences 
(Fontana and Frey, 1998). ‘Insights gained from qualitative interviewing may improve 
the quality of survey design and interpretation’ (Gaskell, 2000: 39). For the purpose of 
this research, the researcher adopted the semi-structured interview as questions were 
specified / fixed on the issues investigated, however, this will allow the researcher to 
probe beyond the questions in the questionnaires and thus engage the interviewee in a 
dialogue (May, 1997). The target population for the interviews were with a range of key 
people who may act to amplify or attenuate risk communication about environmental 
degradation by the major oil companies in the Niger Delta [community leaders, 
journalists, policy-makers, politicians, government officials, environmental agencies and 
civil servants]. However, the population of this study is linked to different facets of the 
conflict; that is, they hold vital information in their area of profession as compared to the 
larger population used for the quantitative aspect of this research that may just be aware 
of the conflict around their immediate surroundings. Qualitative interviewing presents the 
researcher with a variety of analysis to choose from after successful completion of the 
interview. The analysis employed for this purpose is a combination of results from the 
semi-structured interview and the questionnaire at the same time when analysing the data. 
The reason for this combination is to get a fuller picture or knowledge about the issues in 
the study which is wider than that a single approach would have provided or to mutually 
confirm the findings of both approaches. Here, the qualitative and quantitative methods 
will complement each other on the issues in this study and this is regarded as the 
complementary compensation of the flaws and blind spot of each single method (Flick, 
2002).  The methodology will be explained in details in chapter three of this study. 
 
1.5  RESEARCH QUESTIONS   
 
These research questions were formulated before this study started in response to the 
Niger Delta conflict in Nigeria. The researcher addressed these research questions 
through a survey [1,200 questionnaires] of Nigerians and interviews [ten] with key people 
in Nigeria. These research questions are very timely and penetrating, in what has been, to 
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date, a very under-researched area – namely, investigating the flows and impacts of trust-
risk communication in agenda setting in a developing country.  
 
1.  To what extent can media exposure influence policy maker’s perception about public 
opinion on issues relating to the Niger Delta conflict? 
2.  Can media exposure shape the Nigerian public’s perception on policy issues relating 
to the Niger Delta conflict? 
3.  How effectively have the Nigerian media communicated risk issues on contemporary 
environmental degradation in the affected oil communities of the Niger Delta? 
4.  What are the issues of trust between the Nigerian government, oil companies and the 
oil affected communities? 
5.  Are there any strengths or weaknesses of media exposure in influencing the Nigerian 
government’s policy relating to the Niger Delta conflict? 
 
1.6  SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
The researcher has answered the research questions that were formed at the start of this 
study breaking new grounds in the research field of media and communication, thereby 
adding to the existing body of literature. Existing literatures on policy agenda-setting, risk 
communication and trust tends to focus on the west - it is worth noting here that the 
achievement or failure of attempts at dealing with risk in the industrialized west inheres 
with Africa. In order to further the field of risk-trust communication both in the west and 
Africa, this research from the Niger-Delta context has produced results on issues / levels 
of trust in key institutions such as oil companies, politicians, government, media and 
other relevant institutions that may act to amplify or attenuate risk communication. The 
study has unveiled an understanding of the conceptual perspectives of risk that will help 
to shape the Nigerian public policy field on risk issues. However, understanding issues of 
trust for institutions and risk perception on environmental degradation from Nigeria’s 
Niger Delta perspective, the researcher has discovered through Nigerians’ response via 
field work the extent to which policy-agenda setting by competing establishments [media, 
public and policy-makers] can work in this study or studies similar to this. In the 
 11 
literature review [in Chapter Two], new routes are created to address the gaps in several 
academic literatures used in this study; thus, this will add to the existing body of 
knowledge. This research will certainly be of benefit to the Nigerian government on the 
direction of policy in the Niger Delta region on risk issues and also help policy-makers to 
work within Nigerians’ response and understanding in ameliorating the web of issues the 
crisis has mobilised while allowing voices of indigenous oil host communities to be 
heard. In addition, my study has exposed the focal areas of the crisis that needs effective 
conflict management skills and resolution that will assist government / policy makers, 
media, oil companies and individuals in the crisis-affected areas to a great extent in 
ameliorating the crisis and bring development and lasting peace to the region through its 
outcome. Key findings are presented in chapter four and five of this study. 
 
1.7 LIMITATION OF THIS STUDY 
 
In this study, there were limitations that prevented the researcher from conducting an 
extensive research especially before, during and after the field work of this study; these 
limitations include financial and time constraints. Before the field work actually started, 
the researcher had to wait for two months in search of finance to accommodate the travel 
and living expenses the field work would incur thereby consuming time which would 
have being used to advance the field work almost immediately. During the field work of 
this study, due to the limited amount of resources / funds available, the researcher could 
only afford to conduct ten interviews out of the proposed eighteen interviews in order to 
stay within the actual budget for this purpose and meet the set deadline for data collection 
and return date to the UK as the researcher was also engaged in conducting the qualitative 
aspect of this research. In other words, the researcher used eights weeks instead of the 
proposed twelve weeks for the field work, which was not enough considering the wide 
geographical areas used for the study; an extra four weeks would have given the 
researcher more time in the retrieval of more questionnaires and in conducting more 
interviews. After the field work, the researcher had to wait for another two months in 
order to meet the challenges of living expenses back in the UK before attending to the 
research work. These limitations were quite disturbing, discouraging and challenging; 
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however, it did not prevent the researcher from emerging with useful results / outcome of 
this study. It will be worth noting here that specific methodological limitations and how 
the researcher addressed them are discussed in chapter three.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.0 INTRODUTION  
 
This chapter critically reviewed pertinent academic oriented literatures on Media 
Exposure, Policy Agenda-Setting and Risk Communication in Nigeria’s Niger Delta 
region. Drawing on recent academic literatures on risk oriented theory, policy and media; 
key books, journal articles, newspaper publications and credible internet sources were 
consulted to help formulate needed theoretical frameworks and appropriateness of 
adopted research method.      
 
2.0. (i)   ETYMOLOGY OF RISK CONCEPT 
 
The term ‘risk’ has its definition in a vast range of distinct sub-disciplines and 
professions that have arisen from the ‘multitudinous’ realm of definitional uses given to 
the term (Althaus, 2005: 570). Risk as a concept was first coined by the early western 
explorers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Denney, 2005), with Giddens 
suggesting the term assimilated into the English language from the Portuguese and 
Spanish, and referred to sailing into uncharted waters (1999 in Althaus, 2005: 570). Rosa, 
citing Timmerman, believes it to derive from French in the 1660s, ‘which had been 
adopted (though its exact origins remain obscure)’ (2003: 64). Luhmann (1993: 9) asserts 
that the word risk originated in Germany in references in the pre-modern period and that 
the renaissance Latin term riscum had long been in existence (see Lupton, 1999 and 
Althaus, 2005), before the origin of Italian word ‘risco, riscare, rischiare’ meaning to 
cruise among dangerous rocks (Rosa, 2003: 64). 
 
Risk originated from the Arabic word risq meaning a gift from God which you draw 
profit (Wharton, 1992). The concept of risk first appeared in the Middle Ages and was 
connected to the evolving idea of maritime insurance (Taylor-Gooby and Zinn, 2006), 
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‘and was used to designate the perils that could compromise a voyage’ (Althaus, 2005: 
570). At that time, risk indicated the possibility of an objective danger, a force majeure, 
an act of God, a tempest or other dangers of the sea that could not be ascribed to wrongful 
conduct (Lupton, 1999). This idea of risk, therefore, disassociated the concept of human 
defect and accountability. Risk was not attributed to man made but was perceived as 
natural event, for example epidemic, storm, flood, failing harvest. As such, humans could 
hardly interpret or estimate the likelihood of such occurrences and take measures to 
abridge their impact (Denney, 2005, Lupton, 1999).  
 
2.1   RISK: AN INTRODUCTION   
 
In the pre-modern era, dangers and threats to humans was associated with war, hunger, 
cold, epidemic disease, pestilence and failing harvest. More specifically, the threats posed 
by demons, bands of brigands, wild dogs, evil portents (Denney, 2005) and subsequently, 
epidemic of such diseases as smallpox, typhoid, whooping cough, dysentery, syphilis 
constantly struck villages and towns, destroying their populations. At this time, dangers 
to life were deemed incalculable and were ascribed to external and supernatural causes. 
The description of everyday life and beliefs in historical and sociological context portrays 
how individuals dealt with danger, fear and hazard (Lupton, 1999: Beck, 1995). In late 
modernity, equally potentially lethal dangers have replaced that of previous era (Denney, 
2005). ‘The concept of risk is now widely used to explain deviations from the norm, 
misfortune and frightening events’ (Lupton, 1999: 3). Furthermore, the risk concept 
assumes human responsibility and that something can be done to avert disaster (Lupton: 
1999). 
 
Changes in the meanings and use of risk have always accompanied the advancement of 
human society (Taylor-Gooby and Zinn, 2006; Lupton, 1999; for citations, see Sahlins 
1974; Garnsey, 1988; Gallant; 1991). The concept of risk during the eighteenth century 
had begun to metamorphose into an arena of scientific calculation, drawing upon new 
mathematical concepts relating to probability. The advancement of the statistical 
calculations of risk and the growth of insurance in early industrialism meant that: 
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(Lupton, 1999), ‘Consequences that at first affect only the individual became “risk”, 
systematically caused, statistically describable and in that sense “predictable” types of 
events, which can therefore also be subjected to supra-individual and political rules of 
recognition, compensation and avoidance’ (Beck, 1992a: 99). In late modernity, the 
perception of risk was no longer attributed entirely to nature, but was also in human 
beings and their activities in society (Ewald 1993 cited in Lupton, 1999).  
 
This modernist notion of risk represented a new form of viewing the globe and the 
unforeseen consequences of industrialisation and its chaotic manifestation and 
contingencies, which have exerted a dominant and naturally unexpected influence on the 
difficulties and problems we face (Taylor-Gooby and Zinn, 2006). It assumed that the 
uncertainty and unforeseen outcomes may be the repercussion of human activities rather 
than attributing it to agencies beyond human control such as, luck, destiny, fate, divine 
agency or the indescribable intentions of the divine being mainly replacing earlier notions 
of fortuna or fate (Giddens, 1990; Taylor-Gooby and Zinn 2006; Lupton, 1999; Beck, 
1992).  
 
The concept of risk in late modernity has attracted intense study from social scientists - 
for two core purposes. The first is the increasing complexities of modern technologies 
and of the organisations that govern our lives. Deficiencies of modernisation and 
technology are well publicized. This applies to the Thalidomide tragedy (emerging in 
1962), Bhopal (1984), Chernobyl (1986), Exxon Valdez oil spill (1989), BSE outbreak 
from 1986 to 1996, GM crops and the Columbia space shuttle in 2003, Oil spill from 
sunken rig in United States (US) (2010), Icelandic volcano cloud and its impact on air 
travel in Europe (2010). These events depict how risk has accompanied technical 
advancement and revealed the shortcomings of organisations for managing the resulting 
uncertainty (Taylor-Gooby and Zinn, 2006; see also Huges et al, 2006). Technical 
developments are constantly associated with issues of uncertainty. ‘It is the increasing 
complexity of the processes involved, both in terms of the coordination of myriad 
activities in planning and in terms of the institutions through which risk are governed’, 
and the prevalence in public knowledge of weaknesses in risk management that account 
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for the peculiar contemporary force of risk concept (Taylor-Gooby and Zinn, 2006: 2). 
Second, alongside the proof that uncertainty and risk are endemic, and that contemporary 
technology and social organisations are unable to eradicate it, it is rapidly acknowledged 
that risk and uncertainty also involve socio-political questions of adequacy and of 
challenge. The capacity for resolution through technical resources alone is limited, once 
risk issues become politicized (Taylor-Gooby and Zinn, 2006).  
 
Modernist concepts of risk assert the idea that risk could be both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ 
(Althaus, 2005; Denney, 2006; Lupton, 1999). The concept of risk as it advanced in 
insurance is associated with ideas of damage and loss on the one hand and chance or 
probability on the other. These two sets of ideas originated in the notion of uncertainty 
such as accident, against which one insures oneself. From this viewpoint, risk is a neutral 
idea, ‘denoting the probability of something happening, combined with the magnitude of 
associated losses or gains’ (Lupton, 1999: 8). Towards the end of the twentieth century, 
the distinctions between risk and uncertainty or chance, tends to be somewhat lost. Risk 
has become a loose term in everyday parlance. Issues of probability calculations are not 
necessarily imperative to the colloquial use of risk (Althaus, 2005; Lupton, 1999). The 
positive aspect of risk, as Althaus contends, is no longer acknowledged and the term risk 
in every day language is largely associated with something negative (2005: 575; see also, 
Douglas, 1992; Lupton 1999). The term risk now stands for danger and ‘high risk means 
a lot of danger’ (Douglas, 1992; 24). Generally, risk is no longer related to positive 
outcomes but related only to undesirable or negative outcomes, especially when it is 
related to technical assessment of risk (Lupton, 1999). The dilemma that instantaneously 
appears from the ‘increased emphasis on the positive and negative aspects of risk is the 
question of how to balance risk against advantage’ (Taylor-Gooby and Zinn, 2006:7).  
 
The colloquial use of risk by lay people tends to almost exclusively refer to a danger, 
hazard, threat and harm. As a consequence, human perception of risk and cognitive 
capabilities are inherently incomplete. Thus, an apparatus of expert research, awareness 
and opinion has expanded around the concept of risk: risk communication, risk 
management, risk analysis and risk assessment are all important disciplines of research 
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practice, used to calculate and control risk in different fields as far-ranging as economics, 
public health, anthropology, business, law, mathematics, medicine and industry (Rosa, 
2003; Lupton 1999; Althaus, 2005). Modernists have also pointed to transformations in 
the nature of risks, as they contend, risks have become more globalized, less identifiable, 
and more severe in their consequences and therefore cannot be easily controlled and are 
anxiety-provoking (Beck, 1992; Lupton 1999).  
 
According to Lupton, it may be argued that in late modernity the obsession with the idea 
of risk has its foundations in the transformation of societies from pre-industrialism to 
early industrialism to late industrialism (1999: 10; see also Beck 1992b). In her writing, 
she also acknowledged that these transformations in societies are accompanied with an 
increasing sense of uncertainty, complexity, ambivalence and disorder, an increasing 
distrust of traditional authorities and social institutions and a growing knowledge of the 
threats inherent in everyday life. The concept of risk has metamorphosed into an 
atmosphere of fear, anxiety and uncertainty. Concern about risk has increased because of 
a general mood of dissatisfaction and disorientation, ‘a sense that we are living in a time 
of endings and major disruptive change’ (Lupton, 1999: 12). 
 
2.2   ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONCEPTS OF RISK 
 
Philosophical debate surrounds risk literature on ontological (metaphysical) and 
epistemological (knowledge) concepts of risk. Thompson questions if risk is classified as 
a metaphysical or epistemological concept. He provides the following definitions that are 
widely used in different risk literature to differentiate these risk phenomena. First, 
subjective risk: the psychological position of a person who experiences uncertainty as to 
the outcome of a given occurrence. Second, objective risk: the difference in occurrence 
when actual losses differ from expected losses. Third, real risk: the combination of 
harmful outcome and probability that exist in the real world. Fourth, observed risk: the 
calculation of that combination obtained by creating a model of real world. Fifth: 
perceived risk: the rough estimate made by lay-people of the general public (1986 in 
Althaus, 2005). Embedded in these definitions is a particular difference between an 
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ontological approach, risk as a reality that is present in its own right in the world (e.g., 
objective risk and real risk), and epistemological approach, risk as a reality by virtue of 
human judgement or applying some knowledge to uncertainty (e.g., subjective risk, 
observed risk, perceived risk) (Althaus, 2005; Rosa, 2003). The epistemological reality of 
risk exists by virtue of judgments made under conditions of uncertainty. From an 
economics perspective, the epistemological concept of risk and uncertainty relates to the 
unknown, but that risk is an attempt to manage the unknown by virtue of knowledge 
based on the orderliness of the world and uncertainty cannot be managed or predicted 
because of its totally random nature (Althaus, 2005).      
                    
2.3   CONCEPTUALIZING RISK 
 
In social scientific literature, risk phenomenon can be addressed in a number of ways. 
The most common is the realist approach to risk perspective, which has developed and is 
mainly expressed in technico-scientific approaches. Cognitive science based in 
psychology principally adopts this approach. An alternative perspective is that of social 
constructionism, supported by those who are principally interested in the cultural and 
social aspects of risk. These contrasting perspectives will be analysed in this section 
using the epistemological approach in which they are based and the distinctive ways in 
which risk is perceived and represented from an interdisciplinary research area (Lupton, 
1999). 
 
2.3.1 THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 
 
Technico-scientific approach to risk, originated from different disciplines such as 
psychology, mathematics and statistics, engineering, epidemiology and economics. They 
convey together the concept of danger with calculations of probability. Experts and 
commentators in these fields assert that risk is an outcome of probability and 
consequences of an undesirable occurrence (Bradbury, 1989; 382 in Lupton, 1999). In the 
technico-scientific field, expert and lay people controversy tends to centre around the 
magnitude of severity of a risk in terms of its possible consequences, how precisely a risk 
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has been calculated and identified, how correct is the science that has been consulted to 
measure and calculate risk and what are the predictive models that have been designed to 
know why risks occur and how individuals respond to them in certain ways. Much of 
technico-scientific literatures address issues such as disparity between government 
institutions, the public, and scientific and industrial arenas in relation to environmental 
and health risks associated with science, industry and technology (Lupton, 1999; Althaus, 
2005).  
 
In early and late modernity the general public have become more concerned about the 
activities of industry and government, literatures on risk addressing this conflict tends to 
identify the psychological and social factors influencing greater public cynicism, distrust 
of institutions, blame, defensive mechanism and individuals’ vulnerability and other 
aspects of cognition and motivation that differentiate risk behaviour (Lupton, 1999; 
Althaus, 2005). The objective of the technico-scientific approach is to facilitate 
understanding between the general public and institutions, ‘and as Brown puts it, to 
provide a route out of ever growing bitterness of clashes between affected publics and the 
managing institutions’ (1989 in Lupton, 1999: 18).  
 
Risks, according to technico-scientific models, are pre-existing in nature and can only be 
identified through scientific calculation and measurement and managed through this 
knowledge. The cognitive science approach mostly adopts psychological models of 
human behaviour to understand how individuals react to risk cognitively and 
behaviourally. Psychological models also address the contrasting views of the subjective 
understanding of lay people vis-à-vis the objective scientific view of risk as they are 
calculated by experts (Althaus, 2005; Lupton, 1999). A number of cognitive science 
researchers have adopted the psychometric perspective to identify how cognitive factors 
influence and shape lay responses to risk (Lupton, 1999). These researchers attempt to 
identify the mental model or heuristics, which uses the conventional notion of rational 
decision-making to identify cognitive biases in lay people’s judgement. The principal 
concept is that individuals develop theoretical structures that correspond to risks as they 
understand them. These conceptual structures may be more or less accurate, thus, this 
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approach seeks to investigate how individuals construct accounts of reality (Slovic, 1987; 
Zinn and Taylor-Gooby, 2006).  
 
Psychometric researchers have constructed a taxonomy by which hazards or dangers are 
categorized and dealt with cognitively. They contend that lay people find it difficult to 
assess risk using probability because they under-estimate and over-estimate some 
categories of risk (Lupton, 1999). Von Winterfeldt, John, and Borcherding assert that 
‘risk with low probability but high consequences would be perceived as more threatening 
than more probable risk with low medium consequences’ (1981 cited in Zinn and Taylor-
Gooby, 2006: 30). Psychometric researchers note that occurrences that attract a high level 
of media attention increase more public concern than those that do not, even if they are 
relatively rare events; dangers that occur in clusters are deemed more severe than an 
equivalent number of occurrences that happen over an extended period of time; and the 
outcome of disasters that happens immediately provoke more concern than those that are 
delayed, people dread risk that are perceived as unacceptable (grave consequence) to 
society. Psychometric researchers in attempting to investigate people’s responses to risk 
in social and cultural group membership, found out that people of social group that are 
less powerful tend to be more worried than people of powerful social group (Lupton, 
1999). Psychometric analysis aims at the individual rational behaviour underpinned by 
effective philosophy that specifies individuals as self-interested calculating actors 
(Althaus, 2005). 
 
2.3.2 SOCIOCULTURAL PERSPECTIVE  
 
Sociocultural perspectives on risk assert the very aspect technico-scientific and cognitive 
science approaches have being condemned for ignoring (Lupton, 1999). The sociocultural 
perspective aims at the individual’s perception and response to risk based on their 
sociocultural background and identity as a member in a social group, rather than through 
individual understanding (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982). Risk can be defined from the 
sociocultural approach as a ‘socially constructed phenomenon although it has some roots 
in nature’ (Zinn and Taylor-Gooby, 2006: 37). The ways in which society or particular 
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groups perceive risk are embedded in their social institutions (Zinn and Taylor-Gooby, 
2006). The sociocultural dimensions on risk according to Lupton (1999) can be divided 
into three major groups. First, Mary Douglas and her colleagues that constitutes the 
cultural / symbolic perspective on risk. Second, the risk society group that principally 
constitutes the work of sociologists Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens. Third, the 
governmentality theorists who are inspired by the writings of French philosopher Michel 
Foucault.  
 
2.3.2 (i) THE CULTURALIST POSITION  
 
The culturalist perspective on risk is largely drawn from the works of Mary Douglas 
(Althaus, 2005), which constitutes an anthropological or cultural-based approach to risk 
(Denny, 2005). The contemporary awareness of risk and the growth of social movements 
opposing technical advancement from last decade have shifted in the institutional culture 
of society, rather than events of new risks. Complex historical transformations have led to 
increased mobilization of society or citizen’s institutions opposing big government, 
organisations, market values and big money (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; see also 
Zinn and Taylor-gooby, 2006). According to Althaus, whenever risk is associated within 
a socio-cultural context, risk becomes politicized (2005: 575). The modern concern with 
risk is part of a societal backlash against large organisations, ‘the political pressure that is 
brought to bear in relation to risk disputes is largely against exposing others to risk’ 
(Lupton, 1999: 48). This pressure is therefore centred on large institutions to blame and 
less on society or individuals (Lupton, 1999). Environmental activists and society blame 
and demonise particular industries and government department over risk associated with 
ecological degradation and pollution (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982).   
         
These concerns are basically cultural rather than individual. Individual choices are 
usually not independent especially about big political issues, they come already prepared 
with culturally learned assumptions and weightings when faced with estimating 
probability and credibility (Douglas, 1992). According to Lupton, the society or lay 
people’s responses to risk should not be seen as biased if they are different from expert 
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assessment. ‘Rather, their use and value within a particular cultural context needs to be 
acknowledged’ (1999: 37). However, culture does not only assist individuals calculate 
risks but also adds to a mutual rather than an individualistic concept of risk, taking into 
account communal responsibility and expectations.  
 
‘A community uses its shared, accumulated experience to determine which 
foreseeable losses are most probable, which probable losses will be most 
harmful, and which harms may be preventable. A community also set up 
actors’ model of the world and its scale of values by which different 
consequences are reckoned grave or trivial’ (Lupton, 1999: 38).  
 
Douglas and Wildavsky constructed a framework for analysing how logic of risk is 
expressed in a social institution along the two dimensions of ‘grid’ and ‘group’ model 
(1982 in Althaus, 2005: 575; Denny, 2005; Zinn and Taylor-gooby, 2006). The grid 
group indexes represent the boundary individuals have created between themselves and 
the outside world. The grid and group represent a taxonomy of culture that help to 
understand how people’s experience can determine the way in which risk is perceived 
(Denny, 2005). The group index constitutes two types of group, those with high group 
affiliation and those with a low group affiliation. The high group asserts solidarity 
amongst group members and make strong divisions between the members of the group 
and the world outside the group, while the low group has weaker ties with others and 
emphasizes individuality (Lupton, 1999). The grid index is a set of rules which govern 
the way individuals behave to one another. The grid model constitutes two types, high 
grid and low grid (Danney, 2005). “‘High grid’ are subject to a large number of cultural 
constraints, while those who are ‘low grid’ have few constraints shaping their actions” 
(Lupton, 1999: 50-1).   
 
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) identifies four ideal types of combined grid and group 
indexes with respect to risk. They include: hierarchists (high group and high grid) have 
respect for authority and conforms to the dominant societal norms and trust established 
institutions; egalitarians (low grid and high group) they tend to strongly identity with 
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their groups and hold outsiders responsible for risk; individualists (low grid and low 
group) they trust individuals rather than organisations, self regulation of risk, dislike 
external constraints, individualistic and entrepreneurial and see the benefits of taking 
risks, often in profit-making terms as well as dangers with it; fatalist (high grid and low 
group) their approach to risk lack group cohesion, they tend to trust in fate and luck in 
relation to risk and because there is very little they can do to control it (for citations see, 
Lupton, 1999; Zinn and Taylor-Gooby, 2006, Althaus, 2005, Denny, 2005, Adams, 
1995). However, the overarching contribution of the culturalist position is that risk 
perception is political and public debates about risk are inevitably debates about politics 
(Althaus, 2005). My research did not investigate the culturalist model; however, the 
culturalist position on risk and responses is still controversial and the main problem is 
that culturalist approach interprets culture as an ‘additional and independent, not as a 
general underlying factor’ (Zinn and Taylor-Gooby, 2006: 38). 
 
2.3.2 (ii) THE RISK SOCIETY POSITION 
 
Risk society has been conceptualized by Beck (1992; 1995; 1996) and seconded by 
Giddens (1990; 1994; 1998). Beck’s work on risk society (1992) has been influential in 
the field of theorizing risk (see also Zinn and Taylor-Gooby, 2006). Beck asserts that the 
production of wealth has been accompanied by that of risks as an outcome of 
modernization. Beck also acknowledges that industrial societies are becoming risk 
societies in contemporary western societies (Beck, 1992b: 19). Controversies over risk 
issues in these societies have begun to dominate public, private and political sphere. 
Individuals in these industrialized societies have a greater knowledge of risk and are 
meant to deal with risk on a daily basis (Lupton, 1999). However, Beck claims that risks 
associated with modernization are irreversible threats to mankind, plants and animals. In 
his writing, he demonstrates that the nature of modern risk cannot be measured spatially, 
temporally and socially; and that individuals in industrial societies are constantly faced 
with threats on an unprecedented scale which is often open-ended, rather than 
occurrences which have a foreseeable end (Beck, 1992b, 13-23; 1995: 13). 
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Beck differentiates risks in three epochs: pre-modern era or pre-industrialism, early 
modern era or early industrialism and late modern era or late industrialism (1992b: 3). 
Beck describes risks in the pre-modern era as threats such as famine, plague, natural 
disasters, and wars which were attributed to external or supernatural forces and were 
deemed incalculable. In the early modern era, these threats were now changed into 
calculable risk due to advancement of instrumental rational control, while in late 
modernity the processes of calculating threats and risk fail in risk society (1995: 30 see 
also Lupton, 1999). According to Beck, risk in late industrialism cannot be easily 
predicted or calculated because of its non-localised nature and long term effect. He 
further stressed that risk and threats in late modernity cannot be prevented by any 
organisation or compensated for its damages, given the degree of the threat (1996b: 31). 
Giddens acknowledged in his writing that risks in late industrialism are far more 
hazardous and widespread than in previous eras. He termed late industrialism ‘as a risk 
culture’, thereby distinguishing it from previous eras because risk awareness in late 
industrialism is linked to the threats associated with human activities (1991: 3). Giddens 
contends that people in late industrialism are not more exposed to risk or are more 
concerned about threat to life than they were in previous eras; however, people in 
previous eras were also faced with threat to life such as catastrophe destroying mankind 
and the world on different time scales (1991, 121-2). Lupton in accordance with Giddens 
demonstrates that threat to life in late modernity is linked to the role human intervention 
has played, ‘resulting in nature ‘striking back’ for having been so cruelly treated or 
inappropriately managed’ (Lupton, 1999: 65).     
  
Risk in late modernity largely escapes perception. Unlike in previous eras, when risks and 
threats were thus perceptible to the senses, risk have now transformed into sphere of 
physical and chemical formulas such as nuclear threat, toxins in food (Beck, 1992b: 21). 
Thus, these threats exist in scientific knowledge rather than in everyday experience 
(Lupton, 1999). According to Giddens, knowledge has generated greater uncertainty, the 
fact that experts disagree has become a known position for almost everyone (1994, 186). 
Hence lay people in industrial societies can no longer depend on ordinary knowledge, 
traditional belief, observation, religious precepts and other forms of practice to evaluate 
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their daily lives, as they did in previous eras, instead they must rely on experts they do 
not know and are unlikely to ever meet for directions, despite the growing knowledge that 
experts tend to contradict each other and make mistake when calculating risk (Lupton, 
1999; Denny, 2005; for more on experts’ contradictions and impacts on public 
perceptions of risk, see Bennett, 2005; Collins and Pinch, 1998; Irwin and Wynne, 1996). 
In contemporary society, lay people see science and industry as responsible for the threats 
about which they are concerned (Denny, 2005). ‘Scientists have therefore lost authority 
in relation to risk assessments: scientific calculations are challenged more and more by 
political groups and activists’ (Becks, 1995 in Lupton 1999: 64).  
 
In late modernity risks and threats are ascribed to be humanly generated rather than 
supernatural and external forces; these modern catastrophes are considered as the 
responsibility of humans to control and avert (Beck, 1992b; Giddens, 1990). Notably, the 
related occurrences of industrialization, globalization, urbanization and modernization 
and the setbacks of events are constantly confronted and challenged. By these processes, 
Beck note that risk societies have transcended into world risk society, in which the 
gravity of risks and threats confronting humanity has created a new type of citizenship, 
‘global citizenship’, which have metamorphosed into new ‘alliances of ad hoc activist 
groups’, a new and distinct kind of politics beyond conventional chain of command 
(1996b, 2; see also Lupton, 1999, 66). The risk society perspective has been criticized in 
terms of empirical and theoretical evidence (Zinn and Taylor-Gooby, 2006; see Tulloch 
and Lupton, 2003; Lash, 1994; Elliott, 2002). Beck and Giddens notion on the wide 
spread use of risk language due to the consequences of technical advancement in modern 
societies and existential situation of humans and their world may be misleading (Rose, 
1996). Other criticisms put forward are that Beck’s and Giddens’ perspectives have broad 
and loose assumptions about structural and institutional advancements, without 
grounding these specifically enough in the real circumstances and experiences of 
organisational and everyday life. Despite these criticisms, Beck and Giddens perspectives 
on risk in modern societies have been influential in Anglophone sociology (Lupton, 1999, 
82). Regardless of these deficiencies, Beck and Giddens perspectives on risk remains 
relevant to my research as technical advancement / operations of oil multinationals in 
 26 
Nigeria’s Niger Delta region due to the production of wealth has been accompanied by 
that of risk.  
 
2.3.2 (iii) GOVERNMNETALITY POSITION            
 
The governmentality approach largely constitutes the work of Foucault (1991). In late 
modernity, states have developed up to date techniques for overseeing their citizens and 
achieving national goals (Gordon, 1991; Zinn and Taylor-Gooby, 2006). Risk from this 
perspective may be understood as governmental scheme of regulatory power by which 
citizens are under surveillance and managed through the aspirations of neo-liberalism 
(Lupton, 1999). Thus, ‘the increasing amount of risk communication in society is 
therefore understood as the result of the growing influence of neo-liberal strategies of 
government’ (Zinn and Taylor-Gooby, 2006: 45). Risk is governed through a large 
network of interactive experts, organisations, practices and knowledges. Information 
about diverse risks is gathered and analysed by different professionals such as 
environmental scientist, legal practitioners, statisticians, sociologists, medical researchers 
and other disciplines. Through these unending efforts, risk is considered problematic, 
rendered governable and calculable. Also, through these efforts, certain ‘social groups are 
identified as ‘at risk’ or ‘high risk’, requiring particular forms of knowledges and 
interventions’ (Lupton, 1999: 87).  
 
The aim of governmentality is not to confront a strong dangerous situation, but to foresee 
all possible forms of ‘irruption’ of risk. This preventative measure that constitutes the 
social policy are now mainly used not only by citizens or individuals needing assistance 
by the state, but by permutation of factors which constitutes risk assessment that 
concentrate on the summative population and not the individual. Such state or 
government activities are carried out on the supposed possibility of consulting risk 
science as a basis for reducing harm to citizens of the state. ‘The control of these 
probabilities, and protection of individuals from risk, becomes the responsibility of inter-
locking agencies with varying levels of direct connection with the state’ (Denney, 2005: 
35). The citizen of the state is no longer treated in a holistic manner but a carrier of 
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indicators which qualify his or her relationship to a particular group or another which is 
considered as at risk or risky. Specific safety policies were introduced most prominently 
social insurance, which supersede the previous class in mercantile society or specific 
institutions (Zinn and Taylor-Gooby, 2006). Citizens are now active rather than passive 
subjects in government discourse of governance. Rather than externally monitored by 
inter-locking institutions which are directly connected to the state, individuals monitor 
themselves, they exercise authority upon themselves as standardized subjects who are in 
search of their own freedom, best interests and improvement, seeking a healthy and 
happy life (Lupton, 1999).   
 
Within the conceptual framework of Foucauldian perspective, risk and safety are seen as 
fundamental facet of authority and domination and a plan for the government of societies 
(Zinn and Taylor-Gooby, 2006), which have therefore added to the manufacturing of 
certain kinds of rationalities, schemes and subjectivity (Lupton, 1999). Risk is thus not 
considered as an objective fact; rather it represents a particular approach in which aspects 
of reality can be theorized and deemed controllable (Zinn and Taylor-Gooby, 2006). It is 
this schemes and discourses that bring risk into existence, ‘that select certain phenomena 
as being ‘risky’ and therefore requiring management, either by institutions or individuals’ 
(Lupton, 1999: 102). The governmentality approach has been criticized as over-
dependent on a top-down functionalism that tends to elucidate social advancement in 
requisites of the demands of government and other powerful agencies, to see individuals 
as inherently exposed to manoeuvring and to have an under-developed account of 
institution (Zinn and Taylor-Gooby, 2006). Despite these criticisms, the governmentality 
perspective is imperative to my research because state control and regulations is an 
effective way to oversee the welfare of its citizens and managing the local or national 
resources within a well developed state, hence it is the responsibility of the government to 
be strong in enforcing its laws to protect citizens from harm (Greene, 2006).  
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2.3.2 (iv) SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST POSITION 
 
The social constructionist position will be largely drawn from the work of Deborah 
Lupton (1999), because her research best depicts the social constructionist perspective. 
This approach to risk has its root in the sociology of knowledge, science and technology 
and conceptualizing from poststructuralist perspectives. Social constructionists contend 
that humans exist in a social world through interactive relationships, in which each 
transforms the other. However, individuals’ experiences in the social and material world 
are objective and pre-existing realities; these realities constitute the reproduction of 
knowledges and meanings through interactive social relationships and rely upon shared 
definitions. Through individuals’ socialisation in the society, the nature of reality is 
continually constructed and its meanings are unstable and subject to change. From this 
approach, knowledge about risks is generated in a sociocultural context, whether in 
relation to expert, scientist or lay people’s knowledge. Thus, risk is therefore not a 
stagnant, objective phenomenon, but is steadily negotiated and constructed through social 
interaction and the development of meanings (Lupton, 1999). 
 
Discourse about risk from this approach involves questions of how cultures are 
represented and defined, and the political stand point in relation to risk. The weak social 
constructionist position sees risk as objective hazards, threats or danger that is mediated, 
perceived and responded to in certain ways through social, cultural and political 
processes. The strong social constructionist position also sees risk as socially constructed 
but only acknowledged as risk when human actors identify and tag it as such. However, 
issues of public debates on risk construction are rarely centred on lay people’s knowledge 
but rather on expert knowledge particularly those emanating from science and other 
relevant discipline embedded within institutional context, which are central to the 
formation and publicizing of risk. Experts do not ascribe their knowledge to be culturally 
shaped but prefer to present them as objective universal truth. Nonetheless, “if a ‘risk’ is 
understood as a product of perception and cultural understanding, then to draw a 
distinction between ‘real’ risks (as measured and identified by ‘experts’) and ‘false’ risk 
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(as perceived by members of the public) is irrelevant”, because these perspectives are 
describing pattern of risk, and they lead to certain actions (Lupton, 1999: 33).   
 
2.4 THEORITICAL FRAMEWORKS: POLICY, RISK AND MEDIA 
 
Linking together the media, risk and policy change, there are two vital research traditions 
– namely, social amplification of risk (SARF) and policy agenda setting (Bakir, 2006). 
These will be elucidated below.  
 
2.4.1 POLICY AGENDA-SETTING 
 
Located within the research paradigm of agenda setting, the word agenda indicates the 
pertinent and relevant issues which are discussed and prioritized in society (Porche, 
2004). In other words, agenda is a list of events and issues that are ranked in a hierarchy 
of significance in society (Rogers and Dearing, 1988; also see Birkland, 1997). Societies 
direct their attention, establish agendas and set their priorities for action towards societal 
conflict because problems are diversified and endless (Berger, 2001). In the process of 
policy formulation, decision or policy makers must be aware of the competing agendas 
that may be responsible for influencing the public’s opinion (Porche, 2004). Generally, 
agenda setting in relation to policy can be classified into three subfields: media agenda 
setting, the public’s agenda setting and policy agenda setting (Rushefsky and Patel, 1998; 
Porche, 2004). The plethora of quantitatively-oriented research articles on agenda setting 
has conceptualized either media agenda setting, public agenda setting, or policy agenda 
setting as the dependent variable (Rushefsky and Patel, 1998; Rogers and Dearing, 1988) 
in order to elucidate how it is influenced by other factors (Whitney, 1991).  
 
In the agenda setting framework – what it means to set the agenda – indicates different 
meanings in each field (Swanson, 1988). The salience of an issue must be increased for 
public agenda setting to take place. For media agenda setting to occur, issues must be 
given a significant amount of media coverage, which indicates the extent to which the 
media agenda has been set. By extension, policy agenda-setting is marked by the 
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emergence, and importance of the issues or events in the public policy field (Rogers and 
Dearing, 1988 cited in Whitney, 1991: 348). To reinforce this emphasis made by Whitney 
(1991), much of the agenda setting scholarly articles demonstrates that the agenda setting 
process links the activities of public and media agendas in policy development (Berger, 
2001, also see Rogers and Dearing, 1988). Thus, theory of policy agenda-setting asserts 
that the media draw public attention to significant societal issues and problem; ‘this 
media agenda influences the public’s awareness of, and concerns about, such issues; in 
turn, the public agenda may influence the policy agenda and policy implementation’ 
(Berger, 2001: 94).         
 
The media play a vital role in influencing the public’s opinion on issues which gain 
primacy in the society, thereby constructing policy agenda setting framework (McCombs 
and Shaw, 1972). ‘Policy agenda-setting research suggests that the media influence the 
transferral of items from media to policy agendas’ (Bakir, 2006: 3). The mass media 
shape policy process by influencing government agencies and key players. Thus, the 
media are an imperative requisite in informing policy choices, however, the media play a 
significant role at every stage of decision making especially in cases of immediate crisis 
or national issues (O’Heffernan, 1991). There are two structural processes as a result of 
media exposure that influences policy agenda – namely, priming and framing (Porche, 
2004, see also Rogers and Dearing, 1988). Priming employs the cognitive psychology 
process the media uses to construct an idea in a person’s or the public’s mind by 
increasing the salience of an issue through semantic pathways or previously acquired 
information (Porche, 2004). The media uses this process to retrieve and store information 
(Rogers and Dearing, 1988) in the mind and also prepare its audience or readers for what 
the media intend to mediate in the future (Porche, 2004). Consequently, priming 
constructs public attitudes through media agenda-setting by showing or attracting an 
individual’s attention to significant issues (Rogers and Dearing, 1988).  
 
Framing is the method the media use to focus the general public’s attention to a particular 
aspect of an issue, thereby shaping the public’s opinion on issues to be discussed and 
prioritized in the society (Porche, 2004; see also Bakir, 2006). In addition, framing is the 
 31 
selection of some features of perceived reality and the construction of them to be more 
salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a specific quandary 
definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and / or treatment recommendation for 
the item depicted (Oladeinde and Ajibola, 2008). For example, during the BSE (Mad 
Cow disease) crisis, the media attracted public attention to the government’s deceptive 
and nonchalant concern for public health. This framing was highly discussed and 
prioritized in the society and it eventually gave way for opposition and critical voices or 
groups to set the agenda (Hughes et al, 2006).  
 
Literatures on public agenda setting indicates that the media construct public agenda 
through media exposure, by influencing what is news and who and what is newsworthy 
(Porche, 2004). The mass media channel their attention to issues that will inform the 
public on what they should know, think and have feelings about. This hypothesized 
function of the media does not tell its audience or readers what to think but what to think 
about (Nwanne, 2006; McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Rogers and Dearing, 1988). ‘While 
the mass media may have little influence on the direction or intensity of attitudes, it is 
hypothesized that the mass media set the agenda for each political campaign, influencing 
the salience of attitudes toward the political issue’ (McCombs and Shaw, 1972: 177).  
 
The policy agenda setting framework constitutes two types of inputs: demand and 
support. When certain demands by individuals or groups are not met by the authority 
involved, the outcome is supported either through protest, demonstration or strike action, 
which then becomes an issue that can assist in elevating the demands to policy agenda 
status. Notably, not all demands brought forward by these groups are considered issues 
and not all issues are deemed fit for policy agenda of the governing body or political 
system. This is because of the amount of resources controlled by different groups and 
institutions; thus, the media have different ways of assessing the credibility of 
organisational groups (Bauer et al, 1963 in Rushefsky and Patel, 1998).  
 
The work of Cobb and Elder dealt directly with the policy agenda building process. They 
assert that ‘an issue is a conflict between two or more identifiable groups over procedural 
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or substantive matters relating to the distribution of positions or resources’ (cited in 
Rushefsky and Patel, 1998: 19). Within the policy domain is the policy community that 
consist of interest groups (Birkland, 1997), which can be classified into two subheadings: 
pluralist and elite (Reese, 1991). According to the pluralist approach, power is viewed as 
directed to many competing groups that struggle with one another to have their 
preferences and interest placed on the policy agenda thereby establishing political 
stability. Most studies have criticized the pluralist approach for its failure to examine 
power explicitly (Rushefsky and Patel, 1998; Reese, 1991). The elite approach asserts 
that a well organised group of elite (from top-down) dominate the agenda setting process. 
These elite groups consist of the most powerful individuals in the society which always 
gets their issues placed on government policy agenda, and the media is viewed as both 
supporting and furthering the power of these elite groups (Rushefsky and Patel, 1998; 
Reese, 1991; Birkland, 1997).  
 
According to Cobb and Elder, issues get on the policy agenda through internal and 
external triggering devices. Internal triggering devices include unpredicted human 
occurrences, natural disaster, bias or imbalances in the allocation of resources, ecological 
and technological changes. External triggering devices consist of the act of war, 
international conflict and advancement in weapon technology. They also identified two 
types of agenda; first, the systematic agenda which deals with how political communities 
perceive issues that attract public attention and also involving matters within their 
legitimate territory of existing government authority. Second, the institutional agenda, 
which they defined as that set of items explicitly up for the active and serious 
consideration of authoritative decision-makers’ (cited in Rushefsky and Patel, 1998: 19).    
 
Unfortunately, the agenda-setting literature has been criticized for its obvious 
inconsistencies and unsound findings (Rogers and Dearing, 1988; Swanson, 1988 in 
Whitney, 1991). This is because only a few agenda-setting scholars have involved real 
world indicators in their analysis. Hence, the researcher has extracted two routes 
pertinent to this study from the agenda-setting literature to avoid spurious variables that 
might confuse the relationship between the media agenda- advancing toward- public 
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agenda-advancing toward- policy agenda (Rogers and Dearing, 1988; also see Ettema et 
al, study in Whitney, 1991). The first route examines how the public agenda, once set 
by, or echoed by (Rogers and Dearing, 1988), media exposure influence policy 
implementation or the agenda of decision makers (Berger, 2001; Bakir, 2006). Such 
influence of the media can be discerned into three categories. First, by disseminating 
information, the public’s agenda is influenced by the media, in turn influencing policy 
(Porche, 2004). Second, by exposing and analyzing issues, the media can help create 
policy image for the public. Third, through media coverage, ‘organised interests can 
channel their policy demands to wider constituencies, so increasing public pressure on 
policy by driving public concerns’ (for citations, see Bakir, 2006: 3).  
 
The second route identified, examines how media coverage influences policy by shaping 
elite decision makers’ perception of public opinion (Rogers and Dearing, 1988; Whitney, 
1991; Bakir, 2006). While these routes and causes of media influence are pertinent to this 
study, the policy agenda literature offers little research into the media’s role in setting 
policy agendas in risk issues, which reflects a pattern across other fields of study and not 
just those of risk – due to the difficulties, time and inaccessibility of policy making 
processes and complications in demonstrating causality. Hence, this study turns to the 
social amplification of risk framework (SARF) to grasp how public policy is impacted by 
risk communication (Bakir, 2006: 2008). 
 
2.4.2 SOCIAL AMPLIFICATION OF RISK FRAMEWORK (SARF) 
 
In recent years, concern over risk communication has become increasingly prevalent, 
drawing a global constituency of interest within government and industry alike (Horlick-
Jones et al, 2003). This is due to the rapid change in global economy, with an enormous 
expansion in contemporary media and communication technologies, and significant 
socio-cultural fragmentation (Petts et al, 2001). According to commentators, 
combinations of these transformations have produced politicization of risk issues (Beck, 
1992), the appearance of active consumer and a new tendency for moral panics (Horlick-
Jones et al, 2003; Petts et al, 2001). Risk communication emerged as a prerequisite to 
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bridge the gap between scientific / expert assessments of risk and measures to reduce risk 
to unconvinced lay audience (Frewer, 2000 in Bakir, 2006). Research in the field of risk 
communication has recently identified the apparent failure of the paternalistic top-down 
communication activities (Petts et al, 2001), emerging from public cynicism towards the 
intentions of scientific advisor, industrialist, politicians, and regulators (Frewer, 2004 
cited in Bakir, 2006). Consequently, risk communication aims to understand how risk 
knowledge is apparently exchanged within and between individuals in the society (Petts, 
et al, 2001): one outcome of this research is the SARF (Bakir, 2006).  
 
Social amplification of risk framework (SARF) was formulated in 1988 by Kasperson 
and colleagues from Clark University (Kasperson et al, 2003), as a response to the 
disjunctures between the different parts of risk research, to rectify the deficit of our 
knowledge about the social process that can mediate between a risk and its outcomes 
(Breakwell et al, 2001). Thus, the SARF framework describes the different dynamic of 
social process underlying risk response and perception embedded within risk 
amplification and attenuation. Risk amplification can be defined as the various processes 
that leads to hazards and events which experts assess as relatively low in risk but triggers 
socio-political activities and become a focus of interest and concern within a society, 
while risk attenuation can be described as hazards and events which experts assess as 
relatively high in risk but receive comparatively little attention from society (Petts et al, 
2001; Kasperson et al, 2003). Examples of major hazards subject to social attenuation of 
risk include smoking, exposure to radon gas or automobile accident (Kasperson et al, 
2003). On the other hand, social amplification of risk perceptions includes Bhopal (1984), 
Chernobyl (1986), and the BSE outbreak (Taylor-Gooby and Zinn, 2006).  
 
The social amplification of risk framework (SARF) starts from the concept of a risk-
related occurrence (Petts et al, 2001). These events pertaining to risks interact with a wide 
range of psychological, social, institutional and cultural processes which create 
interpretations that may heighten or attenuate risk perception and its manageability, 
thereby shaping risk behaviour (Murdock et al, 2003; Renn et al, 1992 in Breakwell et al, 
2001). The main thrust of SARF is that social and economic consequences of a risk 
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occurrence are determined by social and cultural processes rather than the physical harms 
of the event (such as the numbers of individuals and locations affected) (Barnett and 
Breakwell, 2003). Kasperson et al., argue that these socio-cultural processes (receiver, 
interpreter, sender) of  risk signals are transformed as they filter through stations of 
amplification (such as scientific institutions, politicians and government agency, media 
and pressure groups), leading to social intensification or attenuation of risk, sometimes 
generating ripple effects of secondary and tertiary consequences (such as stigmatisation, 
demands for regulatory action, loss of trust in authority) spreading far beyond the initial 
impact of the risk events (1988; 2003) and may even impinge upon previously unrelated 
institutions and technologies (Petts et al, 2001).   
 
The SARF specifies four major mechanisms of risk amplification: signal value, heuristics 
and value, stigmatization and social group relationship (Kasperson et al, 1988 cited in 
Bakir, 2006). Renn, Burns, Kasperson et al., suggest that signal value serves as a warning 
message for society about the seriousness or manageability of the risk (1992 in Kasperson 
et al, 2003; see also Bakir, 2006: 4). Stigmatization is the adverse public perception of an 
activity, product, technologies, places that are perceived to be excessively dangerous and 
thus, leads to avoidance or pessimistic behaviours (Kasperson et al, 2003). Heuristics and 
values are used by individuals to assess risk and shape responses to manage the difficulty 
of risk daily. However, as risk issues penetrate the schema of social and political groups, 
the nature of their social group relationships influence risk permutation and member 
responses (Bakir, 2006: 4). SARF is of paramount interest and concern for policy makers 
because of its integrated approach to risk communication that cuts across theoretical and 
disciplinary boundaries (Pidgeon, 1999 in Breakwell et al, 2001; Horlick-Jones et al., 
2003).   
 
Social amplification of risk framework (SARF) has proved influential in the risk 
literature and has assisted to initiate research activity; however, serious criticisms have 
emerged (Holick-Jones et al, 2003). Murdock et al., argue that the framework does not 
give a satisfactory account of risk communication and individual responses in modern 
democracies (2003). Similar criticism has been aired in connection with media response 
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to risk issues; they argued that SARF fails to consider the diversity of the media and its 
unique role as a symbolic information system. That is, lay public are not just receiver but 
rather their active voice and participation are vital in sense making dynamics (Horlick-
Jones et al, 2003). Hence, Rayner (1988) asserts that the framework does not give a full 
account of the complexity and richness of individual risk-related behaviour (cited in 
Horlick-Jones et al, 2003).  Thus, this research draws upon rather different intellectual 
roots, but distinct work, which has developed over a period of time. Specifically, the 
pragmatic approach to assessing SARF brings fresh insight in understanding the 
consequences of a risk-related event (Horlick-Jones et al, 2003) and also integration of 
insights drawn from studies of policy process and socio-political and economic analysis 
(Gowda, 2003). However, it is worth noting here that the media are only one of the social 
amplification stations mentioned in the SARF. It would therefore seem important in 
evaluating the utility of the framework in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region to consider the 
relationships between all of the levels of data that SARF identifies; the physical 
characteristics of a risk event, media coverage, public reaction, risk perception and 
societal impact (Burns et al, 1993 cited in Breakwells et al, 2001; Horlick-Jones et al, 
2003).   
 
2.4.3 THE MEDIA AND RISK 
 
Beck acknowledges that we now live in an era characterized by uncertainty which he 
termed risk society - an era obsessed with risk of ecological and natural disaster, 
accidents, technological errors, professional miscalculation and scientific uncertainty. 
Modern uncertainty has triggered public and political debate over defining risk as a 
concept (1995b: 5-7, see also Eldridge and Reilly, 2003) and the mass media are seen to 
play a key role in social transformation and channel through which risk-related events are 
mediated (Lundgren and McMakin, 2004). There is prevalent belief amongst sectors of 
risk community, industry, experts and government agencies that the media exert 
significant influence on people’s responses to risk. Sociological approaches suggest that 
the media facilitates the awareness of public risk consciousness. In spite of public 
reliance on the media for risk information, it soon became clear that public trust in media 
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started to decline (Zinn and Taylor-Gooby, 2006), as ‘the media are nearly almost 
perceived as negative influences in this regard, allegedly prone to dramatisation, 
distortion, sensationalism, misrepresentation, attention seeking’ and anti-science and 
technology (Petts et al, 2001: 2). Also, scientists often complain that the media 
exaggerate risks that pose small danger to the public and discard those that do (Hughes et 
al, 2006).  
 
Media reporting has been depicted to shift from emphasising risk in favour of offering 
reassurance to the public, although some commentators have argued that it is in crisis 
scenarios that this operates (Eldridge and Reilly, 2003; Sandman, 1997 in Petts et al, 
2001). The concept of media as amplifiers has proven to be complex; authors of SARF 
have themselves arrived at inconclusive evidence on the media as amplifiers. Several 
studies on risk occurrences for example, the 128 quantitative hazard event study 
conducted by Clark University and Decision research and qualitative study of six risk 
events carried out by Kasperson and colleagues, indicated that continuous and heavy 
media coverage did not of itself trigger risk amplification or considerable secondary 
effects, but rather downplayed the risks (Kasperson et al, 2003; Kasperson 1992; Petts et 
al, 2001). However, the studies were centred on hypothetical rather than actual 
occurrences and failed to address factors that influences individuals’ responses to real-life 
risks (Petts et al, 2001).  
 
However, studies on real life experience on risk events, for example bacterium yersinia 
pestis in Surat Indian, indicated that the media and other social network amplified the risk 
events and it led to secondary effects, while another risk event like the arsenic water 
pollution received comparatively low media coverage and the number of affected people 
and the scope of the infected area continued to rise over the time (Susarla, 2003). Thus, it 
is clear that media coverage on risk is selective, even if the risk event is newsworthy, 
hence news items may amplify or attenuate risk events because media selectivity on risk 
issues has real world impacts (Eldridge and Reilly, 2003; Susarla, 2003).The mass media 
are unevenly attracted to risk because the mainstream news media are poorly constructed 
to sustain attention of any specific future threat (Eldridge and Reilly, 2003). When a risk 
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is still hypothetical and there are no proven casualties to interview, a story will be less 
attractive to news media. This is because journalists are interested in the news of the day. 
However, risk reporting is influenced by the pace at which a threat unfolds and how 
evidence is marshalled and procedures launched as news events. Thus, the media will 
focus on events which involve many deaths rather than one that have a growing effect 
over a long time (Hughes et al, 2006: 255).  
 
Eldridge and Reilly gave three main reasons why the media do not encourage sustained 
risk coverage. First, risk is uncertain and scientific evidence is often inconclusive. 
Nonetheless, it is controversy, new and definitive findings that attracts the media rather 
than scientific uncertainty. Second, a risk related event may not be attractive or be of 
interest to journalist unless government or other official agencies implement policy and 
the precautionary principle. Third, risk is a concept based on future prediction and this is 
in conflict with the media news agenda that emphasizes the events of the day [fresh news 
story]. The media tend to ignore hypothetical and distant risk, even when it is a potential 
threat until the dangers are manifest in some ways. ‘The news media are better at 
retrospective than prospective reporting of risk, and retrospective risk reporting is 
inherently limited’ (2003: 140; for more on news story selection see Tuchman, 1978, 
Gans, 1979; Allan, 1999; Hausman, 1990 and Franklin et al, 2005).  
 
One route pertinent to this study is the model of risk communication based on Bourdieu’s 
(1998) metaphor of public communication as a field of play and competition (cited in 
Petts et al, 2001). This model is grounded in the metaphor of public communication 
where political organisations and public agencies concerned with risk are caught up in a 
continual challenge with other key stakeholders such as pressure groups and campaigning 
institutions, expert communities, opposition parties and corporations – to key in their 
preferred opinion and issues and to rally support at the level of both public views and 
actual everyday actions. This model introduces interactive model that brings major 
stakeholders concerned with risk to continually launch initiatives and respond to public 
and each other’s move. Thus, they communicate with the public (lay people) to allay fear 
of risk event via different means of communication - internet, poster campaign, mail 
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shots, however, for general purpose to reach a wider audience, these stakeholders ‘enter 
into exchange relations with journalists, bargaining information, images or 
announcements against publicity’ (Petts et al, 2001: 3). Consequently, the media remains 
essential to the political process and the engine room where battles over defining, 
identification and risk management are fought out (Bourdieu, 1998, Eldridge, 1999 cited 
in Petts et al, 2001).  
 
Although, the model of risk communication has succeeded in transforming audience from 
active to interactive (Hughes et al, 2006), one major challenge faced by risk 
communicators with this model is the rise of internet weblogs or blogs (Ashlin and Ladle, 
2006). Blogospheres create a communication avenue where information and views are 
exchanged, transformed and reworked with astonishing swiftness across international 
boundaries and time zones (Ladle, 2006). The growing ubiquity of the internet or 
blogosphere ‘shifts the balance between expert knowledge, everyday experience, and 
personal testimony and increases opportunities for public participation in debates around 
shared risks’ (Hughes et al, 2006: 266). Despite this prevalent embrace of weblogs, many 
scientists are not embracing it, probably because they are scared of intellectual property 
theft (Ashlin and Ladle, 2006). However, unlike the traditional news media, the content 
flow and different forms of uses are not easy to control because no gatekeepers, reviewers 
or authority exist to avert misrepresentation of a risk related event and also to filter the 
influence of uninformed, misleading and misguided weblogs or websites. Since it is 
difficult for experts or scientist to spot and correct errors in blogging discourse, the 
increasing popularity of blogs and related websites are viewed with considerable 
suspicion by both experts and lay public (Ashlin and Ladle, 2006; Ladle, 2006). Despite 
these challenges legitimate institutions - the media, government agencies, scientific 
communities, professional institutions, social movement and campaigning groups - 
source the internet to enhance feedback ‘as the basis for campaigns tailored to popular 
misconception and preoccupation’ (Hughes et al, 2006: 266).  
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2.4.4 INSTITUTIONAL CREDIBILITY AND SOCIAL TRUST 
 
From early to late modernity issues of trust and credibility have been raised in the risk 
field, especially the role of trust in people’s reactions to environmental and technological 
threats from both the policy communities and academic (Pidgeon et al, 2006). Several 
research projects conducted in United Kingdom (UK) revealed that public trust in expert, 
politicians, science and media has declined (Zinn and Taylor-Gooby, 2006; Covello et al, 
1989; Bakir and Barlow, 2007, Worcester, 2003; for polls on trust see, Trust in Media 
Poll conducted by BBC, Reuters, and Media Centre, 2006; Most trusted profession in 
MORI polls, 2007). Generating trust has become a priority for policy makers and 
researchers in the field of risk management, in order to gain public acceptance of policy 
decisions (Zinn and Taylor-Gooby, 2006). However, policy makers have become aware 
that the masses are key players in the recent risk controversies and that (dis)trust may 
play an important part of this (House of Lords, 2000; Cabinet Office, 2002 in Pidgeon et 
al, 2003). According to Petts et al., (2001), trust is recognised as an underpinning 
influence of risk perceptions and reactions to communication and information. Thus, 
abstract systems depend upon trust, hence, active trust must be won and maintained 
(Giddens, 1990, 1994b; Bakir and Barlow, 2007; see also Zinn and Taylor-Gooby, 2006). 
   
Beck (1992: 2) in his writing acknowledged that in reflexive modernization, societies are 
becoming more critical of the activities of organised irresponsibility of the industrial era 
that is systematically accompanied by that of risk, which have led to the production of 
modern threats (nuclear waste, genetically modified food, cloning and pollutant). 
Accordingly, individuals start to lose trust trying to measure what is rational and safe, 
knowing full well that in the industrial phase, risks are industrially manufactured, 
scientifically justifiable and economically externalised as companies do not pay for their 
pollution (Bakir and Barlow, 2007). For example, it is on record that oil companies like 
Shell and BP have a bad reputation of handling indigenous cultures and local people in 
their search for oil (Langford et al, 1999). Consequently, issues of trust and credibility of 
experts, pressure groups, lobbies and government are continuously raised (Bakir and 
Barlow, 2007). This is because more recently there has been much anxiety about 
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technological innovation which has amplified lay people’s concerns and responses to risk 
messages and their unwillingness to accept proposals for activities perceived as risky; 
mobilized social and political protests to avert risks; led to lay questioning of the 
competence and credibility of the decisions of authorities and risk regulators, and 
supports their selective use of information sources (Kasperson et al, 1992; Petts, 1992; 
1995; 1998; Flynn et al, 1993; Lofstedt and Horlick-Jones, 1999 cited in Petts et al, 
2001).  
 
‘Trust presupposes awareness of risk, offering reliability in the face of contingent 
outcomes and thereby serving to minimize concern about possible risk’ (Lupton, 1999: 
78). Giddens asserts that trust and risk are linked, noting that in the face of contingent 
outcomes trust serves to reduce the dangers to which specific types of activity are subject: 
‘What is seen as ‘acceptable’ risk – the – minimising of danger – varies in different 
contexts, but is usually central in sustaining trust’ (Giddens, 1990: 35). Trust, therefore, 
may be considered as a means of dealing with risk in a psychological manner that would 
otherwise lead to anxiety, dread feelings or discourage action. In everyday routine, most 
individuals find risk issues too complex and wearisome to analyse or / and differences 
between expert knowledges will be so great that individuals rely on fate or trust in 
disembedding mechanisms, which Giddens terms pragmatic acceptance that relieves the 
weight of anxiety (Giddens, 1990: 133). However, if expert knowledges fall short of risk 
issues, the consequences extend far beyond the local context. Dependence upon world 
expert system is characterized by uncertainty. Consequently, the lay publics’ are more 
sceptical of expert systems requiring of them that they win their trust. ‘They are also 
turning back towards face-to-face relationships in the attempt to ‘re-embed’ their trust in 
those whom they know personally’, dependent on the sorts of trust relationship that exist 
based on various sorts of risk and intimate other (Lupton, 1999: 77). ‘The disembedded 
characteristics of abstract systems mean constant interaction with ‘absent others’ – people 
one never sees or meets but whose actions directly affect features of one own life’ 
(Giddens, 1994: 89). Lack of trust makes it impossible for people to engage in the leap of 
faith that is required of them in dealing with scientific knowledge or expert systems of 
which they themselves have minor understanding or scientific / technical knowledge 
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because they lack the technical know how / training on these risk issues (Giddens, 1990). 
Therefore, trust exist between knowledge and ignorance, from this perspective the 
function of trust can be defined as solving the problem of limited knowledge by 
minimizing its difficulties (Zinn and Taylor-Gooby, 2006). In late modernity, dependence 
on widespread expert systems over local knowledges, and upon symbolic tokens such as 
money, trust remains an essential part of life (Giddens, 1994).   
 
A large number of psychometric surveys, which have attempted to find out which 
abstract system the public (dis)trust to mediate accurate information, have faced criticism. 
This is because they present individuals with a list of institutions and particularly ask 
them which ones they trust the most. Thus, this approach formulates assumptions about 
lay people’s perceptions and ‘sometimes offers people rather false comparisons – for 
example, do you trust your family more than a politician?’ However, psychometric 
studies have failed to identify how the public address / talk about trust and why some 
organisations are more trusted than others (Petts et al, 2001: 10). For example, in the ten 
country poll conducted by BBC, Reuters and the Media Centre, their research findings 
revealed that Nigerians trust their media more than the government. Arguably, such a 
finding will not be particularly relevant in risk-related events because the question was 
geared towards institutions rather than risk associated with technological and 
environmental degradation in the country (see Trust in Media poll, 2006). There are 
relevant sections of trust studies which are pertinent to this research, but, need detailed 
understanding and however, several commentators have agreed that it also needs further 
research because of unresolved key debates that surround it. However, this research is 
geared towards the direction of the unresolved debates to unveil trust issues as follows- 
First, the significance of trust with regards to a specific risk issue. Second, ‘the 
relationship between trust, risk judgement and the acceptability of a risk’. Third, the 
problems which influence how a message is received from a particular source, rather than 
assumptions of lay-people (Zinn and Taylor-Gooby, 2006: 63; for more insight also see 
Petts et al, 2001; Pidgeon et al, 2006).   
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2.4.5 MEDIA, TRUST AND PUBLIC SPHERE 
 
The concept of public sphere is centred on the relationships that exist between the media, 
state, the public and business institutions. Inexorably, as in the case of all relationships, 
this involves the issue of trust (Boyd-Barrett, 1995 in Bakir and Barlow, 2007). Through 
the twentieth century, the impact of mass media upon civic engagement and practice 
spawned several academic and public debates. Scholars argue that instead of the mass 
media to enable active citizenship as it was in the late eighteenth century, the modern 
mass media of the twentieth century threatened to destabilize the public sphere and 
democracy (Calhoun, 1992; Butsch, 2007). This debate cuts across the best known 
contemporary depiction of the media and public sphere – the historical analysis advanced 
by Jurgen Habermas, whose concept of public sphere triggered prevalent debate 
(Dahlgren and Sparks, 1991; see also Calhoun, 1992). However, critics and advocates 
alike agree that his concept retain relevance in any modern communication, specifically 
regarding the media’s role in democratic societies (Bakir and Barlow, 2007; Dahlgren 
and Sparks, 1991).   
 
Habermas traced the evolution of what he termed the ‘bourgeois public sphere in Britain, 
France and Germany from its origins in the 17th century, to its peak in the 18th century, 
and through to its subsequent decline in the late 19th and 20th centuries’ (Bakir and 
Barlow, 2007: 18; also see Calhoun, 1992). From his historical analysis, the early 
physical and cultural institutions of the public sphere were the salons, coffee houses and 
press that work to advance a democratic state (Butsch, 2007). However, these institutions 
were neither controlled by the state, nor were they part of private world, they also 
differed in size, type, style and topics of discussion. The normal preserve of inequality, 
private interest, political power and influence were suspended in order to prioritise and 
debate on questions of state policy and action. Thus, these early institutions created a 
resuscitated public sphere by acting as a mouth piece for the public, enabling individuals 
to participate in significant discussion of the state (Habermas, 1964, Stevenson, 2002 in 
Bakir and Barlow, 2007). However, the underlying principle reinforcing this approach to 
communication - which aims to bring about trust through sharing knowledge and 
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reciprocal understanding – ‘can be contrasted with that of its polar opposite, strategic 
action and instrumental rationality, where communication is goal-oriented and 
manipulative’ (Garnham, 1992; Dahlgren, 2001 in Bakir and Barlow, 2007: 18). 
 
The public sphere is a concept that is directed to the issues of how and to what extent the 
mass media can help individuals learn about their environment, create an independent 
forum for public debate, thereby enabling the formation of public opinion to keep the 
state in check and also help citizens to reach informed political choices on issues of 
societal and personal interest (Dahlgren and Sparks, 1991). However, the modus operandi 
of commercial mass media in contemporary society is the drive for profit, which 
conceives media in connection to consumers in a market rather than individuals in a 
public sphere (Butsch, 2007). Thus, as the media became commercialized it no longer 
offered access to the citizens for rational-critical debate on issues concerning the state 
(Garnham, 1992, 1995; Bakir and Barlow, 2007). Consequently, the media have reduced 
citizens to passive audience observers rather than active, his argument is based on the fact 
that representatives such as political groups, academic experts, professionals, ordinary 
citizens, pressure groups, journalists and a centralised electronic media, began to 
dominate and influence the flow of information and public opinion, which the media use 
to provide information and surrogate debate for citizens to make decision and vote 
(Butsch, 2007). Habermas described this process as re-feudalisation of the public sphere 
(representative publicity), because the essential organisation of the public sphere, media, 
is controlled by the state and commercial institutions (Dahlgren and Sparks, 1991; 
Calhoun, 1992; Bakir and Barlow, 2007). Thus, ‘the sheer scale of modern media 
corporations overwhelms the relatively minute institutions of the public sphere, as a 
skyscraper enshadows a small public park’ (Butsch, 2007: 8). However, as poll data 
indicated in 2.4.4, trust in media, politician and government is in short supply in the west 
[although not all], (see MORI polls, 2007; BBC, Reuters and Media Centre, 2006). This 
indicates that the public sphere is not working; it does not provide detailed reasons for 
this short supply of trust. Hence, this study turns to Habermas for insight on the decline 
of public sphere from the mid-19th century onwards. Accordingly, the decline in public 
sphere was as a result of the advancement of popular press and the drive for profit by 
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media institutions, which eradicated active citizenship as it no longer offered citizens 
opportunity to partake in rational debate (Calhoun, 1992; see also Bakir and Barlow, 
2007).  
 
However, does Habermas’ rendition of public sphere in the west concur with that of 
Africa (Nigeria)? While polls indicate short supply of trust (bias, inaccuracy and 
distortion) for news media in the west, it also indicates that Nigerians trust their media. 
However, both the west and Africa indicated low trust for politicians and government 
(see MORI polls, 2007; BBC, Reuters and Media Centre, 2006). The process of 
maintaining the public sphere is far from ideal, due to the complex nature of modern 
societies and the inevitable role the media play in the economic sphere (notably, the field 
of advertising) to survive (Herman and Chomsky, 1988). To understand why the public 
sphere is not working, ‘we would do well to pay closer attention to the myriad trust 
relationships sustained between publics, the media and political and economic power-
holders’ (Bakir and Barlow, 2007: 20).  
 
2.4.6 PRESS FREEDOM, MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND CHALLENGES IN 
NIGERIA        
 
The assessment and evaluation of media structure and degree of press freedom in Nigeria 
depends on different factors, such as the types of media ownership that exist, the political 
system, the economy, the judiciary, control tactics, media pluralism and democratisation. 
The Nigerian media structure comprises private and government media ownership, which 
affect the degree of press freedom that exists at a given time (Uche, 1989 in Agbese, 
2006). Broadcast media was solely owned by the government until the establishment of 
the Nigerian Broadcast Commission (NBC) in 1992 which brought change by 
deregulating the industry and gave licenses to private individuals to own and operate 
broadcast media and telecommunications (Musa and Mohammed, 2004; Ogbondah, 
2003). Print media is largely owned by private individuals in Nigeria, though federal and 
state governments own a few newspaper organisations (Olusola, 2008).  
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In 1996, Nigeria had sixty newspapers and twenty-five news magazines both government 
and private owned. In addition, there were fifteen television (including cable stations) and 
fourteen radio stations, all privately owned and thirty-six radio and forty television 
stations were owned by the government (Musa and Mohammed, 2004). However, the last 
dispensation of democratic government that took off May 29th 1999 under the Obasanjo 
government created expansion for the mass media, this period witnessed a mushrooming 
of sorts in the newspaper industry and the proliferation of Nigeria Television Authority 
(NTA) relay stations which added to the number of public television stations in the 
country (Olusola, 2008). However, the media (television and radio) landscape in Nigeria 
is dominated by the federal and state government. Thus, the ratio of government to 
private broadcast media stations stands at three to one (Musa and Mohammed, 2004).     
 
The type of political system existing in Nigeria at a given time can also determine the 
degree of press freedom that exist (Agbese, 2006). According to Nwachuku, the type and 
structure of government that have existed in Nigeria (colonial, military and civilian) 
enacted laws that restrained press freedom. ‘Comparatively, the British colonial 
administration may appear to have done the least harm, but it set in motion the kinds of 
repressive press laws existing in Nigeria today’ (1998: 2). In most cases, the press is free 
only when it does not confront top government officials, scholarly articles reveal that 
Nigerian press have more freedom in democratic regime than they did during military 
regime (Ogbondah, 1997 in Agbese, 2006). Throughout the twenty-nine years of military 
regime in Nigeria, each military government constituted several decrees, extra-legal laws 
and non-legal laws restrictive to press freedom. During this era, journalists were detained, 
harassed, killed and imprisoned without trial. For example, In 1978, Amakiri Minere 
Chief Correspondent of the Nigerian observer was beaten and his head shaved during the 
Gowon military regime, in 1984 Nduka Irabor and Tunde Thompson of the Guardian 
were imprisoned for a year under decree 4 during the Buhari military regime and in 1986 
the tragic death of Editor-in-Chief of Newswatch magazine Dele Giwa through letter 
bomb during the Babangida military regime. (Olayiwola, 1991; Agbese, 2006). 
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Media fared significantly better under the last democratic government headed by 
Obansajo [1999-2007], a retired army general, than they had during the preceding sixteen 
years of military regime. However, during the Obansajo administration journalists were 
not entirely free. The Obansajo government retained repressive practices used by military 
to suppress journalists, and the media experienced different forms of attack during his 
leadership such as, assault, detention, confiscation of copies of news publications and 
injustices meant to suppress the media. Subsequently, the late democratic president 
Yar’Adua who took over power from Obansajo on May 29, 2007 indicated that he would 
sign into law the freedom of information bill, which the Obansajo government rejected. 
In other words, this bill will liberate and give Nigerian citizens, including media, a right 
of access to public information (IREX, 2007). However, this move by the present 
government, on the one hand, will create a resuscitated public sphere as citizens can get 
access to public information through dialogue, debate and discussion, thereby generating 
trust between the government, media and citizens. On the other, it will give media 
institutions liberty to report information without restriction or fear of being harmed 
(Ashong and Udoudo 2008; Olusola, 2008).                  
  
The challenge faced by private media ownership under the present democratic 
government is the exorbitant annual fees charged by National Broadcasting Commission 
(NBC). ‘This situation puts the private stations at a disadvantage as they have to compete 
with the government-owned stations (that are not subjected to the same payment) in the 
same market’ (Olusola, 2008: 40). Moreover, the licenses of twenty private owned media 
that could not meet the standard fees set by NBC due to financial difficulties and 
technical problems were withdrawn (Ogbondah, 2003). This challenge, combined with 
commercial interest of the private broadcast station has made them ineffective in carrying 
out their responsibility in a democratic society. They must first thrive as an industry / 
business before considering public interest and service. However, the twist in Nigerian 
media is that private broadcast stations have become more dormant leaving the 
independent press open to personal monopoly for owner’s benefit and government-owned 
media are mere loud speaker and propaganda machines for the government in power 
(Agbese, 2006; Olusola, 2008). As a result, fairness may always be elusive and this has 
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serious implications for audience trust. Most media institutions sought for stories that 
would make more sales rather than stories that deal with risk issues and conflict 
especially in Niger Delta. For example, Journalists get their information from either 
government sources or multi national companies on risk related issues in Niger Delta 
because they are not always on hand to report risk events the way they unfold. Such a 
situation makes audience lose confidence in media (Ashong and Udoudo 2008).     
 
In addition, the regulatory body (NBC) set by the government can be a form of control to 
monitor the media. An example is the power given to the commission to licence and 
revoke the licence of broadcast media station. First, the issuance of licence to private 
broadcast media by the NBC is under the authority of the minister for information and 
communication, and the president, who has absolute power to issue broadcast licenses. 
The loophole here is that the procedure of issuing licences does not align with the stated 
requirement for broadcast licenses but strictly under the discretion of president. This 
process is neither fair nor competitive but unclear and not open to public scrutiny as the 
president does not give reasons for denial and applicants have no recourse to judicial 
review or appeal. Thus, it is difficult to ascertain on this occasion what consideration 
come into play before licenses are approved (IREX, 2007). Secondly, the power to 
revoke broadcast licenses can be used to repress media freedom of expression. One defect 
of this decree is that the commission can revoke licenses of broadcast stations that do not 
function in harmony with the code and in the public interest, without specifying ‘how to 
seek redress or to what the public interest is, as in the American Federal Communication 
Commission. Thus, the decree allows the NBC to provide licenses in perpetuity only to 
withdraw them at whim’ (Nwachuku, 1998: 1).  
 
Private proprietors of broadcast media apply significant control of their institutions. They 
demand self censorship by their editors for fear of offending government officials, 
business interest and religious groups. In the public media, self-censorship is also 
practiced for fear of risking their safety or losing their jobs. Many journalists also confess 
that they practice self-censorship as a result of pressures from their editors, however, such 
practice prevent journalists from reporting openly (IREX, 20007; Nwachuku, 1998). 
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According to an editor in a public broadcast media - Nigeria Television Authority (NTA) 
in Calabar, situated in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, said: “Journalists and editors, 
particularly in public media, practice self-censorship under the guise of developmental 
journalism (non-critical journalism that showcases the positive aspects of national life), 
NTA and all state-owned broadcast media are culprits. They do so for job security and 
fear for their lives” (IREX, 2007: Objective 2).    
 
The print media appear to be very distinctive due to private involvement; however, their 
limitations lie in reaching the masses adequately. This limitation spreads across 
availability, literacy level, content and the economic situation of the country. The 
economic status of the country does not always permit low income earners to afford 
magazines and newspapers. Consequently, the print media is not largely accessible to the 
rural communities (location and low literacy level) compared to urban areas. This, of 
course, brings the problem of access, since print media limit production of copies that 
they can conveniently sell (Olusola, 2008). Most NBC registered media institutions in 
Nigeria have web sites Nigerians can access, however, internet usage in Nigeria is not 
largely accessible and this remains a major challenge for both urban and rural 
communities (IREX, 2007). To this end, Jonathan argues that the press in Nigeria have 
never been free at any time, he also note that ‘journalism in the country is like a physical 
war that is influenced by the quest for freedom. Journalists, even in their most peaceful 
period may not know what may come after them’ (2008: 551). 
 
2.4.7 RISK REPORTING AND THE NIGER-DELTA CRISIS 
 
Aside media ownership and challenges in Nigeria, it is imperative to look at the risk-
related events that triggered the Niger-Delta crisis through the eye of media exposure. 
There is no doubt that the Niger-Delta crisis has caught media attention both national and 
international because conflict zones and horrific occurrences are good raw materials for 
news (Ashong and Udoudo 2008). Research into media’s role and depiction of conflict 
management and risk reporting such as environmental catastrophe tends to focus on three 
diverse areas. First, is a distinctive body of research concerned with media coverage and 
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performance evaluations in risk-related circumstances (e.g. Perez-Lugo, 2004; Vasterman 
et al 2005 cited in Campbell, 2008; Tobechukwu and Oluwaseun, 2008). Second, 
definitional contention between competing stakeholders [like environmental pressure 
groups, oil companies and the government] has also attracted research (e.g. Bakir, 2006). 
Third, is fiction / documentary films that reflect risk issues. This area has been largely 
ignored by researchers despite its contribution to public debate (Campbell, 2008).  
 
These research paths in examining mediated-risk reporting offered two main routes – 
media’s role in disseminating risk knowledge to inform citizens, and in regulating public 
acceptability towards diverse risks. However, media risk research suggests that these 
routes lack methodology and research foci, enabling new sense of research directions. 
Accordingly, with reference to methodology, there is need for continuous, contextual and 
interpretative analysis of effects of mediated risk at micro and macro level, ‘and more in-
depth, comparative studies between different risk types across different media forms and 
genres’ (Bakir, 2008: 1). Research foci include: the gaps in knowledge within the process 
of making news and the construction of reality (for overview, see Tuchman, 1978; Gans, 
1979): the features of risks event that make it a risk issue and how these features 
interrelate with diverse media forms, audience and genre; and the implications it has in 
audience trust in diverse media and in mass-mediated risk knowledge and experience 
(Bakir, 2008). However, the aforementioned gaps will be addressed in this study.   
 
Media reporting has its root embedded in theories that emerged from the norms and 
practice of media functions of gatekeeping and agenda-setting which have been an 
imperative requisite for media coverage of national and international occurrences 
(Ekeanyanwu, 2005). First, gatekeeping theory coined by Kurt Lewis in1951, can best be 
defined as a set of individuals (editors) who controls the gates or routes through which 
information passes from the source to the final receiver (Tobechukwu and Oluwaseun, 
2008). Media institutions operate within this standard enabling editors at editorial 
conference to decide which news to transmit, defer, modify or completely discard. 
However, one major pitfall in this process of news selection that may affect media 
coverage are factors involved in influencing gatekeeping such as management policy, 
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preference of the audience, perceived needs, political orientation, ideological perspective, 
ownership pattern, timing and how risk issues are considered news worthy (Tuchman, 
1978; Gans, 1979; Ekeanyanwu, 2005 in Tobechukwu and Oluwaseun, 2008).  
 
Notably, studies like Huges et al, (2006) and Kitzinger (1999) note that risk reporting 
guided by journalistic institutional traditions and norms have little relationship to actual 
threat directions. Risk reporting clustering around major risk occurrences, ‘ignoring 
multi-causal, long-term or hypothetical risks and influenced by commitments to ‘balance’ 
and ‘truth’, both concepts liable to founder against the value-laden rocks of uncertainty 
when reporting risk’ (Bakir, 2008: 2: see also, Perez-Lugo in Campbell 2008). According 
to Ogunbunmi a journalist interviewed on media performance with regards to Niger-Delta 
crisis admitted that although the media are reporting the crisis but it is also imperative 
they draw attention via in-depth and interpretative reporting to the underlying causes [risk 
issues] of the crisis (Jimoh, 2008: 441). In most circumstances, especially reporting risk 
issues [like oil spillage or oil pipe explosion] in Niger-Delta, journalist’s commitment to 
‘truth’ and ‘balance’ may not at all parallel actual risk occurrences because most media 
correspondents are not always on hand to cover risk occurrences the way they have 
occurred. On such occasions, journalists get their fact-findings and reports from either 
government sources or multinational companies, and as such, fairness may always be 
elusive to all parties involved in the incident. Such a situation has serious implication in 
audience trust in the media (Ashong and Udoudo, 2008: 315, see also, Kurfi, 2008).  
 
The second conceptual construct, which aids analysis of media performers in reporting 
and managing conflict and crisis, is the agenda setting theory (Tobechukwu and 
Oluwaseun 2008). McComb and Shaw (1972), hypothesize that media emphasis on an 
issue influence the salience of public and decision makers’ attitude. This is because 
media have the ability to create social amplification and attenuation of risk occurrence, 
generate moral panic and can frame and construct media, public and policy agendas 
(Bakir, 2006; Miles and Morse 2007 in Campbell, 2008). The media pre-determine which 
risk issues are important by focusing on the magnitude, quality and nature of mass 
mediated risk information. The press has in one way or the other played significant role 
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in the reportage of conflict in the Niger-Delta, however, research carried out by 
Ekeanyanwu (2005) revealed that sixty percent of news reporting in Nigeria on crisis 
management concentrate on personality and lack in-depth analysis; this will not help in 
crisis / risk situations (Tobechukwu and Oluwaseun, 2008).  
 
The underpinning factor here is that while the media try to set agenda for policy makers 
through media reporting by drawing attention to the underdevelopment in the Niger-Delta 
region (Okanume, 2008) the question is, apart from underdevelopment what about the 
risk issues that bedevil the region daily? Studies suggest that the media’s role in setting 
policy agenda in risk issues is under-explored. However, considering the position of 
policy-makers and corporate decision-makers to risk management, it is imperative for 
studies to unpick how political and corporate management react to risk issues raised by or 
through the media, on behalf of stakeholders. ‘Here, questions arise over the role played 
by established institutions, pressure groups, interest groups and media in strategically 
mobilizing publics over time to influence policy-making in scientific risk issues’ (Bakir, 
2008: 4). For instance, in Nigeria, with specific reference to late Ken Saro Wiwa and his 
movement, they succeeded in mobilizing the public and even attracted international 
environmental community in their campaign to save the Niger-Delta environment from 
environmental degradation through the media. Consequently, the question is how did 
policy and corporate decision makers respond to the protest? And did policy change for 
their course? For more on policy regarding this issue, see 2.5.5 (Westra, 1998; Idowu, 
1999). It is indeed significant to conduct historical and longitudinal studies, as issues are 
difficult to permanently resolve in policy making. It is, however, particularly revealing 
that studies which compare media risk surveillance at various time periods indicate that 
communicative, political and social context are fundamental in understanding risk 
reporting (Bakir, 2006; Palfreman, 2006; Bakir, 2008).  
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2.5 RISK ISSUES, STAKEHOLDERS, OIL COMPANIES AND POLICY-
MAKERS: NIGERIA’S NIGER-DELTA REGION 
 
As risk events create public reaction to risk signals from cooperative action, it stimulates 
pressure and interest group member responses to systematically negotiate risk issues by 
attempting to influence policy through the media (Kasperson, et al, 2003; Bakir, 2006). 
To analyze how social groups react and define risk issues when attempting to influence 
policy, it is significant to first examine the cause and effect of risk occurrences in the 
Niger-Delta region.  
 
2.5.1 RISK ISSUES AND OIL COMPANIES IN NIGER-DELTA 
 
Research into the activities of multinational oil companies in developing countries, 
especially in Nigeria’s Niger-Delta region, have revealed risk issues emanating from 
environmental degradation in the area of oil exploitation and exploration. Over the years, 
risk issues [such as environmental pollution] have dominated global discussion because 
of its severity to humans and animals (Idowu, 1999; Akpan, 2008). According to Beck, 
the production of wealth is systematically followed by that of risk as an outcome of 
modernization. Therefore, individuals in these industrialized societies have to deal with 
risk on a daily basis (1992: 19; see also Lupton, 1999). In accordance with Beck, It is 
indeed plausible that the search for crude oil [wealth] has accompanied the risk of 
environmental degradation and pollution in Nigeria’s Niger Delta since oil was first 
struck in large quantities in Oloibiri, May 1956 (Akpan, 2008). This propelled 
commercial business activities thereby attracting foreign investors and multinational 
companies (like Shell, Chevron, Agip, Elf, Texaco and Mobil) into the country (Adedoja, 
2007; Ransome-Kuti, 2007). Today, Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa and the 
11th largest in the world. Oil exploration activities in the Niger-Delta has left most oil 
host communities impoverished due to oil leaks amounting to thousands of oil spilled into 
the environment, deep sea disposal of poisonous substances and air pollution by constant 
gas flaring into the atmosphere have left land, air and water unbearable for the inhabitants 
to cope with (Idris, 2007: Ransome-Kuti, 2007).  
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The first stage of risk issues associated with environmental pollution and degradation 
starts from the search for crude oil by the seismic crew of the oil servicing companies 
(OSC’s). Chemicals such as pipe lax, bentonite, EP-20 are used during seismic and pilot 
drilling or explosive methods at the exploration stage. At the refining stage, effluents and 
oil waste are often disposed into adjoining land, which are harmful to the flora, fauna and 
humans in the environment. For example, Bentonite leads to bronchial illness, persene 
drilliad and soda ash causes shortness of breath, pipe lax if dumped in the environment 
leads to cancer of the skin and abnormal pains if polluted fruits are eaten and EP-20 kills 
instantly if taken internally (Omoweh, 1995; Idowu, 1999). The wastes from these 
chemicals are poorly managed during operations and are disposed untreated directly on 
land, swamps or pits that are not cased at the top or beneath and therefore overflow into 
other areas mostly in the rainy seasons (Oji, 2008; Afamefuna, 2008; Omoweh, 1995; 
1998). Oil host communities contend that the operation of these multinational oil ventures 
in particular Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) which is the largest oil 
operator in the country have had enormous effect on the environment and the indigenes 
of oil host communities in the Niger-Delta. For instance, high pressure pipes are criss-
crossed in the region, passing over not beneath farm land and within feet of people’s 
home. This of course, would be devastating in the occurrence of oil spill as a result of 
pipeline rupture (Rowell, 1995).  
 
‘Oil spills from pipelines and other operations have become endemic and routine, 
polluting land and water, fishing and farming have been devastated’ (Rowell, 1995: 210; 
see also Afamefuna, 2008). Oil spill on water can be very severe because the depth and 
speed of pollution are so high and fast that within an average of twenty-four hours, over 
five communities are affected (Omoweh, 1995). Over the last fifty years, the Niger Delta 
has experienced 1.5 million tons of crude oil spills from multinational oil ventures 
(Igbikiowubo, 2006). The Nigerian ministry for environment, housing and urban 
development recorded two hundred and fifty-three oil spills in 2006, five hundred and 
eighty-eight oil spills in 2007 and in the first six months of 2008, four hundred and 
nineteen cases of oil spills have been recorded in the Niger-Delta, totaling one thousand, 
two hundred and sixty oil spills in two years (Ochayi and Okereke, 2008; Lawal et al, 
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2008). One of such spill is the Ikarama incident in Bayelsa State which resulted from a 
ruptured pipeline operated by SPDC in the area. The risk event caused devastating effect 
to the people of the affected areas, according to Chief Okah, people in Ikarama started 
experiencing health problems such as respiratory disease, swollen legs, pregnant women 
experienced premature birth and miscarriages after the spill occurred (Oyadongha, 2008).  
 
However, cases of oil spills are not swiftly tackled as a matter of urgency, for instance, in 
July 2007 two communities (Osusu and Joukrama) in Rivers State complained of oil spill 
from SPDC but did not get the attention of the company until February 2008 (Breakfast 
Show, AIT, Saturday, 23rd February 2008 in Ashong and Udoudo, 2008). Oil spills in 
most cases lead to severe fire outbreak when pipes are forcibly damaged for example, in 
1998 over one thousand people died in fire inferno caused by pipeline vandals in Jesse, 
Delta State (Campbell, 2001, for more see, BBC News, 2000; 2006). Oil multinationals, 
in particular SPDC claim losses worth four hundred and nine million naira 
[approximately two million pounds] daily to sabotage and illegal activities of oil bunkers 
in the Niger Delta (Ebiri, 2008). Omoweh contends that technical / human error, poor 
maintenance, sand cut and ruptured oil pipelines accounts for seventy percent of oil 
spillage in Nigeria’s Niger Delta and thirty percent are linked to sabotage (1998).  
 
Gas flaring is another aspect of risk issue associated with environmental pollution 
brought about by the activities of multinational oil corporations. Flaring natural gas from 
oil stations as a by-product of crude oil production has become a normal occurrence that 
dominates the skyline in the Niger Delta. Oil production began in Nigeria’s Niger Delta 
about fifty years ago and so did the practice of ceaseless flaring of Associated Gas (AG) 
twenty-four hours a day. More Greenhouse gas (GHG) is flared in Nigeria’s Niger Delta 
than anywhere else in the world and this placed Nigeria as the biggest gas flarer in the 
world. Currently, there are more than hundred gas flaring stations in Nigeria (Afamefuna, 
2008; Idris, 2007; Ishisone, 2004; Friends of the Earth, 2004). According to World Bank 
report, by 2002 gas flaring in Nigeria’s Niger Delta had contributed more GHG’s to 
earth’s atmosphere than all other oil producing nations in Sub-Saharan Africa combined. 
As such, flaring natural gas pose severe risk issue to indigenous local communities living 
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around the gas flares, thus, increasing the risk of disease, food insecurity and tremendous 
weather damage (Climate Justice Programme, 2005; Friends of the Earth, 2004).  
 
Emissions from combustion Associated Gas (AG) contains widely recognized toxins, 
such as benzene, nitrogen oxides, dioxins, hydrogen sulphide, xylene, and toluene; which 
pollute the air and affect the health of local people. Respiratory problem such as asthma 
and bronchitis, lung disease, heart attack, miscarriage of pregnancies, skin disease and 
others are some of the reported cases becoming prevalent as a result from exposure to 
heat from gas flares (Idris, 2007; Janak, 2006; Climate Justice Programme, 2005; 
Omoweh, 1995). Gas flaring is unfriendly to the environment because it literally destroys 
vulnerable natural resources and contributes immensely to global climate change. 
However, gas flaring produces greenhouse gases (GHG’s), carbon dioxide (CO2), 
methane (CH4) and propane as toxic substances are emitted in flares such as burning of 
fossil fuel which warms up the Earth (Ishisone, 2004; Idris, 2007). Scientific consensus 
on climate change indicate that the burning of fossil fuel have increased the amount of 
carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere by fifteen percent during the last century and at 
present temperature is rising by 0.4 percent yearly. However, this process of emitting 
CO2 warms the lower atmosphere at high latitude (Paterson, 1996). ‘World Bank 
estimated that about 10 percent of global CO2 emission comes from flaring. Nigeria gas 
flaring alone releases 35 millions tons of CO2 and 12 million tons of CH4 which has a 
higher warming potential than CO2’ (Ishisone, 2004: 4).  
 
Global warming poses danger to Earth and has over the years become a high profile 
debate in the globe since most part of the world started experiencing rise in sea levels. 
For example, in Nigeria most areas affected by flooding have major industries located 
there, like oil companies. Just like any other coastal communities in the Niger Delta 
region, Bomadi local government in Delta State experience environmental calamity such 
as severe flooding scourge that bedevil the region as the raining season begins, the flood 
tide and water level increase (Ofuokwu and Adeoye, 2008). It is indeed plausible that 
global warming is responsible for the observed rise in sea level. As the Earth warms, 
glaciers / ice in the arctic region melts and the defrost ice increase the volume of water 
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and cause rise in sea level (Pittock, 2005; Dessler and Person, 2006). Although, it is 
worth noting here that, there is still intense disagreement whether the Earth climate is 
warming or not and if global climate change is man made or natural, however, this thesis 
does not look into it, for more on global climate debate see (Singer, 2007; Science Daily, 
2008; 2001; Lorenzoni et al, 2005; Dessler and Person, 2006). In addition, gas flaring and 
oil spillage have harmful effect on eco-system and human beings. According to US 
government, flaring of natural gas contributes to acid rain which corrodes building 
materials, destroys vegetation and acidifies lakes, streams and river (Idris, 2007). One 
crucial point to note is the risk associated with gas flaring on land, that is, any land that 
have been used for gas flaring is almost permanently unfit for farming due to desiccation 
of soil; and it usually takes about forty years for the affected land to renew itself 
(Omoweh, 1998). However, below are graphic illustrations of risk issues associated with 
environmental pollution by multinational oil companies.  
 
FIGURE 1 
 
Smoke from gas flares close to homes in Ebocha – Egbema in Rivers State (Quist –
Arcton 2007).  
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FIGURE 2 
 
 
 
‘Color composite of the nighttime lights of the Nigeria region from data acquired by the 
US Air Force Meteorological Satellite program. Data from 1995 is blue, 2000 is green 
and 2006 is red, the Vector polygon drawn around the gas flares associated with Nigeria 
are shown in white’ (Quist-Arcton, 2007: 2).   
 
FIGURE 3 
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The aftermath of oil spill – fire explosion that destroyed vegetation at Ibada-Elume, Okpe 
Local Government Area (LGA) in Delta State (Ekeh, 2001).  
 
The last democratic President Olusegun Obansajo (1999-2007) signed a non-binding 
agreement with multinational oil companies to end gas flaring in Niger Delta by 2008 
(Friends of the Earth, 2004; Climate Justice Programme, 2005). However, at present there 
is no end in sight. According to Odusina, Nigeria Minister of State for energy and Gas, in 
2008 noted that the federal government does not yet have a definite date to put an end to 
gas flaring as it would be capital intensive. He also made known key projects that would 
end gas flaring were yet to be completed, one of such project he disclosed was the multi-
million-dollar Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) plant being built by Nigerian Independent 
Petroleum Company (NIPCO). According to Odusina, if the Oil companies executed the 
necessary route to end gas flaring five years ago, the issue would have ended by now but 
instead, oil multinationals preferred to pay the fine imposed as penalty for continuous 
flaring of natural gas rather than to put an end to it (Aliu, 2008). 
 
2.5.2 ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES DUE TO ENVIRONMENTAL  
            DEGRADATION IN THE NIGER DELTA REGION  
 
The above graphic illustration depicts the prevailing potential hazard [risk] the indigenes, 
land and aquatic lives of oil host communities in Niger Delta as well as the globe are 
faced with on a daily basis. However, land and water pollution have eroded indigenes’ 
means of livelihood as majority of individuals living in the Niger Delta engage in 
agriculture and fishing as a means to life and other business activities. At present, 
farming in the oil host communities has become an exercise in Futility as the soil is 
polluted, deprived of its fertility, through environmental degradation (Idowu, 1999). 
Small scale agricultural trade by locals was almost abandoned because agricultural 
produce which served as the major source of capital for business fell drastically as 
farmers were / are faced with poor harvest. This triggered food scarcity and heightened 
poverty, hardship, misery vulnerability in the land. What also quicken the demise of 
small scale / large agricultural produce in the Niger Delta region was the 1978 land use 
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act which stated - the state owns all lands where crude oil is being prospected, mined, 
transported and stored. As a result, oil multinationals expanded their minefields on the 
one hand, and there was sharp decrease of family land holdings on the other. Most 
families where deprived of their farm lands, however, this spelled the end of the road for 
many farmers; and for many [farmers/agricultural local investors] this watershed years 
became atrocious (Omoweh, 1995, 1998; Afamefuna, 2008; Akpan, 2008).  
 
Water pollution (through the deep-sea disposal of poisonous substances) and oil spillage, 
has placed “the oceans’ abundant wealth in jeopardy, causing gross impoverishment of 
many fishermen and disrupting lives of coastal habitats and fish nursery ground” 
(Ransome-Kuti, 2007: 3). For example, in 1973, Shell spilled forty thousand barrels of 
crude oil in Delta State which affected eight hundred fish ponds and two hundred lakes 
were badly polluted as dead fish and other aquatic organism were found floating on 
water, in 1981 Chevron and Texaco spilled two billion barrels of crude oil in Rivers State 
and in the first six months of 2008 about four hundred and eighteen oil spill have been 
recorded by the Federal Ministry for Environment, Housing and Urban Development in 
the Niger Delta (Ochayi and Okereke, 2008; Omoweh, 1998). Coastal fishing 
communities in the Niger Delta are hit by poor catch; as a result, the scarcity of fish 
remains persistent, hence its prices became very high. The hike in fish price spells 
inflation and only few families can afford it as majority of indigene’s sources of income 
specifically farming and tapping are almost impaired. The effect of environmental 
degradation has made many redundant; not just farmers, fishermen and other economic 
activities (like tapping rubber and sale of sharp sand) but also traditional health care 
system that depends on herbs for treatment (Omoweh, 1998).  
 
2.5.3 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE NIGER DELTA 
 
Environment is the core of mankind’s existence on earth; arguably, anything that affects 
it inevitably affects the quality of human life. In this sense, linking the quality of human 
life to environment, the United Nation at the Stockholm Conference on Environment 
sought new routes to enshrine and enforce international protection of the human 
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environment. However, based on the foregoing, it is essential for the well being and 
continuous existence of mankind, that environmental laws and regulations must be 
adhered to, not only through legislations but most importantly through the enforcement of 
such laws (Stockholm Conference, 1972). Linking the concern for human centrality with 
sustainable development (Rio Conference, 1992), the 1972 Stockholm Conference 
declared that mankind has a fundamental right to freedom, right to dignity that permits 
adequate conditions of life in an environment of quality, right to equality and well being 
(Stockholm Conference, 1972). It is indeed evident that these laws have gone a long way 
to curb activities affecting the environment such as, the reduction of CO2 emissions, 
conservation of rain forest and concern over nuclear weapons proliferation to ensure 
human’s continuous existence, which can be described as human’s right to life (New 
York Conference, 1973; Markandya and Halsnaes, 2002). Advocates of environmental 
protection argue that the inherent value and ethical consideration of animals are also a 
foundation for international protection of the environment since animals depends on it for 
their own survival and existence (Rio Conference, 1992).  
 
State responsibility under international environmental law can be seen in the imposition 
of state obligation by the 1972 Stockholm Conference, which states that – states must not 
only prevent activities that would affect neighbouring states but also ensure its citizens 
have the right to a healthy environment. That is, with regards to exploring natural 
resources, states must exercise due diligence (Stockholm Conference, 1972), to ensure 
that its activities do not impact negatively on the environment of neighbouring states and 
its citizens (Rosenne, 1991; Crawford, 2002). Accordingly, a breach in the provision of 
the treaty or non observance by the state would be seen by international community as an 
abuse of sovereignty (Science Direct, 2004) and the state will be held responsible not 
only for their acts or failure to act with respect to their responsibility to protect their 
environment under international law, also for the activities of private institutions like 
multinational oil corporations, whose activities within the state territory have serious 
implication for the environment and also affect the citizens adversely (Atsegbua, 2001; 
Weiss, 1992). The reason for holding the state accountable for environmental degradation 
and pollution by private institutions like multinational oil companies, is due to the 
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principle of state sovereignty; that is, each state has the decisive power to control what 
happens in its territory and should be able to design and enforce laws regulating its 
nationals and legal persons within its territory (Nollkaemper, 2006).  
 
The negligence of a state to implement its obligation under a specific international or 
state law or its refusal or omission to enforce such laws to control the activities of third 
parties whose operations are hazardous could result in environmental degradation. 
Omission or refusal to enforce such laws by state on the one hand and violation of 
environmental law by third party on the other, become an act of human rights violation; 
when a degraded environment occurs with serious health consequences for a particular 
group of people or a disruption of a way of life (Lee, 2000). In 2001, the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ right used this link to hold Nigerian government 
responsible in the Ogoni case, when the state failed to regulate the activities of the oil 
multinationals in Ogoni land that led to environmental degradation. However, in relation 
to environmental degradation, violation of fundamental human rights can be seen from 
two perspectives. The first is when a state does not regulate its acts or activities of third 
party within its territory and eventually leads to environmental pollution affecting the 
individuals’ right to life. Second is violation of international obligation for example, the 
responsibility of the state parties under the 1972 Stockholm Conference to ensure a safe 
and healthy environment for its citizens (Stockholm Conference, 1972; Lee, 2000; for 
citation see, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 
Romania chapter, 2000; Committee on the Rights of a Child (CRC) Jordan - UNICEF, 
2000). The other side of fundamental human rights violation in response to environmental 
pollution are – right to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression, freedom from 
torture and other physical abuses, self determination, right to life, right to adequate 
standard of living (Idowu, 1999). The human rights violations and environmental 
conflicts in the Niger Delta have been known to be mainly executed by the state and oil 
multinationals in the region. For example, the killings and destruction of oil host 
communities like – Odi massacre (2000), Ogoni genocide (1995), the Opia and Ikiyan 
killings (1999), Yenagoa killing (1998) (Okaba, 2004; also see Human Right Watch, 
2002). In summary, the state is held accountable for any act deemed harmful which can 
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be connected to its violation of responsibility under domestic or international law 
resulting from action or omission by the government of the state or any political 
subdivision of the state (United Nation, 2005).  
 
Thus, for enforcement of environmental protection laws to be effective, it must be 
routine, predictable and reasonably resourced; however, this presents a strong challenge 
especially for the developing countries that have always cited economic circumstances as 
an excuse for not carrying out their responsibilities under environmental protection laws 
they are party to (Robinson, 2003). Developing countries depend on exploitation of their 
natural resources to generate national income and since they lack the technical know how 
to execute these projects themselves, they are at the mercy of these multinational oil 
companies who sometimes in carrying out their operation do not abide by domestic or 
international standards of environmental protection law (Bodansky et al, 2007). 
Enforcement of environmental protection law is seen as more of a national function 
because they are enacted through domestic regimes of civil, administrative and criminal 
sub regimes. In addition, several agreements signed by state parties in numerous 
multilateral environmental treaties are not self executing but would require endorsement 
by the state legislative body to give it the obligatory domestic effect. Since most 
environmental protection laws are passed through procedures of domestic legislative arm 
of government, the effectiveness of the implementation of these laws can only be 
measured by the potency of a state rule of law, its economic capability and the 
uprightness of its administrative regime (Robinson, 2003).   
 
Nigeria as a sovereign independent state has enacted environmental laws to regulate and 
provide sanctions for violations of set standards for damage caused by pollution. 
However, these environmental laws are numerous; hence, this study will be limited to 
only those laws addressing the issues of pollution triggered by activities of multinational 
oil companies together with the Nigerian government (Idowu, 1999). The first of these 
laws to be looked at, but in no particular order of importance is the Petroleum Act 1969 
which gave government total control and ownership of all petroleum in, under or upon 
any land (Petroleum Act, 1990). This Act has led to the promulgation of petroleum 
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regulations such as: Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations, Minerals oil 
(safety) Regulations, Petroleum regulations and others. However, these regulations were 
put in place to monitor and prescribe the manner by which the holders of petroleum 
licences are to operate within the set standards (Ojo and Gaskiya, 2003). The Petroleum 
Act of 1969 did not concentrate on pollution in its terms and condition as an item to be 
controlled, rather, what the Act does is to empower the minister of petroleum to 
implement decrees for the prevention of pollution. The law may not be effective since the 
power so vested is discretionary. To support the Petroleum Act, the Regulation 25, part 
IV of the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations 1969 was designed to provide 
terms and conditions to prevent pollution arising from oil exploration activities, which 
states that: 
 
‘the licensee or lessee shall adopt all practical precautions to prevent the 
pollution of inland waterways, rivers, water courses, the territorial waters of 
Nigeria, of the high seas by oil, mud or other fluids or substances which 
might contaminate the water, banks or shorelines or which might cause 
harm or destruction to freshwater or marine life, and where any such 
pollution occurs or has occurred, shall take prompt steps to control and if 
possible, end it’ (Idowu, 1999: 173).  
 
Critics alike argue that the term practical precaution is an open-textured phrase capable of 
subjective interpretation. Thus, they recommended solution to tighten the loop hole in 
this provision, which suggest review of the Act and the implementation of a stricter, more 
comprehensive legislation targeted at tackling the challenges of oil pollution (Ojo and 
Gaskiya, 2003).  
 
In 1991, the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) issued guidelines to monitor and 
direct pollution resulting from exploration and production companies. These guidelines 
explicitly proscribe direct or indirect discharge of waste into swamps, coastal or offshore 
waters, any pit on land other than a temporary holding pit or a landfill, floodplains or 
upland valley and any waters (fresh or reservoir). These guidelines needs to be re-
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examined as oil companies and government are very much unwilling to comply because 
it is cost effective to abstain from such laws (Environmental Guidelines, 1991; Mandy, 
1999; for more on effluents disposal in restricted areas see, Ayotamuno, 1993). Similar to 
Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) guidelines, although, sometimes overlapping 
and in some cases differing is the 1988 Federal Environmental Protection Agency 
(FEPA) Act (Decree No. 58 of 1988) which vested the power to issue standards for air, 
land and water quality within the federal territory and also regulate environmental 
standards in the oil and other industries (Mandy, 1999; Idowu, 1999). The Associated 
Gas (Re-injection) Act of 1979 contain provisions which regulate the operation and 
conservation of natural gas by prescribing penalties such as forfeiture of oil prospecting 
license or concessions granted in a particular oil mining field(s) in a case of breach 
(Idowu, 1999). While the aim of the act is highly praiseworthy, in reality gas flaring is 
prevalent in the oil producing communities and there is no end in sight according to 
Odusina the minister for State and Energy in 2008 (Aliu, 2008). The Oil Pipeline Act 
1956 requires a holder of a pipeline license to pay compensation to any individual who 
suffers damage from oil activities such as oil spills. However, in 1969 after the 
promulgation of the Petroleum Act more comprehensive provisions were made in respect 
of adequate and fair compensation for damage from oil activities. The Petroleum Act 
states that: ‘the holder of an oil exploration license, oil prospecting license or oil mining 
lease shall, in addition to any liability for compensation to which he may be subject under 
any other provision of the Decree, be liable to pay fair and adequate compensation for the 
disturbance of surface or other rights to any person who owns or is in lawful occupation 
of the licensed or leased lands’. While the law states citizens’ right to compensation for 
damage, however, there is no comprehensive legislation dealing with the issue of 
compensation (Frynas, 2000: 94).   
   
2.5.4 THE RISE OF INTEREST / PRESSURE GROUPS 
 
The oil host communities were left with no option than to fight for life. In addition, they 
saw the need to form themselves into community based organisations (Idowu, 1999). The 
first clarion call for the exit of oil multinationals was initiated and championed by Francis 
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Okpozio (1974 – 1980s) in Isoko, Delta State; his campaign lacked an umbrella 
organisation, limited by education and operated with only a handful of youths. However, 
the modus operandi of his protest was occasioned by blocking of shell access roads, 
seizure of oil servicing company’s tools and holding its workers hostage. All these did 
not hold much ground because there were no spontaneous reactions and in most cases, 
agitations did not last for two weeks and thereafter, oil activities were resumed. 
Although, the Isoko Youth Movement (IYM) was popular in the protest against oil 
multinationals notably Shell, however, its support base was local (Omoweh, 1998). By 
1990, indigenes of the Niger Delta from various ethnic groups had begun to protest 
openly against oil multinationals and their activities (Rowell, 1995). The popular protest 
took two dimensions – peaceful and violent. The peaceful agitation took the form of 
raising / carrying placards expressing their demands when ever government officials 
visited the region. Most of the placards read: ‘Shell must go’ or ‘protect our environment’ 
although they got empty promises but at least they made their views known. The violent 
protest on the other hand, involved disruption of oil companies’ activities, like 
production, transportation and storage; however, the violent protest took three main 
forms. First, solidarity with other oil producing communities in the Niger Delta; Second, 
proxy agitation by attacking contracting companies to oil multinationals, like OSC’s; 
Third, political agitation to restore the unevenness in the country (Omoweh, 1995: 137).  
 
At present the fronts for survival in the Niger Delta region are indeed many, the popular 
ones are: the Niger Delta Vigilante Movement (NDVM), Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni 
People (MOSOP), Coalition for Militant Action in Niger Delta (COMA), Niger Delta 
People Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), Chikoko Movement, 
however, not fewer than fifty such fronts are said to presently exist in the region (Akpan, 
2008: 307; see also Alabrah, 2007). These splinter fronts / movements were borne out of 
frustration, age-long poverty, environmental degradation and pollution, which have 
infuriated indigenes of the Niger Delta region and make them act like people pushed to 
the wall in extreme anxiety, violently many times, to draw attention to the prevailing 
conditions in the region. However, ‘the multiplicity of fronts translates into a multiplicity 
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of agendas, some of them shallow and vaguely articulated as well as inter-militia 
violence’ (Akpan, 2008: 307). Of these movements and splinter fronts, the Movement for 
the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) was one of the first organised movements to 
emerge in 1990 with a clear view and able to articulate its agenda – social justice and 
environmental protection. Their modes of operations were through peaceful 
demonstration; one of such was in 1993 that attracted three hundred thousand Ogoni 
indigenes and protest abroad to attract the international community. However, it is 
important to note at this juncture that these splinter fronts and movements emerged in the 
Niger Delta following the advent of MOSOP and the killing of its leader, Ken Saro-Wiwa 
and eight others by the late Abacha junta in 1995. The death of Saro Wiwa could be said 
to be the turning point in politics in the Niger Delta (Niger Delta Crisis, 2000; Rowell, 
1995).  
 
Notably, the initial peaceful protest by the inhabitants of the oil host communities was as 
a result of neglect, underdevelopment, violation of political and civil rights and 
environmental pollution in response to the activities of oil multinationals, before its 
subsequent motive of using militia violence by some movements and fronts, which has 
made the Niger Delta become a hot bed of self expression and preservation (Akpan, 
2008; Adedoja, 2007; Africa Action, 1999). The emergence of some splinter fronts and 
movements with shallow and vague articulated agenda metamorphosed into surge in 
militancy, kidnapping of expatriates / wealthy indigenes for ransom, inter-militia 
violence, pipeline vandalisation and cult clashes which has exacerbated the tempo of 
violent agitations and restiveness in the region (Adedoja, 2007). ‘The level of criminality 
and the publicity that attends every act of violence tend to project struggles for the 
betterment of conditions in the region from the point of militancy’ (Akpan, 2008: 307). 
Overtime, the altruism that was initially exhibited by splinter groups / militant movement 
gave way to self serving motives and lining their wallets with ransom money for 
example, close to a hundred expatriates / wealthy indigenes in Niger Delta have been 
kidnapped within 2006 – 2008 for ransom; while the condition of the region remained 
unchanged (Alabrah, 2007). The violent agitation in the Niger Delta is manufactured, and 
its purveyors – oil multinationals and the government – are beneficiaries. The victims are, 
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of course, the indigenes of oil host communities (Niger Delta Crisis, 2000). According to 
Mitee, the late Saro Wiwa’s successor (MOSOP), the violent agitation with the use of 
arms and criminal activities have taken over what use to be a peaceful and non-violent 
resistance (Afamefuna, 2008). 
 
2.5.5   GOVERNMENT REACTION TO PROTEST (PEACEFUL AND VIOLENT) 
 
Government reaction to protest for recognition and development in Nigeria’s Niger Delta 
started in early 1990s, however, after a peaceful protest in Ogoni land in 1993 which 
attracted international attention to the environmental challenges faced in the region; this 
event made the then military president Babangida to pass treason and treasonable 
offences decree which states that – any one who works together with international 
association or groups within the country and professes aside to minimize the sovereignty 
of Nigeria is / are guilty of treason and punishment by death (Afamefuna, 2008). The use 
of force by the Babangida junta was prevalent in the region for example; towns like 
Umuechem, Iko community, Bonny and other communities were not spared as they 
experienced surge in mobile police action for protesting, which ends up leaving people 
dead, injured or women / girls raped (Rowell, 1995). In 1993, late General Abacha’s 
junta took control of Nigeria and things became worse for journalists who wrote stories 
on Niger Delta, protesters in the region, especially recognised activists organisation like 
MOSOP. However, in 1995 environmentalist Saro-Wiwa and eight others were killed and 
forty arrested for murder of four prominent Ogoni citizens (Idowu, 1999; Rowell, 1995). 
‘Thus, the accused were denied their right of appeal against their conviction which was 
covered under the Civil Disturbances (Special Tribunal) Decree 1995’ (Idowu, 1999: 
180). The death of Saro-Wiwa spawned a new breed of agitators violent in nature and 
fiercer by the day. The use of fire arms were introduced into the struggle and it continued 
into democracy in 1999 led by President Obasanjo’s victory (Afamefuna, 2008).  
 
The Niger Delta became a violent region of self expression and preservation with the 
emergence of freedom fighters and ethnic militias on every front as they could no longer 
watch their communities destroyed by government forces. Expectedly, the government 
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reacted to the violence with full scale police action, iron fist and in some cases the use of 
palliatives. The government now points a gun at the region with the finger constantly at 
the trigger under the guise of fighting militancy; occasionally the trigger is pulled 
(Akpan, 2008). For example, in 1999 twelve police officers were abducted by hoodlums 
in Odi a community in Bayelsa State, despite the intervention of state government, social 
movement and law officials in the region, the police officers were killed. Thereafter, 
under the command of Obasanjo, a major military operation commenced. Instead of 
going after the miscreants, the community was liquidated; no aspect of the community 
existence was spared. According to Port Harcourt Organisation Environmental Rights 
Action, two thousand, four hundred and eight three unarmed civilians were killed in the 
massacre (Rotberg, 2004). However, instead of removing the federal armed forces from 
the Niger Delta region to restore the people’s confidence, the Obasanjo government 
reached an agreement with the United States government to supply arms and fast track 
boats. MOSOP and IYC condemned the act of military deployment into Niger Delta; they 
interpreted the government move as another military junta, designed to oppress oil 
communities struggling for social and ecological justice (Niger Delta Crisis, 2000).   
 
The government realised that oppression and repressive laws brought more losses than 
revenue (Omoweh, 1995), however, when the late president, Yar’Adua assumed office in 
2007 he indicated that his key aim was to stabilise the crisis in the region. Unlike 
previous government that used force and military might, Yar’Adua went for peace, in the 
pursuit of his goal he constituted a peace and reconciliation committee with the mandate 
to concentrate on conflict resolution in Nigeria’s Niger Delta (Adedoja, 2007). Although, 
just like any other nation that fights crime, late Yar’Adua’s government combats only 
miscreants and militants that bring unrest, civil disturbance to the region, disrupt oil 
production and kidnap expatriates for ransom (Ebiri and Ogbodo, 2008). In July 2008, the 
British government offered to assist in strategic support to completely wipe out militancy 
in the oil rich region to restore law and order in the area. Part of the support, was military 
assistance which Prime Minister (PM) Brown identified as a training and advisory 
package to support late Yar’Adua’s proposed establishment of maritime security in the 
region (Oyedoyin et al, 2008; Ogundele, 2008). However, PM Brown’s proposal to assist 
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with military operations led to reactions in Nigeria and a peaceful demonstration was 
staged by Ijaw Peoples Association (IPA) and other Nigerian groups at the Chatham 
House in London to express their objection. According to the chairman of Ijaw National 
Congress (INC) Tuodolo, PM Brown’s offer was unnecessary at the time negotiations for 
Niger Delta summit were made to end the crisis, and he also noted that PM Brown 
provoked the immediate collapse of a vibrant militant group (MEND) three weeks old 
ceasefire in the Niger Delta region. Thus, the indigenes of the oil producing areas have 
seen too much blood shed because of their oil, any form of foreign / British military 
assistance will only exacerbate the crisis as Nigerian government will be encouraged to 
kill and intimidate the people of Niger Delta (Oyedoyin et al, 2008; see also Senge, 2008; 
Oyedoyin, 2008; Ogundele, 2008).      
 
2.5.6 DIRECTION OF POLICIES (FROM 1960 – 2008) IN THE NIGER DELTA 
 
The abysmal conditions in the Niger Delta have made most individuals dismayed and 
lead them to believe that government has no solid, measurable policies for the region. 
Those who are of this view anchor their position on two reasons. First, there was no 
concrete attempt to address the appalling conditions in the Niger Delta, until the violent 
agitation started. Second, government intervention seems ineffective and appears bleak in 
view of the enormity of the conflict which is almost irresolvable. Previous years of 
government policies in the Niger Delta was perceived as ‘half-hearted and mischievous in 
intent and negative in manifestation leaning towards incremental and or disjointed 
implementation theory of policy making’ (Akpan, 2008: 307). Direction of policies 
emerged in 1957 a year before the exploitation of crude oil started in the region, after 
indigenes of Niger Delta and other ethnic minority groups had protest against the regional 
and central government in the allocation of basic amenities and political appointment to 
the Willink Commission, which was designed to negotiate for constitutional framework 
with which the country would be granted independence from Britain (Afamefuna, 2008; 
Niger Delta Crisis, 2000). Thus, their protest led to the establishment of Niger Delta 
Development Board (NDDB) in 1961 to meet the developmental needs of the region 
(Nwabuawele, 2008; Bassey 2006 in Akpan, 2008; Niger Delta Crisis, 2000).  
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From 1966 onwards the military coups and civil war brought an end to the dreams and 
aspiration of NDDB to cater for the developmental need of the people. In 1969, Gowon 
military regime converted oil revenue to the federal government and enacted the 
petroleum degree, which claims land and mineral resources in the Niger Delta without 
consulting them. According to Gowon’s key adviser Asiodu, the Niger Delta people were 
‘numerically insignificant’ and could not change the state of affairs in the Nigeria scheme 
of things (Niger Delta Crisis, 2000: 2). After the Nigeria civil war in 1970, military reign 
continued and another commission was created – Niger Delta River Basin Development 
Authority (NDBDA) to execute a similar job, however, the commission came to an end 
with the military rule in 1979. In 1980 the democratic president Shagari constituted what 
he called 1.5 percent committee to address the developmental challenges in the Niger 
Delta. The appointed committee did not perform their responsibility until the government 
was overthrown by General Buhari junta in 1983. Nothing was recorded about this 
military regime on the developmental challenges in the Niger Delta (Afamefuna, 2008).   
 
In 1992, the military president Babangida established the Oil and Mineral Producing Area 
Development Commission (OMPADEC) to compensate indigenous communities for 
ecological damage and also develop the region (Idowu, 1999; Akpan, 2008). The 
commission was viewed with suspicion as the chief executive was a high ranking military 
officer in government. However, given the nature of the commission, contracts were 
awarded to pro-government forces that did not challenge the government, Shell and other 
environmental agencies that were suppose to look at the level of degradation; rather, they 
were attracted to contracts for basic amenities in the mist of decay and gross pollution in 
the area. The hunger for government contracts led to the fraternity of traditional leaders 
with the military government, as a result, a chapter of the Association of Traditional 
Rulers in the Oil Producing Area (ATROPA) sprang up to weaken the solidarity of the 
youths (Omoweh, 1995, 1998; Idowu, 1999). Throughout the region the people who 
benefited from the commission were the traditional rulers, retired army generals, 
politicians and touts usually deployed to suppress uprising (Omoweh, 1995).  
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In 1999 following the transition into democracy hopes were high for the Niger Delta 
region. In 2001, the former democratic president Obasanjo went the old way to set up 
another commission, Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), which succeeded 
OMPADEC (Afamefuna, 2008; Akpan, 2008). The summary of the commission’s 
directive at the swearing in was to change the face of Niger Delta through sustainable 
development. The commission was designed by law to receive three percent of all monies 
from the federation account, however, the former chairman of the governing board Edem 
noted that this does not happen but the commission gets arbitrary allocation from the nine 
states in Niger Delta for twelve months. This means the commission is not getting enough 
fund to execute projects and achieve the targeted developmental goal spelt out in the 
master plan. Despite the commission (NDDC) is under funded, its impact is felt much 
more in various communities in Niger Delta than local and state government which 
receive thirteen percent derivation fund from federal government (Ero, 2007; Mamah, 
2008). While the Niger Delta state governors have not shown enough commitment in 
partnering with NDDC, oil multinationals have shown some enthusiasm in partnering the 
commission to achieve a common goal in reinstating peace and stability in the region. 
One of such partner project was with Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) 
and NDDC in the construction of the nine and a half billion naira (approximately forty-
five million pounds) Ogbia-Nembe road, which is a 29.818 kilometre road comprising 
nine bridges (Ero, 2007). It is worth noting here that despite the innovation and 
developmental project executed by NDDC, the anger of the oil host communities in Niger 
Delta have not been completely doused. However, it can be said that the commission 
seem to have reduced the tension a little in the region (Aham, 2007). The diagram below 
by Ero (2007) illustrates net federal allocation into the nine states in Nigeria’s Niger 
Delta region from May 1999 – December 2006. The parts in the table that are in bold 
signifies the selected states used for this research, NDDC and Local Government Areas 
(LGAs), and the total amount of federal allocation (Naira and Pounds equivalent) they 
have received from 1999-2006. 
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TABLE: NET FEDERAL ALLOCATION FROM MAY 1999-DECEMBER 2006 
 
S/N STATES/LGAs/NDDC AMOUNT (N) AMOUNT (£) 
rate @ N238 to 
£1 
1 ABIA STATE 93.883 Billion 395 Million 
2 AKWA IBOM STATE 331.358 Billion 1.4 Billion 
3 BAYELSA STATE 379.369 Billion 1.6 Billion 
4 CROSS RIVERS STATE 103.329 Billion 434 Million 
5 DELTA STATE 425,830 Billion 1.79 Billion 
6 EDO STATE 107,639 Billion 449 Million 
7 IMO STATE 118,724 Billion 500 Million 
8 ONDO STATE 160,558 Billion 675 Million 
9 RIVERS STATE 440,013 Billion 1.85 Billion 
 SUBTOTAL 2,160.703 Trillion 9.2 Billion 
 Local Govt Councils 671 Billion 2.8 Billion 
 Total (states and LGAs) 2,831.703 Trillion 12 Billion 
 NDDC 241.5 Billion 1.017Billion 
 SUM TOTAL  3,073,203 Trillion 13 Billion 
                  
 
It is indeed plausible from the above available record that states and local government 
areas receive a sizeable amount of revenue from the federal government than the 
commission (NDDC) created to meet the developmental need of the people. The 
challenges faced by the commission are not only enormous but the indigenes in the Niger 
Delta are in a hurry to feel its impact. Thus, NDDC appears to be an alternative 
government to which all their demands are directed. State and local government seem to 
be doing less as indigenes complaint of their inaction and acknowledge the presence of 
NDDC in the building of schools, canalisation of the waterway, jetties, provision of clean 
water and others (Ero, 2007).  
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The late democratic president Umaru Yar’Adua who assumed office in 2007 continued 
with the vision of NDDC and also indicated a fifteen year master plan for the region 
because of the unabated agitation (Akpan, 2008). In view of expanding projects in the 
Niger Delta, Yar’Adua [late] made known his intention in early 2008 to create a new 
Niger Delta Ministry to tackle the unending challenges in the region (Walker, 2008). His 
intention prompted debate between critics; an activist and human rights lawyer notes that 
creating the Niger Delta ministry generates more bureaucracy that will avoid the real 
issues in the region. The information minister Odey and senator Yale note that the new 
ministry will create jobs, provide education and will undertake civil infrastructure 
projects (Walker, 2008; Daily Trust, 2008). However, 10th of September 2008, the 
Nigeria’s cabinet approved a new ministry for the Niger Delta region [Ministry of Niger 
Delta] (Reuters, 2008). The secretary to Nigeria’s federal government, Ahmed notes that 
the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) will be a parastatal under the 
Ministry of Niger Delta (Taiwo, 2008). According to Akpan (2008), the formation of one 
policy after another appears to be incremental and ends up suffering from disjointed 
implementation. Incremental policy is a situation where a policy maker ‘uses practical 
devices which do not pretend to search for comprehensive solutions that may be difficult 
or even impossible, to achieve’ (Adebayo, 1986: 33). Thus, in regulating one policy after 
another, the whole succession may seem disjointed and each tried solution is another 
incremental of the other (Adebayo, 1986). 
 
2.5.7   REFLEXIVE SECTION 
 
This section briefly explains the ethical dimension of transferring research paradigms in 
this study on risk society thesis largely developed in the west to that of the Africa context. 
Academic theories / literatures on risk society seem to be lacking in Africa due to lack of 
participation in the media and risk field. It is worth noting here that the achievements or 
failure of attempts in dealing with risk in the industrialised west inheres with Africa. In 
order to further the field of risk society thesis both in Africa and the west, my research 
engaged literatures formulated in the west; however, not limited to European cultures 
alone but can be generalised to the international community because from early twenty-
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first century, environmental risk issues started to dominate international agendas for a 
whole generation of political leaders, government officials, academic community, NGOs 
and concerned citizens (see Greene, 2006). Academic literature on risk society used in 
this study referred to industrial societies in late modernity as global risk society (see 
Becks, 1995b: 7). The concept of risk is linked to reflexivity because worries about 
contemporary risk issues tend to pose questions about modern practices, which has led to 
the global awareness of risk that cuts across boundaries leading to world wide treaty. For 
example, global warming is of concern to the world despite intense disagreement whether 
the Earth climate is warming or not and if global climate change is man made or natural. 
As a result of global reaction to modern risk, the need to form new alliances, of ad hoc 
groups, a modern and different type of politics beyond traditional hierarchies have 
emerged (See, Lupton, 1999). This is evident in the Niger Delta situation as 
environmental activist groups in the region informed the international community of the 
risk issues that bedevil the region on a daily basis. By these processes risk society 
becomes world risk society in which political debate and action is globalised (See 
Lupton, 1999; Beck, 1992: 1995b). Nigerian as a nation will respond to risk issues due to 
inactive policies like any other nation in the west and this is the reason why there is 
conflict in the Niger Delta region. However, the conceptual framework on risk society 
used in this study fits reasonably well the issues in the Niger Delta region under 
investigation and the methods adopted for this study because the risk society thesis can be 
generalised and referred to universally.   
 
Against this backdrop, the researcher came up with intriguing questions that were used 
for the survey [questionnaire] see appendix 1 and qualitative [interview] see appendix 2 
in order to answer the very timely and penetrating Research Questions, in what has been, 
to date, a very under-researched area – namely, exploring the flows and impacts of trust 
and risk communication in agenda setting in a less developed country. See chapter one 
for an outline of main Research Questions; however, the main Research Questions for 
this study will be discussed further in chapter five.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter clearly explains the structure, aim and procedure of the methodological 
advances the researcher used in conducting this research. This study is a case study 
research method. The researcher used three states in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region for the 
purpose of this study namely, Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers. The research design the 
researcher adopted for this research is the survey (quantitative / qualitative) method and 
interview (qualitative) method. Both methods are discussed in detail in this chapter.     
 
3.0. (i) CASE STUDY RESEARCH METHOD 
 
Case study research has been a useful tool for investigating specific issues and trends in 
diverse disciplines and professions. This method entails testing theoretical models or 
theories by applying them in real world situation: that is, testing if scientific theories and 
models actually work in real life scenario. Case study research method entails in-depth 
investigation of a specific situation. ‘It is a research method used to narrow down a very 
broad field of research into one easily researchable topic’ (Shuttleworth, 2008: 1). Thus, 
the case study research method for this study is an empirical inquiry that examines a 
current phenomenon [Niger Delta conflict] within its real life context; where boundaries 
between reality and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of 
evidence are consulted (Yin, 1994).  
 
Critics of case study method note that small number of cases cannot offer reliability or 
generality of findings. Others believe biases can occur in the findings because of intense 
exposure to the study. Some argue that because a case study is such a narrow field that its 
finding cannot be generalized to fit an entire study population or question under 
investigation. However, researchers from diverse disciplines continue to adopt case study 
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research methodologies with success in carefully designed and crafted studies of real life 
situations, issues and conflict. Thus, in case study research methodology, new and 
unexpected findings might emerge during its course, and lead to research taking new 
directions (Yin, 1994; Soy, 1997; Shuttleworth, 2008). The technique used for organising 
and conducting this case study is explained below. It is worth noting here that the 
researcher did not use content analysis because this study is not searching for correlation 
between the Nigerian news media’s output and it did not examine media content and 
textual analyses that do analyze messages or depend on archival or pre-existing 
documents for data. 
 
The first step the researcher adopted in this case study was to establish a firm research 
focus by developing research questions about the situation and issues to be studied and 
determining the purpose of the study. The researcher reviewed literatures that have been 
previously conducted to gain insightful questions into the problem the study presents. 
Thus, careful definition of questions emerging from a limited number of occurrences and 
their inter-relationship directed the researcher’s attention to pinpoint where to look for 
evidence and determine what method of analysis to use for this study. The researcher 
adopted a multiple real life cases [Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers State] to examine in-depth. 
It is worth bearing in mind that when using multiple cases, each case is treated as a single 
case and the findings / conclusions from each case can then be generalised to the study, 
but each remain a single case. However, the cases for this study represent a variety of 
geographical areas in the Nigeria’s Niger Delta region (Soy, 1997). Other techniques 
used for case study research such as selection of cases [area of study], data gathering and 
analysis techniques are discussed extensively in this chapter. Data analysis will be in the 
fourth chapter and discussion of the findings and report preparation will be discussed in 
the fifth chapter of this study.     
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3.1 AREA OF STUDY 
 
The areas for this study are three states in the Niger Delta part of Nigeria namely: Delta, 
Bayelsa and Rivers. This section will critically explain why the researcher chose the case 
studies for this research.   
 
The Nigerian political landscape is divided into six geo-political zones namely: North 
West States, North Central States, North East States, South West States, South East States 
and South South States. The political landscape for this research is the South South geo-
political zone [also called Niger Delta] comprising nine multi-ethnic states of the 
federation of Nigeria (Ashong and Udoudo, 2008; Paden, 2008). Below is a map of 
Nigeria numerically showing the locations of the nine multi-ethnic states in the Niger 
Delta region.  
 
Figure 1: MAP OF NIGERIA 
   
 
 
(1). Abia, (2). Akwa Ibom, (3). Bayelsa, (4). Cross rivers, (5). Delta, (6). Edo, (7). 
Imo, (8). Ondo, (9). Rivers  
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The Niger Delta is endowed with mangrove rainforest, creeks, swamps and streams 
formed by River Niger which is the third longest river in Africa with a length of 4,180km 
(Akpan, 2008). Underneath its waters are found the natural resources of  crude oil and gas 
which serves as the nation’s engine, accounting for ninety percent of Nigeria’s income 
and twenty-five percent of gross domestic products (GDP) (Okonta and Douglas,2003; 
Akpan, 2008). The Niger Delta is estimated to have nearly two hundred oil fields, and 
over four hundred production and reserve facilities in diverse locations within its swamps 
and creeks. Notably, gas production in the Niger Delta has made Nigeria the world 
seventh biggest supplier of natural gas with a total of 2.4 percent of world reserve 
(Nwabuawele, 2008; also see Akpan, 2008; Okonta and Douglas, 2003). The Niger Delta 
is distinctive for its multi-ethnicity and has a total population of thirty one million, two 
hundred and twenty-four thousand, eight hundred and seventy-eight indigenes (National 
Population Commission, 2006). The oil and gas facilities in the Niger Delta are operated 
by multinational oil companies such as Shell, Mobil, Chevron, Elf, Agip and Texaco, in 
joint venture with the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). However, most 
of the conflict the region is currently experiencing (1956-2010) is as a result of crude oil 
exploration and exploitation (Akpan, 2008; Ashong and Udoudo, 2008).  
 
The South South geo-political landscape [Niger Delta] in Nigeria has over the years 
experienced conflict arising from risk issues such as environmental degradation due to oil 
exploration, for example; within 2006 and the first six months of 2008, one thousand, two 
hundred and sixty oil spills was recorded in the Niger Delta (Ochayi and Okereke, 2008; 
Lawal et al, 2008). Despite the large financial resources that have been allocated to the 
Niger Delta within the last nine years [1999-2008] of democracy in Nigeria, the 
developmental challenges in the region remained substantially unaddressed, a 
development that further triggered violent agitations and restiveness in the region 
(Adedoja, 2007). The neglect of these facts by the government and multinational oil 
companies has degenerated to increase conflict of interests over the years. However, the 
struggle for wealth control is most pronounced in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria due to 
the abuse and misuse of power (Osinachi, 2006).  
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The enormity of conflict and risk issues is pronounced in three states in the Niger Delta 
region namely: Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers which produce significant percentage of crude 
oil and also experience violence between the government, indigenes of oil host 
communities and multinational oil corporations. However, the researcher chose the 
aforementioned states for this study because the risk events emanating from crude oil 
exploration and violent agitation in the region seem to defy pattern of policy formulation. 
In addition, the aforementioned states receive more federal allocation than other states in 
the Niger Delta [see chart in 2.5.6] because they produce the most crude oil and yet 
experience utmost violence (Nwabuawele, 2008). Taking into account the enormity of 
conflict due to environmental degradation in the Niger Delta, the researcher was able to 
acquire adequate information from the target population in Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers 
State because the awareness of the conflict will be prevalent in these states. Thus, the 
researcher explains below why each of the selected states was chosen for this research. 
 
3.1. (i) DELTA STATE 
 
Delta State was created out of the defunct Bendel State on August 27th 1991; it has 
twenty-five Local Government Areas (LGAs) with a total population of four million, 
ninety-eight thousand, three hundred and ninety-one indigenes (National Population 
Commission, 2006) and the capital city is situated in Asaba. There are five major ethnic 
groups in Delta State namely- Urhobo, Isoko, Igbo, Ezon and Itsekiri. (NgEX, 2006). 
Delta State was the second location where oil was found in 1958 by SPDC, about the 
same period oil was discovered in Ogoniland in Rivers State (Omoweh, 1998). At 
present, Delta State receives the second largest federal revenue allocation [see chart in 
2.5.6, page 73] because it is the second largest oil producing state in Nigeria and supplies 
about thirty-five percent of the nation’s crude oil and significant amount of natural gas 
(NgEX, 2006). Consequently, environmental degradation in Delta State such as oil spills, 
pipeline explosion leading to thousands of deaths for example; the 1998 Jesse community 
fire explosion in Delta State recorded over a thousand deaths (see, Campbell, 2001) and 
destruction of vegetation [see graphic illustration in 2.5.1, page 57-8]. Health 
consequences linked to gas flaring and underdevelopment within the region has further 
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increased the tempo of violent agitation in the region (Ochayi and Okereke, 2008; 
Ransome-Kuti, 2007; Omoweh, 1998). Thus, protest in Niger Delta over environmental 
degradation and underdevelopment was first started in Isoko community in Delta State 
under the umbrella of Francis Okpozio from 1974 to the 1980s before the emergence of 
different fronts currently operating in the region (Omoweh, 1998).   
 
3.1.(ii) BAYELSA STATE 
 
Bayelsa State was created out of the old Rivers State on October 1, 1996 with its capital 
situated at Yenagoa; at the time of creation there were only eight Local Government 
Areas (LGAs); however, in the wake of democracy in 1999 additional twenty-four local 
government areas were created totalling thirty-two LGAs. The aim of this creation was to 
bring the government and development closer to indigenes at the grassroots (Jonathan, 
2006). Bayelsa State has a total population of one million, seven hundred and three 
thousand, three hundred and fifty-eight indigenes (National Population Commission, 
2006). It shares boundaries with Rivers States on the east, Delta State on the north and 
the Atlantic Ocean on the west and south. Oil was first struck in commercial quantity in 
1956 at Oloibiri in Ogbia LGA (then Eastern Region of Nigeria, later became Rivers 
State) and currently Bayelsa State. There are hundreds of oil wells and flow stations 
across the state and contributes thirty percent of Nigeria’s oil production. The major oil 
multinational companies operating in the region are Shell, Agip, Chevron Texaco 
(Jonathan, 2006). Bayelsa State receives the third largest federal revenue allocation [see 
table in 2.5.6, page 73] because it is the third largest oil producing state in the country. 
Despite the huge amount of revenue allocation into the state from federal government, 
restiveness and protest in the region have triggered government action that led to 
thousands of death. For example, in 1999 the former president Obansajor ordered military 
operation in Odi community in Bayelsa State which claimed the lives of over two 
thousand people (Rotberg, 2004: also see Afamefuna, 2008). On February 19th, 2005 
Dickson the community spokesman for Odioma in Bayelsa State note that over one 
thousand, five hundred people lost their lives and about three thousand people detained 
under military operation over land dispute where Shell had started drilling crude oil 
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designated as Toru-9 flow station (Ijaw National Congress, 2005). At present, militancy 
in the region is prevalent for example, on the twenty-sixth of December 2008, not fewer 
than ten militants were killed by military officers at Agip flow station in Tebidaba in 
Bayelsa State (Adebayo, 2008).  
 
3.1.(iii)  RIVERS STATE  
 
Rivers State was created in 1967 with the split of the Eastern Region of Nigeria; at the 
time of creation, Rivers State had fifteen Local Government Areas (LGAs) and after 
Bayelsa State was carved out in 1996, additional eight LGAs were created making a total 
of twenty-three LGAs in the State (NgEX, 2006). The Capital is situated in Port-Harcourt 
and the state has a total population of five million, one hundred and eight-five thousand, 
four hundred indigenes (National Population Commission, 2006). Rivers State receives 
the largest federal revenue allocation because it is the largest producing oil state in the 
country which account for more than forty percent of Nigeria crude oil production and a 
significant amounts of natural gas. The state is classified as the nerve centre of over 
ninety industrial concerns, including major multinational oil company like SPDC, AGIP, 
Texaco, ELF, Chevron, NNPC and Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) project, 
operating in the state (NgEX, 2006). Protest in Rivers State over underdevelopment and 
environmental degradation have led to hundreds and thousands of deaths. For instance, 
the execution of environmental activists Kenule Saro-Wiwa and eight others against 
SPDC on the account of environmental degradation in 1995 by the late Abacha-led Junta 
(Rowell, 1995). However, after the death of Kenule Saro-Wiwa and eight others, the 
initial peaceful protest became violent as fire arms were now introduced in Rivers State 
and other parts of the Niger Delta (Afamefuna, 2008).    
 
3. 2 DESIGN OF THE STUDY   
 
In social science research, design of the study is a step-by-step guide or procedural plan 
employed by the researcher to acquire answers to research questions and problems – 
through the selection of a sample that suits the study, collection of relevant data that can 
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be used as a basis for testing a hypothesis and analysing the results. Thus, the research 
design for this study is aimed at answering questions validly, objectively, accurately and 
economically (Kerlinger, 1986; Thyer, 1993). The foregoing definition directs the 
researcher’s attention to two main functions of the research design. The first conjures the 
identification and development of design procedures and the logistical arrangements 
needed to undertake the study, and the second highlights the significance of quality in the 
adopted procedure to ensure appropriateness (validity, objectivity and accuracy) of the 
findings (Kumar, 2005). The research design the researcher adopted for this study is the 
survey (Quantitative) method and interview (Qualitative) method. Both methods are 
explained in detail below.  
 
3.3 SURVEY METHOD [QUANTITATIVE / QUALITATIVE QUESTIONS] 
 
The use of survey method is an essential part of social science research as they offer 
quick and relatively inexpensive way of obtaining the required results (characteristics and 
belief) of the population at large. Survey methods are frequently used in social science 
research, mostly by academic researchers, government and campaigning organisations 
alike. The method involves the collection of data from a large or even very large 
population. Notably, through the use of a representative sample, all surveys aim to 
explain the features or opinions of a population. Thus, some surveys are constructed to 
test theories and some aim to construct theories. Good survey research follows a regular 
procedure to test and develop a theory whereby a hypothesis or hypotheses will be 
formed. The formation of a hypothesis or hypotheses is the assumption which is deduced 
from a theory, which if found to be accurate will support the theory and if found to be 
contradictory will oppose all or part of the theory (May, 2007). In accordance with this 
study, hypotheses were developed to test theories and where necessary support / confirm 
or refute. It is worth bearing in mind that the question of confirmation and disproving of 
theories is controversial and complex; hence, in surveys, researchers usually seek 
statistical confirmation for a theory rather than proof. Surveys aim to demonstrate causal 
relationships; for example, what is perceived to be the main cause of the Niger Delta 
conflict? Might it be environmental degradation, underdevelopment, or unemployment? 
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For the most part, surveys demonstrate the potency of statistical association with 
variables (May, 2007). Just like any other method in all sciences, the survey method is 
not error free. The process used to carry out a survey has a significant effect on the 
probability that the result from the data will explain accurately what they are intended to 
describe. Embedded in sample survey are three distinct methodologies; sampling, 
designing questions and data collection. Each of these methods has many functions out 
side of sample surveys; however, if used together develops a good survey design (Fowler, 
2002). 
 
3.3(i) SAMPLING          
 
Sampling is the procedure used in selecting a few (a sample) from a larger group (the 
sampling population) in other to form the basis for predicting the spread of an unknown 
section of information or outcome regarding the larger group (May, 2007; Kumar, 2005). 
When using sampling method, there are different terminologies and steps the researcher 
must put in mind before carrying out the research, for example; in this study, the 
researcher collected information from eight hundred and eleven respondents out of one 
thousand two hundred potential respondents from the three selected states in the Niger 
Delta [see 3.1 for population size]. The three states from which the researcher collected 
the information in order to answer his research questions are classified as the study 
population. The small group of respondents selected from the larger group to obtain the 
required information is called the sample. The number of respondents the researcher 
collected the required information from is classified as the sample size. The way the 
researcher selected respondents is called sampling strategy and each respondent that 
became the basis for collecting the sample is classified as sampling unit. The findings 
obtained from the respondents (sample) are classified as sample statistics and the 
predictions or estimates arrived at from the sample statistics are classified as sample 
parameters (Kumar, 2005; Fowler, 2002).   
 
Sampling method is not error free, thus the method has its advantages and disadvantages 
when selecting a small group (sample) from the larger group (study population). The 
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advantages are that it saves time, human resources and it is cost effective. The 
disadvantage is that the result derived from the sample is used to predict or estimate the 
total population characteristics of interest. Thus, the possibility of an error in the 
researcher’s prediction or estimation exists. Factors that may affect the inference drawn 
from a sample on the one hand is the size of the sample; this is, results obtained from 
larger sample size are considered more accurate than those based on smaller ones. 
However, if a study population is small with respect to its features under study, a small 
sample can supply a valuable estimate, but if it is very large the researcher needs to select 
a larger sample to acquire an effective estimate. For example, in this study, the researcher 
chose a larger sample [one thousand two hundred respondents] because the study 
population is very large [see, 3.1 for population size]. On the other hand, the researcher 
must consider the extent of deviation in the sampling population; that is, the larger the 
standard deviation from the characteristics [age-21 and above, gender- male and female, 
rural/urban split, high / low literacy level, skilled/unskilled workers and students] under 
study for a given sample size, the higher will be the error (Kumar, 2005). Most samples 
are flawed in some ways; however, the researcher ensured that the characteristics of the 
sample used for this research, though not perfect, but should reflect a significant aspect of 
the total population.     
 
There are different types of sampling methods namely; random / probability sampling, 
non-random / non-probability sampling and mixed sampling design. The researcher chose 
the random sampling design for this study. However, there are three commonly used 
types of random / probability design; simple random sampling, stratified random 
sampling and cluster sampling. The researcher used simple random sampling design for 
this study because each unit in the sampling population of interest has an equal and 
independent chance of selection in the sample (May, 1997). Equal chance of selection 
means that the choice of a unit in a sample is not manipulated by other thoughts such as 
personal preference, while the independent chance of selection means that the choice of 
one unit during sampling is not dependent upon the choice of another unit in the sampling 
(Kumar, 2005; Fowler, 2002). There are two ways of drawing a random sample; 
sampling with replacement and sampling without replacement. The researcher used 
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sampling without replacement in order to avoid choosing any member of the population 
more than once. To ensure sampling without replacement or each sample from the target 
population is not chosen more than once for this study, the researcher ensured that after 
questionnaires were distributed and collected in a particular area, the researcher moved 
on to the next target area without revisiting areas that have been covered. However, to 
ensure randomness during distribution of questionnaires every fifth person of the target 
population were asked to participate in the study. In order to ensure representativeness of 
the study population, the areas [rural / urban split] where the questionnaires were 
distributed, selected individuals, such as, male and female within the target age range 
[twenty-one years and above] with high / low literacy level, skilled and unskilled workers 
and students had an equal chance of selection (Spiegel et al, 2000). Thus, an unbiased 
sampling strategy is very important because it will better represent the population in a 
long run, and also allow the researcher to draw externally valid conclusions about the 
population. However, this may not guarantee a perfect representation of the total 
population (Kumar, 2005: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2004).  
  
3.3(ii) INSTRUMENTATION / DESIGNING RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
 
In social science research, the category of the study population, the resources available 
and the nature of research question will determine the type of research instrument to use. 
The research instrument used for the quantitative part of this study was the questionnaire. 
However, there are three types of questionnaires used in survey when collecting data 
from respondents: the face-to-face interview, the telephone survey and the mail or self 
completion questionnaire. The researcher adopted the self completion questionnaire 
because it is a more cost effective method of data collection than the others (May, 1997). 
The criteria for adoption of the questionnaire method are as follows: First, the 
geographical distribution of the study population – the target population are relatively 
large and they are scattered over a wide geographical area [see 3.1]. Second, the nature of 
the investigation – the researcher felt that a larger number of potential respondents 
[inhabitants of oil affected region] may feel reluctant to discuss the issues the study is 
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investigating. Putting this into consideration, the researcher felt that the questionnaire 
would be the best option as it ensures anonymity (Kumar, 2005).  
 
The self completion questionnaire has its advantages and disadvantages; the advantages 
are as follows. First, it is cost effective. Second, the anonymity of respondents may be 
advantageous especially when dealing with sensitive issues such as political or ethical 
issues. Third, respondents take their own time to fill in the questionnaires and also 
consider their responses. Fourth, it saves time especially when covering a wider 
geographical area at a lower cost. The disadvantages, on the other hand, are that response 
rate may be low. Second, after the questionnaire is administered there may be no control 
over who answers the questions; for example, the researcher may target girls in the 
household, but boys may fill it instead. Third, the possibility of investigating beyond the 
answer respondent give is absent. Fourth, the opportunity for the researcher to clarify 
issues is lacking; that is, if a respondent does not understand the question or interpret it 
wrongly, it will definitely affect the quality of data provided (May, 2005; Fowler, 2002). 
Considering the strengths and weaknesses of the questionnaire, the researcher adopted 
some measures in other to cushion the weaknesses to a minimal level for effective data 
collection. To be precise, before the researcher started obtaining data from potential 
respondents, it was in the researcher’s interest to make sure that respondents were willing 
to share information with the researcher. That is, the researcher encouraged and 
motivated the respondents by explaining clearly and in simple terms the significance of 
the study, at the time of distribution and through the introductory or cover letter of the 
questionnaire. Second, the researcher endeavoured to make respondents understand what 
is expected of them in the questions in order to achieve the required results. Third, it is an 
imperative prerequisite that respondents should have an understanding of what the study 
is about. In other words, respondents must have the information sought. Fourth, in a 
situation where respondents may find some questions difficult [probably due to literacy 
issue] and need further assistance filling in the questionnaire, the researcher provided a 
contact phone number and email address to clarify any issues or query [see appendix 1, 
cover letter for questionnaire]. Fortunately, there was no contact from respondents over 
issues such as difficult questions or query of any kind, perhaps it might be due to 
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respondents’ embarrassment / apathy or the questions were straight forward and no 
difficulties were encountered. Fifth, the questionnaire was designed in such a way that 
respondents will trust that their anonymity will be ensured. That is, no name and contact 
information were required (Kumar, 2005).  
 
Having decided upon the type of questionnaire used for this study, it was imperative to 
construct the form and wording of the questions with extreme care as they will definitely 
affect the quality and type of information obtained. The researcher constructed some key 
guidelines to aid in designing the questions for this study: first, the researcher avoided 
using questions that were insufficiently specific. Second, bearing in mind the intended 
target population, it was imperative to use the simplest language to convey the meaning 
of the research questions. Third, language that sounded prejudicial was avoided. Fourth, 
the use of ambiguous, hypothetical and vague words was avoided in other to get the 
desired result. Fifth, caution was applied when asking personal questions especially as 
this study related to political and ethical issues. Finally, the researcher ensured the target 
population had the necessary knowledge to answer the questions before administering the 
questionnaires. That is, respondents’ knowledge was measured by asking them if they 
have sufficient knowledge about the Niger Delta conflict before administering the 
questionnaires (for more see, May, 1997). See appendix I, for questions as an example of 
good practice. 
 
As the nature and structure of the questionnaires for this study were intended for 
respondents to fill out themselves, a cover letter was also required. It is worth bearing in 
mind that a good cover letter should explain the purpose of the questionnaire; stressing 
the relevance for co-operation and anonymity of replies are therefore required. 
Respondents were made to understand that participation was voluntary and they had the 
right to respond or not. However, the researcher’s contact number was provided in case 
the respondents had any questions and also a return address for the questionnaires and 
deadline for its return was made available. At the end of the covering letter the researcher 
thanked the respondents for their participation in the study (May, 1997; Kumar, 2005). 
See appendix I, for cover letter as a specific example of good practice.  
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The questionnaire for this study was divided into two sections and respondents were 
given instructions on how to answer the questions in each section. The first section 
entailed personal information from respondents such as location, sex, age range and 
occupation. The following questions will help the researcher see how views vary between 
different groups of the population. The second section consisted of research questions 
that were intended for the respondents to answer. The research questions for this study 
were in open-ended and closed-ended format; however, a larger portion of the questions 
were in closed-ended format. Closed-ended questions are very useful for collecting 
factual information, while open-ended questions give respondents the opportunity to 
express their opinion and perception about a given issue. In other words, it gives room for 
more information (Kumar, 2005; Fowler, 2002; May, 1997).  Considering the relevance 
of this research and to a get an appropriate or a more positive feedback from respondents 
via the use of questionnaire, the researcher decided to pilot the questionnaire on a sub-
sample before it was distributed to the full sample. The reason for this action is to enable 
the researcher take account of any unforeseen problems in the administration of the 
questionnaires, such as rephrasing questions, length of questions or the elimination or 
addition of questions (May, 2002).  
 
The pilot survey was conducted among fifteen Nigerians that are indigenes of Nigeria’s 
Niger Delta who are current and have a vast knowledge about the Niger Delta conflict. 
The method of distribution the researcher used was via e-mail and responses received 
were by phone and e-mail. The options in question thirteen were rephrased from ‘very 
good’, ‘good’, ‘poor’ and ‘very poor’ to ‘very high quality’, ‘high quality’, ‘neither high 
nor low quality’ ‘low quality’ and ‘very low quality’ in order to get a positive feedback 
from respondents by giving them a better option. Question seventeen was also rephrased 
from ‘Do you think changing the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) to 
Ministry of Niger Delta will solve the Niger Delta crisis?’ to ‘Do you think the creation 
of Ministry of Niger Delta alongside the operation of Niger Delta Development 
Commission (NDDC) will end the conflict in the Niger Delta?’ because my attention was 
drawn to the creation of the Niger Delta Ministry alongside Niger Delta Development 
Commission (NDDC). This is because as at the time the literature review was 
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constructed, there was still debate over the creation of Niger Delta Ministry [see appendix 
I]. These were the only amendments the researcher made before the questionnaires were 
administered to the full sample.   
 
3.3(iii) DISTRIBUTION AND METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION               
 
The researcher distributed a total of one thousand two hundred questionnaires in the area 
of study [Niger Delta]. That is, four hundred questionnaires were distributed to each of 
the chosen states; Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers. Taking into account the large geographical 
terrain of each state [see, 3.1] and how the target population are scattered over the prime 
areas [oil producing communities] within each chosen states, the researcher had to travel 
to these prime regions to monitor the distribution and collection of questionnaires. The 
method of distributing the questionnaires was by face-to-face as mail would have been 
ineffective because the researcher did not want to send questionnaires at random since he 
was not too familiar with the terrain. To effectively achieve this purpose, the researcher 
thought it pertinent to employ individuals in each of the prime areas to help monitor the 
distribution and ensure that a reasonable amount of questionnaires were retrieved before 
the set deadline for this purpose and handed back to the researcher. Another reason for 
employing these helping hands in the prime areas was to save time and money as the 
researcher was very busy visiting other areas for this study. 
 
However, the individuals [four in each state, both male and female within the age of 20-
35] the researcher employed for the purpose of distribution and collection of 
questionnaires were trained and given instructions on how to execute their functions 
adequately. First, respondents must be twenty-one years and above. Second, to ensure 
everyone in the region has a random and equal chance of being selected, the researcher 
instructed the employed individuals on locations that will be used and the researcher 
personally monitored the distribution of questionnaires to the various locations needed for 
this research to avoid only certain types of people from answering the questions. The 
locations used for the distribution of questionnaires were colleges and universities 
[academic and non-academic staffs and students were used for the study], government 
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and private institutions, skilled and unskilled labour - that is, areas where people are 
predominantly engaged in fishing, agriculture, local trade and community leaders. Thus, 
it is worth noting here that the locations used for this study were core areas that are at the 
centre of the conflict within the selected states. In Delta State, the locations used for the 
survey were – Sapele, Warri, Ughelli, Oleh, and Asaba. The locations used for the survey 
in Bayelsa State were – Yenagoa, Amassoma, Odi and Kaiama. The locations used for 
the survey in Rivers State were – Ogu-bolo, Okrika, Port-Harcourt, Bori, Gokana and 
Ogoniland. Third, after distribution the researcher gave instructions to the employed 
individuals on how to follow up and collect the questionnaires as it might take days for 
some respondents to actually fill in the questionnaires and return. Fourth, the standard set 
date the researcher used for the collection of questionnaires was three working days. The 
reason for this decision is that, on the one hand, from the researcher’s previous 
experience the longer questionnaires stays in the hands of respondents the harder it 
becomes to retrieve, in most cases, loss of questionnaires may occur through migration or 
respondents forgetting to return the questionnaire. Furthermore, the people employed 
may forget who they have issued the questionnaires to.              
 
3.3 (iv) POPULATION OF THE STUDY 
 
The target population for this study are respondents within the age of twenty-one years 
and above, and were both male and female from the selected states [Delta, Bayelsa and 
Rivers] in the area of study [Niger Delta]. The reasons for selecting the target age range 
in the aforementioned states are as follows: First, in the researcher’s own point of view, 
respondents within this age group are classified to be independent in making their own 
informed decision without any form of interference from external sources when filling in 
the questionnaires. Second, for clarity sake, the crisis is not new and can be better 
understood as a long-drawn out historical process which can be traced back to 1956 when 
oil was first struck in the Niger Delta. Considering the age range, the researcher felt that 
respondents must have availed history knowledge of the crisis through diverse forms of 
institutions and also experience in person any form of current crisis, government plans / 
motive and environmental degradation within the region. Third, the target population can 
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clearly express themselves when filling in the questionnaire especially the open-ended 
questions. This is because the total adult literacy rate from 2003-2008 in Nigeria was 72 
percent (UNICEF, 2010). Fourth, the researcher made sure by asking respondents in the 
chosen region their level of educational attainment / knowledge about the Niger Delta 
conflict before questionnaires were administered in order to acquire the necessary / 
adequate information needed for this study.  
  
3.3(v) METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The tool of data analysis adopted for this study is the Microsoft Excel Package. The 
analysis entails the structuring and organising of data from which conclusions can be 
drawn and verified (Collis and Hussey, 2003). For example, the questionnaire was 
designed to measure various aspects of respondents’ view on the Niger Delta crisis in 
Nigeria. The researcher came up with twenty possible questions and each question was a 
statement followed by variables in subcategories, for instance, ‘very often’, ‘often’, 
‘rarely’ and ‘very rarely’. Thus, the questionnaire for this study is made up of multiple 
items each of which demands a response from the same individuals. As such, the design 
is a repeated measure. Thus, repeated measures go in different columns, different 
questions on a questionnaire should each have their own column in Excel (Field, 2005: 
1). Hence, for the purpose of this study, the research data gathered was analysed using 
Microsoft Excel Package and the responses from the target population was presented in 
bar charts. The method the researcher used to calculate respondents response rate via 
questionnaire to percentage is shown below:  
 
Number of responses                                100 
Total number of respondents                     1        
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3.4 INTERVIEWING [QUALITATIVE METHODOLOGY]           
 
Qualitative interviewing is one of the most commonly used methods to obtain 
information from individuals or understand our fellow human beings in social sciences. 
This process has a wide multiplicity of forms and variety of uses. There are two types of 
format used during the interview; the individual, which usually takes the form of face-to-
face verbal interchange and the face-to-face group interviewing (Fontana and Frey, 
1998). Beyond the wide objectives of testing hypothesis / concepts, theoretical 
development and objectives of description, qualitative interviewing may also be relevant 
in the combination with other methods. That is, ‘insights gained from qualitative 
interviewing may improve the quality of survey design and interpretation’ (Gaskell, 
2000: 39). In qualitative interviewing, there are four types of interviews; structured 
interview, the semi-structured interview, the unstructured or focus interview and the 
group interview (Flick, 2002). For the purpose of this research, the researcher adopted the 
semi-structured interview as questions were specified or fixed on the issues investigated 
and the researcher is also free to probe beyond the answers and thus engage the 
interviewee in a dialogue. However, this method would allow the researcher to seek 
clarification and elaboration on issues or the answers given. The semi-structured 
interview permits the interviewee to answer questions using their own terms and thus 
provide a greater structure for comparability. This method of interview is useful because 
the researcher had specific focus for the interviews within the range of the other method 
[questionnaire] employed for this study (May, 1997).  
 
The qualitative interviewing method has its own advantages and disadvantages; the 
advantages are as follows: First, in an interview, questions that are not quite clear to the 
interviewee can be explained by the interviewer. Second, qualitative interviewing is a 
way of collecting in-depth information by probing. Third, the interview is appropriate for 
complex situation; that is, studies that are complex and sensitive in nature, the researcher 
can prepare the respondents before asking sensitive questions and explain difficult / 
complex questions to the respondents in person. The disadvantages of qualitative 
interview are as follows: First, interview is expensive and time-consuming. Second, in an 
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interview, the quality of information obtained is affected by the skills, experience and 
commitments of the interviewer. Third, the quality of communication between the 
researcher and respondent in an interview is likely to affect the quality of information 
obtained (Kumar, 2005).  
 
Thus, taking into account the disadvantages of interviews, in order to cushion this effect, 
the researcher employed three necessary conditions to the successful completion of an 
interview: First, accessibility; that is, subject to availability of information by respondent. 
In other words, the person [interviewee] answering the questions must have access to the 
information the researcher seeks. Certain conditions can lead to a situation where the 
respondent or interviewee cannot provide the information the researcher seeks, for 
instance; the interviewee may know the answer but have forgotten or the interviewee may 
not want to disclose some information probably due to political, ethical or person reasons. 
In such a situation, the researcher must make a decision whether or not to continue the 
line of questioning, or the interview itself. Fortunately for the researcher, the ten 
respondents that took part in the interview indicated their willingness to provide needed 
information in accordance with the questions during the interview. Second, cognition; 
that is, the interviewee should have an understanding of what is expected and also the 
information that is required of them before the interview actually starts. It is worth 
bearing in mind that without this, the interviewee may feel uncomfortable and this can 
affect the resultant data. Thus, the researcher encouraged the ten interviewees used for 
this study to exhibit a high level of knowledge and competence to the interview questions 
during the interview. Third, motivation; the researcher made the people taking part in the 
interview feel that their participation / co-operation is fundamental to the conduct of the 
study and also their answers are valued (May, 1997).  
 
3.4 (i) POPULATION OF THE STUDY 
 
For the qualitative interviewing aspect of this research, the target population of the study 
were policy makers, heads / staffs of federal and state environmental agencies within the 
Niger Delta, community leaders of oil host communities, journalists, environmental 
 95 
activists, government officials, politicians and academicians. The reason for this selection 
is to get the required or in-depth information needed for the study. However, the 
population of this study are linked to different aspects of the Niger Delta conflict; that is, 
they hold vital information in their area of profession as compared to the larger 
population used for the quantitative aspect of this research that may just be aware of the 
conflict around their immediate surroundings. For instance, policy makers in government 
sector can give vital information on government plans to amend policy, tackle the conflict 
and give reasons for government actions as regards the conflict. Another clear example is 
documentation and records of environmental degradation by environmental agency or oil 
companies. The researcher felt that the target population for the qualitative aspect of this 
research are knowledgeable, have a greater awareness and can clearly express their 
opinions and give rich insight into the issues the researcher wishes to investigate. It is 
worth noting here that the interviewees used for the qualitative aspect of this research 
also took part in the survey. 
 
3.4 (ii) DISTRIBUTION AND METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION 
 
Considering the wide geographical area for this research, the researcher was able to 
conduct ten interviews from the selected states [Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers] in order to 
stay within the actual budget for this purpose and meet the set deadline for data collection 
as the researcher was also conducting the quantitative aspect of this research. Gaskell 
acknowledges that for a single researcher, the limit that is required to conduct and analyse 
interview is between 10 and 25 interviews (2000). The pattern of interview the researcher 
adopted for this research was the individual or face-to-face interview.  
 
The individual interview is a type of conversation that differs from ordinary 
conversations in a number of respects. The individual interview in most cases last for an 
hour to an hour and a half between two unacquainted individuals. The face-to-face 
interview took the form of one person, the interviewer or researcher, is expected to ask 
the questions; the other, the respondent or interviewee is expected to respondent to them. 
The choice of topic discussed was entirely up to the researcher; thus, beforehand the 
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interviewees were given serious consideration and informed about what is expected of 
them. This pattern of interview presents a situation where the interviewee may be rather 
self-conscious, hesitant and defensive. In situations like this, the interviewee may lack 
trust for the interviewer and decide to limit answers to what is assumed to be informative 
and imperative, and take on positions on issues that match a specific self-image (Gaskell, 
2000; also see, Fontana and Frey, 1998). Putting these understandable tendencies into 
utmost consideration, the researcher created an atmosphere suitable to establish a 
relationship of trust and win the interviewee’s confidence in order for the interviewee to 
talk at length and expand on issues that the researcher wishes to probe further. This was 
‘achieved by the interviewer’s form of questions, by verbal and non-verbal reinforcement 
and by being relaxed and unselfconscious’ (Gaskell, 2000; 45-6). Furthermore, the 
researcher won the interviewees trust and support by explaining that my research was self 
sponsored to advance the completion of my PhD programme and their contributions 
through the interview will be valued as the research was geared towards seeking a lasting 
solution to the Niger Delta conflict.  
 
The instrument the researcher adopted to store data during the interview was the tape 
recorder. The reason for this selection is that tape recorder aids interpretation as it allows 
the researcher to concentrate on what is said rather than note taking. It also guides against 
the interviewer using his own words for those of the interviewee (May, 1997). It was 
imperative that prior to the interview, the researcher checked if the tape recorder was in 
perfect condition and also take care to press the right button in the interview (Gaskell, 
2000). Unfortunately, the back up tape recorder became very useful as the other tape 
recorder purchased for the purpose of the interview developed some technical problems 
that could not be solved after the first interview. It is always good for researchers to equip 
themselves when embarking on such research field work in order to deal with unforeseen 
circumstances when it arises.  
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3.4 (iii) METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS          
 
Qualitative interviewing presents the researcher with a variety of analysis to choose from 
after successful completion of the interview. The analysis employed for this purpose is a 
combination of results from the semi-structured interview and the questionnaire at the 
same time when analysing the data. The reason for this combination is to get a fuller 
picture or knowledge about the issues in the study which is wider than that a single 
approach would have provided or to mutually confirm the findings of both approaches. 
Here, the qualitative and quantitative methods will complement each other on the issues 
in this study and this is regarded as the complementary compensation of the flaws and 
blind spots of each single method. The background of this idea views the quantitative and 
qualitative methods as complementary rather than competitive; and none of the methods 
combined is seen as preliminary or better, but they are seen as equals in their role in this 
study based on the actual research issues at hand. For example, the study population is 
given a structured questionnaire to fill at random, but in the second step, the researcher 
decided which participant of the survey study are selected for the interviews [semi-
structured] to enable the researcher probe beyond the structured questions in the 
questionnaire. Their answers in both were put together and referred to each other in the 
analysis (Flick, 2002). According to May, a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
approaches, perhaps in a multi-method approach, may remedy some of the weaknesses 
and difficulties; however, it is not an automatic resolution of all methodological 
difficulties (1997).    
 
3.5   ETHICAL ISSUES ARISING FROM THIS RESEARCH 
 
Social science research and other related academic and non-academic professions are 
guided by a code of ethics that has evolved over the years to house the changing ethos, 
expectations, values and needs of individuals who hold a stake or participate in the 
profession. Some professions are better placed and well advanced in terms of their code 
of ethics. Some take strict measures to make sure every stake holder in the profession 
adhere to the code of ethics and where breached appropriate steps will be taken against 
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those who abstained from the guidelines. Over the years, many research institutions (such 
as law, business, education, psychology, medicine and other social sciences) have written 
a well structured and established code of ethics separately for research to govern the way 
research is carried out in their respective field (Kumar, 2005). It is worth nothing here 
that the researcher consulted the University of Glamorgan’s ethical guidelines for 
researchers at the start of this study.  
 
Ethical behaviour in research means in accordance with principles of conduct that are 
deemed correct, especially those of a given profession. Notably, there are certain 
behaviours in research that are considered not appropriate and regarded as unethical - 
such as inflicting harm on people, contravening confidentiality, inappropriate use of 
information and introducing bias. However, in this research there are various stakeholders 
and it is worth looking at the ethical issues in relation to each of them: First, the research 
participants and second, the researcher (Kumar, 2005; Lee-Treweek and Linkogle; 2000; 
King et al, 1999).  
 
3.6 ETHICAL ISSUES RELATING TO RESEARCH PARTICIPANT 
 
In social sciences, research participant are respondents such as individuals, groups or 
communities that provides information for the researcher to help in gaining understanding 
of an issue, situation, phenomenon or interaction (Kumar, 2005). There are ethical issues 
to be considered when dealing with participant in this research fieldwork such as:  
 
3.6 (i) COLLECTING INFORMATION 
 
There would have been no progress in this research without collecting information from 
respondents. However, it is worth bearing in mind that research is required to improve 
conditions and it also helps society directly or indirectly. There are codes of conduct to 
adhere to when collecting information from respondents with regards to this research. 
First, before any information in the quantitative and qualitative aspect of this research 
was collected, the respondents’ informed consent was obtained. Second, the researcher 
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considered the importance and usefulness of the research he undertook and was able to 
convince the aforementioned target population by justifying the importance of the 
research he undertook. This is good practice as it is ethical for researchers to inform their 
target population ahead of time and gain informed consent before information is collected 
(Kumar, 2005).   
 
Seeking sensitive information can pose an ethical dilemma in research. Respondents 
sometimes may be unwilling to provide certain types of information because they may 
consider it sensitive and thus an invasion of privacy. However, researchers must pursue 
their interest in the area and add to the existing body of knowledge (Kumar, 2005). 
According to Lee-Treweek and Linkogle, researchers find themselves confronted with 
difficulties in gathering sensitive information (2000). For example, the researcher 
envisaged sensitive questions arising from this research such as, seeking information 
from the government and community leaders on violation of political and civil rights 
which have been executed mainly in response to demonstration about activities of 
multinational institutions that produce Nigeria’s oil and the use made of the oil funds by 
the Nigerian government without developing the oil host communities. Further 
sensitivities arose from seeking information from community leaders on how the crisis 
and environmental degradation has affected them and their communities and how many 
people have lost their lives or fallen victims to these circumstances. However, seeking 
such sensitive information allowed the researcher to pursue his interest in the field and 
added to the existing body of knowledge.      
 
However, it is ethical to ask such sensitive or intrusive questions in this type of research 
provided the respondents are aware of the nature of ‘information you are going to ask 
clearly and frankly, and give them sufficient time to decide if they want to participate, 
without any major inducement’ (Kumar, 2005: 213). After collecting data from 
respondents, the researcher examined carefully whether their participation in the study 
was likely to harm the respondents in any way. If it was likely to, the researcher took 
appropriate measure to reduce the risk to a minimal level. Minimal risk in this context 
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means that the level to which the research will harm or bring discomfort is not greater 
than that ordinarily encountered in every day life (Kumar, 2005).    
 
3.6 (ii) SEEKING CONSENT 
 
In every profession informed consent can be seen as a benchmark for ethical code of 
practice (Lee-Treweek and Linkogle, 2000). ‘It is considered unethical to collect 
information without the knowledge of participants, and their expressed willingness and 
informed consent’ (Kumar, 2005: 212). In social science research, informed consent is 
commonly used. It implies that respondents are adequately aware of the type of 
information they are giving, for what purpose, why the information is needed, how they 
are expected to participate in the research and to what extent it will directly or indirectly 
affect them. It is expedient that consent should be voluntary and without any form of 
force or pressure (Kumar, 2005; Lee-Treweek and Linkogle, 2000). 
 
According to Schinke and Gilchrist, ‘under standards set by the commission for the 
protection of human subjects, all informed-consent procedures must meet three criteria: 
participant must be competent to give consent; sufficient information must be provided to 
allow for reasoned decision; and consent must be voluntary and uncoerced’ (1993: 83 in 
Kumar, 2005: 213). Competency, according to Schinke and Gilchrist (1993), is the state 
of an individuals’ physical and mental well being and legal abilities of respondents to 
give informed consent (in Kumar, 2005). The researcher constructed a written informed 
consent letter stating the researchers’ name, school, why he is conducting the research, 
the areas for the study, the target population and promise the respondents that all answers 
will be treated confidentially. See appendix I and appendix II for questionnaire and 
interview consent letter.   
 
3.6 (iii) PROVIDING INCENTIVES 
 
Providing incentives to respondents has raised ethical questions in research because most 
people think that offering incentives is unethical (Kumar, 2005). Respondents used for 
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this research did not participate because of incentives but because of the importance of 
the research. Kumar, acknowledges that ‘in her experience most people do not participate 
in a study because of incentives, but because they realise the importance of the study’ 
(2005: 213). Therefore, providing a small gift to respondents after having obtained their 
information, as a sign of appreciation, in Kumar’s opinion it is not unethical. However, it 
is unethical to give gifts before data collection (Kumar, 2005). After data was collected 
from both interviewees and respondents who participated in the survey, the researcher 
verbally thanked them and no incentive was given.    
 
3.6 (iv) MAINTAINING CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
In research it is unethical sharing information about a participant with others for the 
purpose other than research. However, the researcher has kept all information elicited 
from respondents as anonymous because it is unethical to identify a respondent after they 
are made to understand that the study is strictly anonymous. Therefore, the researcher 
ensured that after all information has been collected, its sources cannot be identified or 
known (Lee-Treweek and Linkogle, 2000; also see Kumar, 2005). The researcher chose 
to adopt the practice of anonymising respondents’ answers because of the nature of the 
research as it is directly related to Niger Delta conflict that involves the government. In 
the researchers’ experience most Nigerians do not like revealing their identities on 
sensitive issues relating to crisis especially when the government is involved.       
 
3.7 ETHICAL ISSUES RELATING TO THE RESEARCHER 
 
In social science research, there are ethical codes of conduct that researchers must adhere 
to when applying data elicited from respondents in their research work such as avoiding 
bias, using a valid methodology and make use of information appropriately without any 
form of distortion (King et al, 1999: also see Lee-Treweek and Linkogle, 2000).   
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3.7 (i) AVOIDING BIAS  
 
The researcher must act with integrity because bias on the part of the researcher is 
unethical. Bias is an intentional attempt to confuse respondents with questions during 
data collection stage, to hide what the researcher has found in his study at the data 
interpretation stage, or to emphasize something unreasonably to its true existence 
(Kumar, 2005). At the data collection stage of this study the researcher ensured that 
questions that were asked at the interview and questionnaire were item that served the 
purpose of this study. In doing so, the researcher kept the following principles in mind 
when constructing the research questions. First, questions were made simple and familiar 
to all respondents, and relevant to the study. Second, the researcher aimed for accuracy to 
ensure the meaning of questions was clear. Third, double-barrelled questions were 
avoided; that is, each question must cover only one issue. Fourth, leading questions were 
avoided; that is, questions that lead respondents to one direction instead of treating each 
possible response equally. Fifth, sufficient context for respondents to respond realistically 
or remember accurately was provided. That is, questions were brief as possible in order 
for respondents to digest with the least effort. Sixth, the researcher checked for a social 
desirability effect; that is, questions were designed in such a way for respondents to find 
it easy to give their views even if it is negative or might oppose that of other respondents 
(Kumar, 2005; May, 1997).  
 
It is generally accepted that researchers have to support claims for their contribution or 
make a causal statement which is generally based within a set of theories upon which 
researchers consult. That is, researchers have a predisposition to certain theories. Thus, 
bias in data interpretation and framing is unavoidable, with the interpretation representing 
a standpoint not absolute truth. When reflecting the play of ethnicity, class, culture, race 
and gender, all texts are biased because objective interpretations are impossible (Belk, 
2006). Bias in data interpretation cannot be easily set aside, but should instead be 
acknowledged and even used as productive prejudices that sensitise the researcher to 
research the issue at hand [Niger Delta conflict]. Considering the fact that the researcher 
hails from Nigeria’s Niger Delta region, it is in the researcher’s interest to be impartial in 
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order not to create / cause harm to anyone being investigated or respondents used for the 
study. The researcher took appropriate measures to avoid unproductive biases when 
interpreting data such as hiding what the researcher found, emphasize something 
unreasonably to its true existence, interpreting data to support a particular group and 
manipulating the findings to suit a specific situation.   
       
3.7 (ii) USING VALID METHODOLOGY  
 
In research it is inappropriate and unethical to use a method or procedure that is not valid. 
In quantitative research there are two key concepts – validity and reliability (sometimes 
referred to as internal validity and external validity). Internal validity is ‘the extent to 
which the effects detected in the study are a true reflection of reality rather than the 
results of extraneous variables’ (Burns and Grove, 2005: 215). External validity can be 
defined as the extent to which the findings / outcomes of a study can be generalized 
across and to settings, times and population (Johnson and Christensen, 2000). According 
to Onwuegbuzie, every study in education has threats to internal and external validity. 
Thus, these threats to internal and external validity can be described as internal 
replication and external replication (2000).  
 
Internal replication threat refers to the extent to which the findings of a study would re-
emerge if the research was replicated using exactly the same sample, time frame, context 
and settings. If truly the independent variable was accountable for the changes in the 
dependent variable, with no rival hypotheses, then the study will yield exactly the same 
result if an internal replication is conducted. On the other, external replication threats 
connotes that the outcomes / findings of the study would replicate across different sample 
of the study, time frame, settings and contexts. If the sample was truly generalised, then 
external replications across diverse sample will produce the same findings. There are 
three stages in research that threats to internal and external validity can emerge; these 
stages are the inquiry process: research design / data collection, data analysis and data 
interpretation (Onwuegbuzie, 2000a). It is in the researcher’s interest that this study, if 
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replicated, will produce the same result or arrive at the same conclusion. Thus, in order to 
achieve this, the researcher adopted the following measures which are stated as follows 
 
First, threats to internal validity can emerge when invalid instrument is used. That is, 
when results yielded from instrumentation lack consistency or generates invalid result. 
Hence, the researcher took appropriate measures to construct the instrument 
[questionnaire] used for this study in order to obtain valid results [see, 3.3. ii]. Second, 
different selection of participants, also known as selection bias occurs at the data 
collection stage of a study; most often, it occurs when already organised [i.e., non-
randomized] participants are compared. Thus, to avoid selection bias, the researcher 
adopted measures to ensure adequate random selection of the target population [see, 3.3. 
iii]. Third, mortality is the situation when respondents who have been chosen for the 
study fail to take part or do not participate in every phase of the investigation. This occurs 
when respondents have low level of motivation and persistence. This can, however, affect 
the study if the response rate is low. Hence, this study was designed in such a way to 
avoid the chances of attrition by motivating respondents at data collection stage through 
the cover page of the questionnaire and in some cases verbally [see 3.3. ii and appendix 1 
and II]. Fourth, researcher’s bias can be active or passive source. The passive include 
personal traits or attributes of the researcher for example age, gender, ethnicity or 
institutions. This study mobilizes different multi-ethnic societies in Niger Delta and 
institutions such as government, oil companies, media and other profession. It is worth 
bearing in mind that the researcher hails from the Niger Delta; hence the researcher did 
not allow prior knowledge of respondents from different ethnic background or institution 
influence the conduct of data collection or influence findings to favour a particular group. 
This is because the research is of relevance to all parties / stakeholders involved in the 
study. However, to avoid such biases, the researcher adopted the anonymous format of 
questionnaire and also ensured every member of the target population had an equal 
chance of selection to avoid preference and personality trait (Onwuegbuzie, 2000b).  
 
Threats to external validity emerge at the research design / data collection stage. First, 
population validity refers to the extent which the findings from this study are 
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generalizable from the sample to the study population as well as different sub groups 
within the larger target population. Thus, to achieve this purpose, the researcher used a 
large and random sample technique to ensure population validity of results [see, 3.3.i]. 
Second, ecological validity; refers to the extent which findings from this research can be 
generalized across contexts, setting, conditions and variables. The researcher ensured that 
findings from this study are generalisable from the locations [Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers 
State] where the investigation took place. Findings from this research can be generalised 
to the Niger Delta states [see Map in 3.1 for Niger Delta states] as they experience the 
same conflict but on a different scale and also certain aspects of the findings that are of 
national concern [like, media laws, policies, financial management and others] can be 
generalized to the whole country. Taking internal and external validity in quantitative 
study into account, the appropriate ethical standard procedure guided the researcher in 
adhering to the code of research ethics.  
 
Ethics in qualitative study directs the researcher’s attention and focus to trustworthiness 
of the findings by demonstrating that they are transferable, credible, confirmable and 
dependable. These terms used in qualitative study are often likened to terms used in 
quantitative study, such as credibility (internal validity), transferability (external validity), 
dependability (reliability) and confirmability (objectivity). However, there are still 
contentions that quantitative language is not congruent to qualitative study (Conrad and 
Serlin, 2005; McKay, 2006).  
 
First, in qualitative study, credibility depends on the extent to which it resonates true to 
the study population and colleagues in the field. To ensure credibility in this research, the 
researcher ensured that the interpretation of the case under study is accurate based on the 
knowledge and understanding of the study population. In other words, the case under 
investigation is credible when what the researcher interprets and presents depicts reality 
of the respondents who informed the study in ways that resonate with them. To satisfy the 
credibility standard, the researcher ensured that the interpretation process and interactions 
within the borders of the case under investigation was sufficiently in-depth to highlight 
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any complexity the case mobilizes (Research Methods, 2006; McKay, 2006; Conrad and 
Serlin, 2005). 
 
Second, in case study research, transferability must be useful in clarifying another context 
if it is to be considered transferable; that is, the study should be applicable to another 
setting or group. In case study research, the study under investigation needs to be relevant 
to other studies in similar situations, especially those with similar research questions or 
problems of practice (Conrad and Serlin, 2005; McKay, 2006). The researcher ensured 
(by using valid methodology) that the results derived from this study can be transferred or 
generalized to other study in the media and risk field and conflict study with similar case 
study. The lessons from this case study research can be used as recommendation that can 
apply to future research with similar background (Research Methods, 2000; Conrad and 
Serlin, 2005). 
 
Third, dependability involves accommodating changes in the research design and area 
being investigated. ‘This occurs as the understanding of the researcher becomes more 
refined over the course of data collection (and even during analysis, which occurs, in part, 
concurrently with collection)’ (Conrad and Serlin, 2005; 416). Marshall and Rossman 
acknowledge that in qualitative study the social world is created and the idea of 
replication is itself problematic (1999 in Conrad and Serlin, 2005, also see Research 
Methods, 2006). However, in case study research, research questions evolve in response 
to emerging data, with the researcher perhaps reconstructing or removing preliminary 
questions and adding others. Putting this into consideration, the researcher ensured that 
references are made to changes over time when reporting results. According to Miles and 
Huberman, dependability in qualitative research is the process of consistency and 
stability of a study over time and across researchers and methods (1994 in Conrad and 
Serlin, 2005). To ensure dependability in this research, the researcher adopted the 
following measures. The research questions matched the study design. The role and status 
of the researcher was explicitly explained before the interview [see, appendix, II]. 
Findings from the study depicted the data source. Data across the areas of study and 
target population for this study was collected. Information from respondents was selected 
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according to the theoretical need of the research and the amount of data collected 
respectively (for more see, Conrad and Serlin, 2005).   
 
Fourth, confirmability in qualitative study refers to the extent to which the findings could 
be confirmed by others. Thus, to enhance confirmability in this study the researcher 
documented the procedures for checking data throughout the study (Research Methods, 
2006). 
   
3.7 (iii) INAPPRIOPRATE USE OF INFORMATION 
 
Inappropriate use of information in research can cause harm directly or indirectly to the 
respondent, which is termed unethical in research. The researcher considered and settled 
issues that can cause adverse harm to the study population. It is ethical to use correct and 
appropriate information to avoid misrepresentation and harm of the study population 
(Kumar, 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 108 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
4.0 RESULTS AND DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The quantitative and qualitative data collected for this study are analysed and represented 
in this chapter. The results from the quantitative data are discussed as they are 
represented and analysed in bar charts respectively. However, the quantitative and 
qualitative data results were put together and referred to each other in the analysis to 
compensate the flaws and blind spots of each single method (Flick, 2002). The total 
number of questionnaires used for this study is eight hundred and eleven out of the one 
thousand two hundred that were distributed and the number of interviews conducted and 
used for this study is ten. This chapter is divided into section A and B due to the design of 
the questionnaire. Section A entails analysed personal information from respondents such 
as gender, age, place of residence and profession and section B consists of analysed 
research questions that respondents attended to. Furthermore, some research questions in 
section B are in open-ended format. See appendix one for design of questionnaire.  
 
FIGURE 1: TOTAL NUMBER OF QUESTIONNAIRES DISTRIBUTED, 
RETRIEVED AND LOST ACROSS THE THREE STATES USED FOR THIS 
RESEARCH – DELTA, BAYELSA AND RIVERS 
 
100% 100% 100%
93%
27%
83%
7%
73%
17%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
Delta Bayelsa Rivers
Total % Distributed 100%
Total % Retrieved 68%
Total % Lost 32%
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ANALYSIS: 
 
It will be seen from the above chart that Delta and Rivers State had a higher response rate 
than Bayelsa State. The reason for the low response rate in Bayelsa State was due to lack 
of time and finance. First, time was indeed a crucial factor that did not permit the 
researcher to follow up the remaining questionnaires in Bayelsa State [292] because the 
researcher had to meet already scheduled interview appointments in Delta and Rivers 
State, which left the researcher with very limited time to visit Bayelsa State for more 
retrieval of questionnaires and the researcher had less than a week to return to the UK. 
Second, it will be worth saying here that the researcher initially planned twelve weeks for 
the research field work, however, due to financial constraints, the researcher had to cut 
down the field work trip to eight weeks. This, of course, affected the retrieval of 
questionnaires in Bayelsa State. However, the low response rate in Bayelsa State will not 
affect the representativeness of the results in this study as it will be seen from the chart 
that the overall retrieval of questionnaires from Delta, Bayelsa and River State combined 
is above 50% which is indeed commendable and can adequately represent the total 
population.   
 
FIGURE 2:  DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY GENDER 
 
56% 53%
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44% 47%
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Total % of Male 61%
Total % of Female 39%
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ANALYSIS: 
 
The above chart shows male participated more than female in this study, it is also evident 
that the survey was not clustered solely around a particular gender. However, there is 
quite a difference between gender representations as revealed in the above chart. One of 
the challenges the researcher encountered during the distribution of questionnaires in the 
three states was that male respondents were more responsive than female respondents. 
Despite this challenge, the researcher made sure that females were represented. It will be 
seen in Delta and Rivers State that the percentage between male and female is less 
compared to Bayelsa State. If more questionnaires were retrieved in Bayelsa State, 
perhaps the overall percentage between male and female would have been narrowed.   
 
FIGURE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY AGE 
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25%
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Total % 21-30 50%
Total % 31-40 35%
Total % 41-above 15%
 
 
ANALYSIS: 
 
It can be revealed from the above chart that during the survey for this study, the 
researcher distributed the questionnaires fairly across all age groups in the three states in 
order to acquire information from different age perspective. However, the age and gender 
of the total sample reflect the age and gender characteristics of the population of Nigeria. 
According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report (2010), the age and gender 
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percentage structure of Nigerians between 0-14years: 41.5% (male 31, 624, 050 / female 
30, 242, 637), while 15-64 years: 55.5% (male 42, 240, 641 / female 40, 566, 672) and 65 
years and above: 3.1% (male 2,211, 840 / female 2, 343, 250). Estimated life expectancy 
at birth: total population 47.24 years (CIA, 2010).     
 
FIGURE 4:  DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY LOCATION 
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ANALYSIS: 
 
The above chart implies that respondents in Delta State responded higher than 
respondents in Bayelsa State and Rivers State. With specific reference to surveys in less 
developed countries, response rate is usually problematic especially when using slow and 
unreliable postal system, telephone, internet based, fax and relatively low standard of 
research support infrastructure. One technique used in avoiding low response rate in less 
developed countries is the drop and collect survey technique which the researcher 
adopted during the field work of this study. The drop and collect survey involves the 
researcher and / or trained field work assistants in personally allocating and later 
collecting the instrument used for the survey [questionnaire] either directly from the 
target respondents or indirectly via a nominee or gatekeeper. This method usually 
delivers a higher response rates of 50% and above (Goliath, 2004). It is indeed plausible 
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from the above chart that the response rate is high, perhaps if not for time and financial 
constraints the response rate would have been higher than 68%.  
 
FIGURE 5:  DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY PROFESSION 
 
42%
69%
15%
49%
18%
60%
9% 13%
25%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
Delta Bayelsa Rivers
Total % of student 35%
Total % of Employed 49%
Total % of Unemployed 16%
 
 
ANALYSIS: 
 
The above chart implies that the survey was not clustered around a particular profession 
[skilled and unskilled] and location in the three states rather the survey covered a larger 
region in each state in order to gain more insight into different professional / unskilled 
understanding of what this study invokes. It will be worth noting here that the reason why 
there is a high proportion of students in Delta and Bayelsa State is that students were 
more responsive than unemployed. Students used for this study in Delta and Bayelsa 
State were from tertiary institutions and adult school of learning. This, of course, does not 
limit the sample because respondents were asked if they were knowledgeable about the 
Niger Delta conflict before questionnaires were administered.        
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SECTION B 
 
Question 1:  Which is most important to you when getting information on the Niger 
Delta crisis?  
 
CHART 1 
 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
Delta Bayelsa Rivers
Total % Television 36%
Total % of Radio 19%
Total % New spaper 28%
Total % Magazine 3%
Total % Internet 5%
Total % Fiction f ilm 3%
Total % w ord of mouth 4%
Total % Other 1%
Total % No response 1%
 
 
ANANLYSIS: 
 
The above finding reveals that individuals prefer to get information from television 
stations more than any other means of communication. The broadcast journalist 
interviewed for this study acknowledged that most individuals in Nigeria and other 
countries have no habit of reading, but prefer to listen because of tight work schedules 
(Interview, July, 2009). However, television stations are used more than any other means 
of communication in Nigeria and also have a wider network coverage (Musa and 
Mohammed, 2004). It is particularly revealing and encouraging that newspaper 
organizations have done a lot to attract readers despite the challenges faced in newspaper 
production in terms of accessibility to rural areas, funding capacity, literacy level and 
economic situation in Nigeria, which of course, brings the problem of access as the print 
media are forced to print limited copies they can conveniently sell (Olusola, 2008). 
According to the broadcast journalist, in interview:  
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‘story that sell is what the media go for, what obtains in Britain is what is 
obtained in Nigeria, we have this no culture of reading, people prefer to 
listen more to radio than reading newspapers because they don’t have time, 
for media to sell, their story must be away from the ordinary, it must be 
exclusive, so they write sensational reports and headlines to draw the 
attention of the people, it goes beyond the normal news reporting, story 
must be put in such a way that it will attract the reader’  (Interview, July, 
2009).  
 
The use of radio might be interpreted as an encouraging sign, perhaps symptomatic of a 
genuine embracing of the technology’s scope for information gathering and 
dissemination. The use of internet by individuals to get information is relatively low as 
shown in the above chart; this might be due to accessibility problem, which remains a 
major challenge for urban and rural communities in Nigeria (IREX, 2007). The above 
chart shows that magazine does not seem to interest individuals when getting information 
on the Niger Delta crisis. The economic climate of Nigeria may not permit low income 
earners to afford magazines and accessibility is relatively low especially in rural areas 
(Olusola, 2008). The above chart reveals that very few individuals get information from 
fiction film, this shows that fiction films does not appeal to most individuals when getting 
information on the Niger Delta conflict. Wahlberg and Sjoberg (2000) note that films are 
not popular in depicting risk issues and this is evident in the Niger Delta context. Word of 
mouth and others are relatively low, this shows that individuals prefer to consult 
established institutions for information as shown in the above chart.  
 
Overall, the above chart reveals that the television, radio and newspaper remains essential 
to the political process and the engine room where battles over defining, identification, 
conflict and risk management are fought out and brought to public knowledge in the 
Nigeria’s Niger Delta context (Bourdieu, 1998).  
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Question 2:  In general, how satisfied are you with media reporting and coverage on 
the Niger Delta crisis? 
 
CHART 2 
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Delta Bayelsa Rivers
Total % Very satisf ied 20%
Total % Fairly satisf ied 40%
Total % Neither satisf ied nor
dissatisf ied 13%
Total % Fairly dissatisf ied 13%
Total % Very dissatisf ied 13%
Total % No response 1%
 
 
ANALYSIS: 
 
It is indeed plausible that the Nigerian media are actually reporting the Niger Delta 
conflict as shown in the above chart but what differs here are respondent’s level of 
satisfaction. The three journalists interviewed for this study; acknowledged that the media 
has done a lot to bring the Niger Delta crisis to the world’s attention but there are other 
factors that may hinder journalists’ performance which has serious implications for 
audience satisfaction with the media (Interview, Print, Broadcast and NTA Journalist, 
July, 2009).  
 
First, lack of access to information; the journalist from broadcast media acknowledged 
that information sought for by journalists from the government and oil companies is 
always very difficult to obtain (Interview, Broadcast Journalist, July, 2009). Accordingly, 
the journalist from the print media notes that until the freedom of information bill is past 
into law, government and oil companies will continue to withhold vital information 
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(Interview, Print Journalist, July, 2009). Second, media inaccuracy; it will be recalled 
from the literature review that Ashong and Udodo (2008) acknowledged that journalists’ 
commitment to truth and balance may not at all parallel actual risk / conflict occurrences 
because most media correspondents are not always on hand to cover these occurrences 
the way they have occurred. On such occasions, journalists get their fact-findings and 
reports from government sources, people involved or multinational companies; as such, 
fairness may always be elusive to all parties involved in the incident. The journalist from 
NTA gave an instance of some print journalists that did not visit Gbaramatu kingdom in 
Delta State but heard about government military operation in the community from people 
involved, the print journalists wrote a story about complete destruction of the community 
but when the state governor and his entourage got to the community, they discovered the 
story was over exaggerated (Interview, NTA Journalist, July, 2009). The journalist from 
the print media also gave another scenario where journalists went to the creeks in Warri, 
Delta State, hearing that there was a crisis in a village. Nobody saw the number of deaths, 
five different newspapers gave different figures of deaths; however, no newspaper 
reported the same number of deaths (Interview, July, 2009). The broadcast journalist 
notes that reports will not be balanced if journalists do not have quick access to the 
conflict zones (Interview, Broadcast Journalist, July, 2009). Third, media type is also a 
determinant factor; commercial interests of the private media outfit have made them 
unproductive in carrying out their responsibility in a democratic society. The media must 
first thrive as a business before considering public interest and service. In Nigerian, the 
private media outfits have become inactive leaving the independent press open to 
personal monopoly for the owner’s gain and government owned media are mere loud 
speakers and propaganda machines for the government in power (Agbese, 2006; Olusola, 
2008). The journalist from NTA which is a national government outfit notes that ‘we are 
all just machines because this media agency is every government organ and we have to 
follow a phase’ (Interview, July, 2009). In addition, the print and broadcast journalists 
made known that in every media outfit the proprietor matters a lot especially when 
dealing with the Niger Delta conflict as it is deemed sensitive (Interview with Print and 
Broadcast Journalist, July, 2009).  
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On the one hand, taking onboard the factors that affect media performance on the Niger 
Delta conflict as explained above and on the other, how it affects audience satisfaction, 
the researcher concludes that the media is actually covering the Niger Delta conflict but 
not enough to essentially give audience the satisfaction they desire as there are still 
factors that hinder journalist access to information which in turn affect media 
performance. It will be seen from the above chart that 40 percent, which is the highest, 
said they were fairly satisfied. However, if the Nigerian media can cross the impediment 
confronting them from getting appropriate information, there might be an increase in 
respondents being very satisfied but if these issues are left unattended, perhaps, 
respondents’ satisfaction might even decrease from very satisfied and fairly satisfied to 
other levels of dissatisfaction.   
 
Question 3:  Do you think the media has brought the risk of environmental 
degradation to government attention through heavy media coverage? 
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ANALYSIS: 
 
The above chart reveals that 45% of respondents do not think the media has brought 
issues of risk to government attention. It will be recalled from the literature review that a 
journalist interviewed on media performance with regards to the Niger Delta conflict 
admitted that although the media is reporting the crisis, it is also imperative they draw 
attention via in-depth and interpretative reporting to the underlying causes [risk issues] of 
the conflict (Jimoh, 2008). The journalist from the print media notes that to a very large 
extent there is a handicap in risk reportage and the handicap is that the government 
sectors are not ready to give journalists information and that is why reportage of 
environmental degradation is on the low side (Interview, July, 2009). The professor of 
management science from Bayelsa State interviewed for this study acknowledged that 
information control on the part of oil companies is problematic because they are not 
ready to give accurate information about their operations. The professor further 
acknowledged that the media report physical events that are visible to the eye and such 
reports occur when there is a major devastation like oil spills, which does not always 
match the actual consequences of the pollution. The long term effect of risks emanating 
from pollution which affect human health cannot be precisely measured by the media 
because there are no effective indicators of environmental quality to monitor and report 
the issue through the media in the Niger Delta (Interview, Professor, July, 2009).  
 
It will be recalled from the literature review that Eldridge and Reilly note that the mass 
media are unevenly attracted to risk because the mainstream news media are poorly 
constructed to sustain attention of any specific future threat (2003). When a risk is still 
hypothetical and there are no proven casualties to interview, a story will be less attractive 
to news media. This is because journalists are interested in the news of the day. Risk 
reporting is influenced by the pace at which a threat unfolds and how evidence is 
marshalled and procedures launched as news events. Thus, the media will focus on events 
which involve many deaths rather than one that have a growing effect over a long time 
(Hughes et al, 2006). Eldridge and Reilly (2003: 140) gave three main reasons why the 
media do not encourage sustained risk coverage. First, risk is uncertain and scientific 
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evidence is often inconclusive; however, it is controversy, new and definitive findings 
that attracts the media rather than scientific uncertainty. Second, a risk related event may 
not be attractive or be of interest to journalist unless government or other official 
agencies implement policy and precautionary principle. Third, risk is a concept based on 
future prediction and this is in conflict with the media news agenda that emphasizes the 
events of the day [fresh news story]. The media tend to ignore hypothetical and distant 
risk, even when it is a potential threat until the dangers are manifest in some ways.  
 
Against this backdrop, it is indeed evident that the public perceive that Nigerian media 
report risk events only when it occurs but do not have an in-depth, interpretative and 
sustained coverage to attract the public and government attention to the implications and 
consequences of environmental degradation. If the media reportage was heavy and 
sustained more respondents would have agreed that the media have brought the effects of 
risk issues to government attention and the number of respondents that did not know 
would have been far lesser than 20% but on a different scale of media judgement.  
 
Question 4:  Who do you trust to tell the truth on risk events [environmental 
degradation] linked to the conflict in the Niger Delta?  
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ANALYSIS: 
 
The above chart implies that 31% of respondents, which is the highest, trust the media to 
tell the truth on risk issues. It is particularly revealing that despite the handicap faced by 
the Nigerian media in getting accurate information on risk issues from key institutions 
(Interview, Print Journalist, July, 2009) most individuals in Nigeria still trust the media to 
tell the truth on risk issues than any other profession linked directly or indirectly to 
environmental issues and management in the Niger Delta region. Trust for pressure 
groups is second on the chart which indicates that individuals recognise and trust the 
effort of legitimate interest groups to convey risk communication. The above chart 
reveals short supply of trust for government, politicians and private agencies; however, 
this has serious implications on policy acceptance by the masses. The masses are 
important players in risk controversies where distrust may lead to rejection of policy 
decisions (Pidgeon et al, 2003). Thus, abstract system depends upon trust; hence active 
trust must be won and maintained (Giddens, 1990). Trust for oil companies is the lowest 
in the chart. It will be recalled from the literature review that in reflexive modernization, 
societies are becoming more critical of the activities of organised irresponsibility of the 
industrial era that is systematically accompanied by that of risk, and individuals starts to 
lose trust trying to measure what is rational and safe, knowing full well that in the 
industrial phase, risks are industrially manufactured, scientifically justifiable and 
companies do not pay for their pollution (Beck, 1996b). Thus, risk transformations in 
developed and developing societies are accompanied with an increasing sense of 
uncertainty, complexity, ambivalence and disorder, an increasing distrust of traditional 
authorities and social institutions with a growing knowledge of the threats inherent in 
everyday life (Lupton, 1999). It is worth noting here that the risk society thesis was 
developed largely in the west, to explain western nations’ responses to living in a risk 
society. However, Beck in his writing referred to modern risk as a global issue, which 
generates the awareness of the global nature of risk, triggering new impulses towards the 
advancement of co-operative international institutions. By these processes, risk society 
becomes world risk society, in which socio- political debate and action is globalized 
(1995b: 7; 1996b: 2; see also Lupton, 1999). Nigeria as a nation will respond to risk just 
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like any other nation in the west and that is one of the reasons why there is conflict in the 
Niger Delta region.  
 
Research conducted in the UK by BBC, Reuters and Media Centre in 2006 and Mori Poll 
in 2007 revealed that Nigerians trust their media more than the government Although, the 
findings produced similar results in this study, however, it is worth noting here that the 
former will not be relevant in risk related issues because the question was geared towards 
institutions with different goal orientation rather than  specific institutions that have a 
stake in risk associated with technological and environmental degradation in Nigeria 
which this study presents.  
    
Question 5:  Who, in your opinion, should be held responsible for the conflict in the 
Niger Delta?  
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ANALYSIS: 
 
It is particularly revealing that 64% of the respondents held government responsible on 
grounds of, first; failure to discharge social responsibility in areas of meaningful 
development, provision of basic amenities, youth empowerment through gainful 
employment, internship and soft loans. The Professor from Bayelsa State distinguished 
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government inadequacies on developmental issues between the three tiers of government 
[federal, state and local]. He acknowledged that federal government had been trying to 
tackle the Niger Delta problem through the method of interventionist agencies from 
1960-2009. However, these interventionist agencies did not do anything to secure 
development in the Niger Delta region (Interview, Professor, July, 2009). The principal 
from Rivers State interviewed for this study notes that the developmental problems in the 
Niger Delta are enormous for these interventionist agencies to handle because they are 
under funded and these agencies are:  
 
‘just ways used by the new colonialist headed by the Hausa, Fulani’s, Igbos 
and the Yoruba [four major tribes in Nigeria] to still gimmick the oil 
producing minorities because the states here are small, the problems of the 
Niger Delta are enormous’ (Interview, Principal, July, 2009).  
 
It will be recalled from the literature review that the formation of one policy [intervention 
agency] after another appears to be incremental and ends up suffering from disjointed 
implementation (Akpan, 2008). The elder statesman interviewed for this study notes that 
until the federal government practices true fiscal federalism the problem of 
underdevelopment will remain substantial in the Niger Delta (Interview, July, 2009). The 
professor notes that mismanagement of government funds is very common at the state 
level, ‘it is on record that the Niger Delta state governors have actually gotten so much 
from the federation account, to what extent have they applied it?’ (Interview, July, 2009) 
According to the principal and writer, various past governors (1999-2007) from the core 
Niger Delta states have been accused and charged for embezzling the monthly federal 
allocation given to their states for developmental purposes. [See 2.5.6 for government 
allocation, page 73]. The principal from Rivers State described the local government as 
‘jamborees’ because they share the enormous government allocation within themselves to 
the detriment of developmental projects in their communities, which the professor also 
acknowledges (Interview, July, 2009).    
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Second, Militants are armed by most government officials; some respondents claimed 
that most government officials elected into office with highest votes provide youths with 
weapons in order to secure a position in government by rigging elections for them and 
that these weapons are now used for militancy in the region. Third, failure to enact 
sincere policies to curb pollution; some respondents note that government have failed to 
come up with adequate policies to guide the operations of oil companies in the Niger 
Delta region. The elder statesman in interview notes that regarding the laws concerning 
oil, government put a lot of them in place ‘like the land use decree act, is a law to make 
the federal government to be in total control of land to the detriment of the people who 
are in the environment; and you have gas laws, oil laws, none of these laws is to better 
the life of the people’ (Interview, July 2009). Fourth, some respondents blamed 
government for the violation of fundamental human rights in response to environmental 
pollution such as: right to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression, freedom from 
torture and other physical abuses, self determination, right to life, right to adequate 
standard of living (Idowu, 1999). It will be recalled from the literature review that human 
rights violations and environmental conflict in the Niger Delta have been known to be 
mainly executed by the state and oil multinationals in the region. For example, the 
killings and destruction of oil host communities like the Odi massacre (2000), Ogoni 
genocide (1995), the Opia and Ikiyan killings (1999), Yenagoa killing (1998) and others 
(Okaba, 2004; also see Human Rights Watch, 2002). In summary, the state is held 
accountable for any act deemed harmful which can be connected to its violation of 
responsibility under domestic or international law resulting from action or omission by 
the government of the state or any political subdivision of the state (United Nations, 
2005).  
 
Oil companies and politicians were both 10% as shown in the above chart. Reasons 
respondents gave for holding oil companies responsible is that the oil companies are more 
concerned with oil exploration and exploitation than the interest of the oil host 
communities. A respondent from Delta State notes that the oil companies do not have 
respect for the environment during oil exploration and do not care or show concern over 
how the degradation affects the health and living standard of the indigenes of the oil host 
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communities. The elder statesman notes that the oil companies are in the Niger Delta to 
take away oil, ‘they don’t care about the damages they are causing to oil producing 
communities, if you go to different areas of these oil host communities, you will see gas 
flaring, oil spillage and toxins being buried’ (Interview, July, 2009). Accordingly, it is on 
record that oil companies like Shell and BP have a bad reputation of handling indigenous 
cultures and local people in their search for oil (Langford et al, 1999). The 10 percent of 
respondents that held politicians responsible for the Niger Delta conflict accused 
politicians of paying lip service to the indigenes of oil host communities, failing to pay 
attention to the Niger Delta problems because they steal the funds meant for 
development, aiding and abetting government embezzlement and engineering militancy 
by providing arms and encouraging oil bunkering in the Niger Delta region.  
 
Respondents that held community leaders responsible are relatively few. Reasons 
respondents gave for holding them responsible was that most community leaders are 
corrupt, limited by education, mislead the oil companies to the detriment of their 
community by enriching themselves, sharing the money meant for compensation and 
development among themselves. The journalist from the print media notes that Shell 
invited traditional rulers and community leaders for a meeting and asked what they 
wanted in their communities: 
 
‘some of them preferred to be taken to the United States to spend holiday to 
the detriment of their people, others said give me the money you want to 
give to my people, only me will take the money to them, I speak for them so 
whatever you are going to give, it will pass through me’ (Interview, Print 
Journalist, July, 2009).  
 
The community leader from Delta State interviewed for this study acknowledged that 
even though oil host communities are undeveloped, community leaders cannot be 
exonerated from the pressure of what is happening (July, 2009). It can be seen from the 
above chart that 5% of respondents held militants responsible for the Niger Delta conflict 
on accounts of disorderly behaviour in the society, breaking the law, damaging pipelines 
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and they made themselves available for politicians and government to use to the 
detriment of peace in the land. However, despite the shallow and vague articulated 
agenda of the militants in the region, more than 90% of individuals do not see them as the 
cause of the Niger Delta conflict. The elder statesman notes that he does not see the 
youths as militants:  
 
‘I call them freedom fighters because they have been in prison for a long 
time, they want to free themselves out of the poverty situation. The federal 
government should have a bearing in oil producing communities, 
particularly the areas where oil is been produced’ (Interview, July, 2009). 
 
1% of respondents held organized interest groups responsible for the conflict because 
they see them as individuals who are part of the government, political and militant set up 
in the region and 2% of respondents held indigenes of oil host communities responsible 
because they have failed to hold executives and community leaders from their community 
accountable and also illiteracy among the growing youths in the region.  
 
Question 6:  How do you perceive the risk of environmental degradation caused by 
oil companies to humans, plants and animals in the Niger Delta? 
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ANALYSIS: 
 
The above chart indicates that 64% of respondents perceive the risk of environmental 
degradation to humans, plants and animals as very high risk. According to the principal, 
in interview, environmental degradation caused by oil companies has affected land, water 
and air; sea animals such as fish, lobsters, crab and others can no longer survive the harsh 
terrain, agricultural products can no longer be produced in large quantity compared to 
before oil was discovered and indigenes of oil producing communities started 
experiencing air borne diseases due to polluted environment. The principal also made 
known that the level of degradation is almost eighty to ninety percent (Interview, July 
2009). In addition, the elder statesman notes that:  
 
‘People are dying and nobody knows the type of disease that are affecting 
them, the man who wakes healthy this morning before night falls you hear 
he is dead, no good medical facilities being put in place. We are living in a 
very dangerous environment, what I will call predicament, which the 
government really needs to take seriously, very serious predicament’ 
(Interview, July, 2009). 
  
[See 2.5.1, page 57-8 for graphic image on environmental degradation].   
 
 It will be recalled from the literature review that Beck’s work on the risk society 
demonstrates that the production of wealth has been accompanied by that of risks as an 
outcome of modernization. Beck also acknowledges that industrial societies have become 
risk societies in late modernity (Beck, 1992b: 19). Beck claims that risks associated with 
industrial societies are irreversible threats to mankind, plants and animals. The nature of 
modern risk cannot be measured spatially, temporally and socially; and that individuals in 
industrial societies are constantly faced with threats on an unprecedented scale which is 
often open-ended, rather than occurrences which have a foreseeable end (Beck, 1995b:13; 
1992b: 13-23). Controversies over risk issues in industrialized countries have begun to 
dominate public, private and political spheres (Lupton, 1999). According to Beck, it may 
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be argued that in late industrialism the obsession with the idea of risk has its foundations 
in the transformation of societies from pre-industrialism to early industrialism to late 
industrialism (Beck 1992b: 3; see also Lupton 1999). Giddens termed late industrialism 
as risk culture, thereby distinguishing it from previous eras because risk awareness in late 
industrialism is linked to the threats associated with human activities (1991: 3). 
According to Lupton from cultural perspective on risk, the society or laypeople’s 
responses to risk should not be seen as biased if they are different from expert 
assessment. Rather, their use and value within a particular cultural context needs to be 
acknowledged (1999: 37). Furthermore, culture does not only aid society in calculating 
risk but also adds to a mutual rather than an individualistic concept of risk, taking into 
account communal responsibility and expectations. Society uses its shared, accumulated 
knowledge to ‘determine which foreseeable losses are most probable, which probable 
losses will be most harmful, and which harms may be preventable’ (Lupton, 1999: 38).  
 
Question 7:  Who precisely, would you say, most shapes your awareness about the 
risk of environmental degradation caused by oil companies in the Niger Delta?  
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ANALYSIS: 
 
The above chart reveals that the media shapes the awareness of 48% respondents. 
Overwhelmingly, the media are the most important factor in shaping people’s risk 
awareness. The main reasons respondents gave is that the media disseminate adequate 
information on risk, educate on health and safety, show live coverage of oil spills and 
enlighten the populace on risk related issues. Interest groups shape the awareness of 14% 
respondents. The reasons respondents gave is that interest groups give situation reports on 
the sharp practices going on in the oil sector, they are most vibrant in disseminating 
information about the risk of environmental degradation, they speak for the people in the 
oil producing communities, they educate people about the dangers of environmental 
degradation and they are indigenes of oil host communities. Government shapes the 
awareness of 13% respondents. The reasons are that the government represent the people 
at federal, state and local government level, they have the mechanisms to execute such 
awareness especially through the environmental agencies and it is the government the 
people cry to for help when ever there is environmental degradation in their community. 
Individuals shape 10% of respondents’ awareness of risk. The reasons respondents gave 
for their choice of answer is that they get information on risk from individuals who are 
experts, individuals who are family members and friends that live in the oil host 
communities and from individuals in school, seminars and through publications. Culture 
[tradition] shapes 4% of respondents’ awareness about the risk of environmental 
degradation. The reason respondents gave is that community consultation and activities 
shapes their risk awareness. It will be recalled from the literature review that these 
concerns are basically cultural rather than individual because individual choices are 
usually not independent especially about big political issues, they come already prepared 
with culturally learned assumptions and weightings when faced with estimating 
probability and credibility (Douglas, 1992). Culture does not only assist individuals 
calculate risks but also add to a mutual rather than an individualistic concept of risk, 
taking into account communal responsibility and expectations. Religion shapes 3% of 
respondents’ awareness. The reasons respondents gave was that they get information 
through other members of their religious group. The internet shapes 3% of respondents’ 
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awareness. The reason respondents gave is that they get detailed information with 
graphics and any information they need is on the internet. However, the reason why the 
researcher designated the internet as a separate category from the media is that internet 
usage in Nigeria is still on the low side. Thus, the researcher deemed it necessary to 
obtain a full account of other forms of media usage by respondents when getting 
information on risk issues as they are more prevalent than the internet especially in places 
used for this research.1% of respondents’ awareness is shaped by destiny and luck. 
 
Question 8:  How often does the media offer indigenes of oil host communities the 
opportunity to partake in a public debate with policy makers on environmental 
degradation in the Niger Delta? 
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ANALYSIS: 
 
The above chart shows that 37% of respondents’ opinion went for rarely and 30% of 
respondents’ judgment went for very rarely. This shows that the media have not done 
enough to resuscitate the Nigerian public sphere on the Niger Delta conflict. It will be 
recalled from the literature review that the concept of public sphere is directed to the 
issues of how and to what extent the mass media can help individuals learn about their 
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environment, create an independent forum for public debate, thereby enabling the 
formation of public opinion to keep the state in check and also help citizens to reach 
informed political choices on issues of societal and personal interest (Dahlgren and 
Sparks, 1991).  
 
In interview, the broadcast journalist notes that the government and oil companies 
normally organize workshops, town hall meetings and sensitization visits to oil host 
communities to let them know of their activities, however, it is not too frequent because it 
is only when there is problem they ‘embark on this fire brigade approach of trying to call 
the people together and sensitize them’. Furthermore, the broadcast journalist notes that 
the media organises workshops twice a year because they give indigenes of oil host 
communities the opportunity to partake in public debate, some oil companies do it once a 
year and the government do it more often than even the oil companies (Interview, 
Broadcast Journalist, July, 2009). It will be recalled from the literature review that the 
media have reduced citizens to passive audience observers rather than active. This is 
because representatives such as political groups, academic experts, professionals, 
ordinary citizens, pressure groups, journalists and a centralised electronic media, began to 
dominate and influence the flow of information and public opinion, which the media use 
to provide information and surrogate debate for citizens to make decision and vote 
(Butsch, 2007). Habermas described this process as re-feudalisation of the public sphere 
(representative publicity), because the essential organisation of the public sphere (media) 
is controlled by the state and commercial institutions (Dahlgren and Sparks, 1991; 
Colhoun, 1992; Bakir and Barlow, 2007). The decline in public sphere was as a result of 
the growth of popular press and the drive for profit by media institutions, which 
eradicated active citizenship as it no longer offered citizens opportunity to partake in 
rational debate (Bakir and Barlow, 2007).  
 
To understand why the public sphere is not working in Nigeria’s Niger Delta conflict 
situation, this study paid closer attention to the trust relationships sustained between the 
publics, media, politicians, government and economic power holders like oil 
multinationals. This study revealed that Nigerians trust their media based on trust in risk 
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communication while trust in politicians, government and oil companies is in short 
supply. However, despite trust in media, it will be seen from the above chart that the 
media has not done enough to encourage public debate on risk issues. According to the 
broadcast journalist, politicians, government and oil companies seldom encourage the 
public sphere except when there is a problem (Interview, July, 2009). This shows that the 
process of public sphere is far from ideal in Nigeria’s Niger Delta context due to the 
complex nature of modern societies and the inevitable role the media play in the 
economic sphere to survive (Herman and Chomsky, 1988). It is indeed plausible that 
Habermas’ rendition of the decline of the public sphere in the west concurs with the 
Nigerian context.  
 
Question 9:  How would you categorise press freedom in present day democracy in 
Nigeria? 
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ANALYSIS: 
 
The above chart shows that 43% of respondents which is the highest acknowledged that 
the press is fairly free and next on the chart was 20% of respondents which note that the 
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press is neither free nor repressed. It will be recalled from the literature review that the 
type of political system existing in Nigeria at a given time can also determine the degree 
of press freedom that exists (Agbese, 2006). However, media fared significantly better 
under the previous democratic government headed by Obansajo (1999-2007) than they 
had during the preceding sixteen years of military regime. Yet, during the Obansajo 
administration journalists were not entirely free. The Obansajo government retained 
repressive practices used by the military to suppress journalists, and the media 
experienced different forms of attack during his leadership such as, assault, detention, 
confiscation of copies of news publications and injustices meant to suppress the media. 
Subsequent democratic president late Yar’Adua who took over power from Obansajo 
May 29, 2007 indicated to sign into law the freedom of information bill, which the 
Obansajo government rejected. In other words, this bill will liberate and give Nigerian 
citizens, including media, a right of access to public information (IREX, 2007). 
According to the journalist from the print media, the federal government is still sleeping 
on the information bill because the government sees journalists as their enemies and also 
government officials have something to hide from the public. Furthermore, ‘as 
government continue to have vote of six, secret acts and others, they are laws that are 
holding back from signing into law the freedom of information bill, as long as these laws 
continue to reflect in our status quo, we cannot talk about this bill’.  Thus, as long as 
government continue to withhold certain information, we cannot talk of press freedom 
(Interview, Print Journalist, July, 2009).  
 
In interview, the broadcast journalist notes that the press is a little bit better in democratic 
setting than it was during the military regime but in total the press is not free. The 
broadcast journalist rated the degree of press freedom as 80% because repression is still 
there in terms of closing down of media houses (Interview, July, 2009). It will be recalled 
from the literature that the government set up the Nigerian Broadcast Commission (NBC) 
as a regulatory body to control and monitor the media. This study identified two 
loopholes the government uses to repress the media through the NBC; first, the president 
and minister for information have the power to revoke and issue licence to private 
broadcasters, which does not conform to the stated requirement for broadcast licence. 
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This process is neither fair nor competitive but unclear and not open to public scrutiny as 
the president does not give reasons for denial and applicants have no recourse to judicial 
review or appeal. Thus, it is difficult to ascertain on this occasion what considerations 
come into play before licences are approved (IREX, 2007). Second, the power to revoke 
broadcast licenses, the defect of this decree is that the commission can revoke licenses of 
broadcast stations that do not function in harmony with code and in the public interest, 
without specifying ‘how to seek redress or to what the public interest is, as in the 
American Federal Communication Commission. Thus, the decree allows the NBC to 
provide licenses in perpetuity only to withdraw them at whim’ (Nwachuku, 1998: 1). 
According to the NTA journalist, in interview, press freedom is a ‘white elephant 
project’, everybody desires it but nobody wants to make it happen, press freedom is still 
floating, as journalists we do as much as we can and leave the rest to fate’ (Interview, 
July, 2009).  
 
Question 10:  Do you think press freedom has actually become better or worse since 
democracy was installed in Nigeria?  
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ANALYSIS:  
 
It is indeed plausible from the above chart that the press has become better since the 
installation of democracy in Nigeria. According to the broadcast journalist, press in 
democratic settings is far better than what they used to obtain in the military era, then 
state owned media were public relation organs of government because journalists wrote 
what military officers wanted them to write. The broadcast journalist also acknowledged 
the growth of Nigerian press both in print and electronic media sector citing examples of 
how the press reveal activities of fraudulent politicians, top government officials and how 
the state owned media now constructively criticize government operations in the society. 
The broadcast journalist notes that the press is not entirely free from repression; however, 
it has indeed become better (Interview, July 2009).  
 
Question 11:  How would you rate the environmental standard of operation by oil 
companies in the Niger Delta? 
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ANALYSIS: 
 
It can be seen from the above chart that the two highest percentages of respondents’, rate 
the environmental standard of operation by oil companies as low and very low standard. 
It is indeed plausible from respondents’ ratings that the environmental standard by oil 
companies is very far from ideal and does not meet the safety standard stated by the 
Stockholm conference 1972, which states that mankind has a fundamental right to 
freedom, right to dignity that permits adequate conditions of life in an environment of 
quality, right to equality and well being. It will be recalled from the literature review that 
each stage of oil exploration activities in the Niger-Delta has left most oil host 
communities impoverished due to oil leaks amounting to thousands of barrels of oil 
spilled into the environment, deep sea disposal of poisonous substances and air pollution 
by constant gas flaring into the atmosphere have left land, air and water unbearable for 
the inhabitants to cope with (Idris, 2007: Ransome-Kuti, 2007). Over the last fifty years, 
the Niger-Delta has experienced 1.5 million tons of crude oil spills from multinationals 
oil ventures (Igbikiowubo, 2006). The Nigerian ministry for environment, housing and 
urban development recorded a total of one thousand, two hundred and sixty oil spills 
between 2006 and 2008 (Ochayi and Okereke, 2008; Lawal et al, 2008). Accordingly, the 
staff of state ministry of environment interviewed for this study acknowledged that a 
good number of degradation occur as when not predicted (Interview, July, 2009) and also 
the policy maker in state environment committee [legislative arm of government] 
interviewed for this study notes that the environment is in a very bad state (Interview, 
July, 2009). In interview, the elder statesman made known that the oil companies are in 
Nigeria’s Niger Delta region to take away the oil and leave the people with nothing, they 
are not concerned about the damages they cause in oil producing communities, the oil 
companies are not making effort to bring conducive environment to the oil host 
communities rather they are always polluting the environment and that is one of the 
reasons why indigenes of oil host communities will continue to act. According to the 
elder statesman, ‘Oil production is a curse and not a blessing to the people of the Niger 
Delta rather it is a set back to the life of the people’ (Interview, July, 2009).  
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The level of environmental degradation in the Niger Delta as shown in the above chart 
raises the question of how environmental laws are being enforced in Nigeria. In 
interview, the staff of ministry of environment note that ‘to some extent the laws are 
there, but it is the implementation that is some how a little bit faulty because they are not 
hundred percent adhered to’ (Interview, July, 2009). The ministry of environment staff 
also acknowledged that there are federal, state and local government environmental laws; 
however, the oil companies oblige the federal laws more because they feel the federal 
government is supreme and whatever law they formulate takes care of the state and local 
government (Interview, Staff of State Ministry of Environment, July, 2009). The policy 
maker, in interview, cited a case of oil spill by Agip in 2003 at Abalagada in Ndokwa east 
in Delta State, that it was almost impossible to bring Agip to Delta State House of 
Assembly because these oil companies are aware that the nation’s economy depends on 
oil revenue and they may decide not to comply with state laws and the federal 
government will at every point back their action. Even when these laws are put together, 
if the oil companies are threatening to leave, there is a possibility that the federal 
government will ask them to stay. There is little or nothing policy makers can effectively 
put in place because oil exploration is an exclusive thing. The state now acts as a referee 
between the oil companies and oil host communities whenever there is dispute over 
environmental degradation (Interview, Policy Maker, July, 2009). Robinson notes that 
since most environmental protection laws are passed through procedures of domestic 
legislative arm of government, the effectiveness of the implementation of these laws can 
only be measured by the potency of a country’s rule of law, its economic capability and 
the uprightness of its administrative regime (2003).  
 
It will be recalled from the literature review that countries must ensure its citizens have 
the right to a healthy environment. That is, with regards to exploring natural resources, 
countries must exercise due diligence (Stockholm Conference, 1972), to ensure that its 
activities do not impact negatively on the environment of neighbouring states and its 
citizens (Rosenne, 1991; Crawford, 2002). Accordingly, a breach in the provision of the 
treaty or non observance by the state would be seen by international community as an 
abuse of sovereignty (Science Direct, 2004) and the state can be held responsible not only 
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for their acts or failure to act with respect to their responsibility to protect their 
environment under international law, also for the activities of private institutions like 
multinational oil corporations, whose activities within the state territory have serious 
implication for the environment and also affect the citizens adversely (Atsegbua, 2001; 
Weiss, 1992). The reason for holding the state accountable for environmental degradation 
and pollution by private institutions like multinational oil companies, is due to the 
principle of state sovereignty; that is, each state have the decisive power to control what 
happens in its territory and should be able to design and enforce laws regulating its 
nationals and legal persons within its territory (Nollkaemper, 2006).  
 
Question 12:  Do you think the environmental standard of oil companies has 
changed for the better or worse since democracy was installed in Nigeria? 
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ANALYSIS: 
 
The above chart illustrates that 59% of respondents thinks the environmental standard has 
become worse. The reasons 59% of respondents gave to back up their argument is that 
the oil companies do not care about the environment, they give money to community 
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leaders instead of carrying out major projects in the community, the oil companies prefer 
to take host communities to court instead of clearing up their degradation in the 
community, the issue of gas flaring and oil spillage is still very much prevalent in the oil 
host communities, more cases of oil spill are reported without action from the oil 
companies and the oil companies pay lip service to the pollution without improving their 
standard of operation. It is particularly revealing that more individuals are of the opinion 
that the environmental standard by oil companies have become worse which has serious 
implications on how Nigerians view and accept the operations of oil companies. It is 
indeed plausible that most Nigerians are aware of the dangers associated with the 
operations of oil companies and this has led to stigmatization. It will be recalled from the 
literature review that Kasperson et al., (2003) defined stigmatization as the adverse public 
perception of an activity, technologies and institutions that are perceived to be 
excessively dangerous and thus leads to avoidance or pessimistic behaviours, which is 
already the issue the indigenes of oil host communities have against the oil multinationals 
operating in the Niger Delta region. Indigenes of oil host communities now view oil 
companies operations with suspicion; the elder statesman, in interview, note that the king 
of Okpe Kingdom, an oil host community in Delta State refused government plans to 
bring infrastructural development through oil companies to his community because they 
have been oppressed in time past by these oil multinationals to the extent that they cannot 
allow them into the community again (Interview, July, 2009). The print journalist who is 
also consulting for shell, in interview, acknowledged that the oil companies do not want 
to talk about degradation because a lot of damage has been done to the environment and 
to the people. Furthermore, the print journalist acknowledged that on one of the trips 
sponsored by SPDC to the creeks: ‘I happen to know that a lot of damage has been done 
to the surroundings and to the creeks but sometimes because of company’s corporate 
image, they try to hide some of the things they are doing’ (Interview, July, 2009). The 
community leader, in interview, notes that the environment is in a poor condition and that 
the gas flaring and oil spillage is not properly managed because the oil companies are not 
taking measures to curb environmental pollution in his community (Interview, 
Community Leader, July, 2009). 
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The reasons 34% of respondents gave for thinking environmental standard had improved 
is that democracy has brought about change to oil host communities as oil companies 
now take them seriously, there are debates at the national legislative arm of government 
to curb unregulated activities of oil companies, the oil companies have always maintained 
a high standard but they neglect the people in terms of provision of basic amenities, the 
government now monitors and enforce environmental standard at Department of 
Petroleum Resources (DPR) and the oil companies now pay little attention to the 
environmental standard even though they can do more. This shows that democracy has 
brought about some little changes in the way oil companies operate, however, from 
respondents’ point of view, these changes on the part of oil companies and government 
are very slow and its effects are not yet visible, which signals much attention still needs 
to be given not just to the operation of oil companies but also the welfare of the people. 
Overall, respondents are not satisfied with the environmental standard of oil companies.  
 
Question 13: How would you describe the quality of life in the oil producing 
communities in the Niger Delta?   
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ANALYSIS: 
   
It is indeed revealing that respondents which describe life as low quality, very low quality 
and neither high nor low quality in oil host communities gave the same reasons to back 
up their argument. First, lack of basic amenities in oil host communities such as constant 
electricity supply, clean water supply, adequate means of transportation, hospitals, good 
roads and good housing scheme. Second, unemployment is on the high side as most 
indigenes cannot farm nor fish because of polluted land and water and also there are no 
graduate jobs. Third, the indigenes of oil host communities have nothing but poverty to 
show for the oil resources available in their community. The professor, in interview, 
acknowledged that life in oil producing community is very poor because:   
 
‘if you go to the interior of the Niger Delta you will see people drinking 
water from the pit and some times from the river which in most cases 
people defecate in. More than eighty percent of youths in Bayelsa State 
don’t have jobs. Have you ever traveled on the Warri-Port Harcourt express 
road? You will see that the road is very bad. Life in the oil producing 
communities is very terrible particularly in the riverine communities, there 
are no roads and other basic amenities, government presence is very 
negligible and I will say that the government can do more’ (Interview, July, 
2009).  
 
Accordingly, the community leader, in interview, acknowledged that people in his 
community still lives in trash houses and that poverty level is at its peak in oil host 
communities, the community leader described the Niger Delta as a place the government 
and oil companies get their wealth and take to other places to develop and this is why 
there is agitation in the region because development is at it lowest level (Interview, July, 
2009).  
 
The low quality of life in oil host communities is alarming; thus, this raises the question 
of accountability on the part of government on the one hand because over the years 
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Nigeria derives over 95 percent of its major income from oil receipt and on the other, 
how oil companies compensate oil host communities for their lost due to environmental 
degradation which has impoverished the indigenes (Adedoja, 2007). First, it will be 
recalled from the literature review that the federal government direction of policy from 
1960-2008 has proved ineffective as the abysmal conditions in the Niger Delta have made 
most individuals dismayed and lead them to believe that the federal government has no 
solid, measurable policies for the region. Those who are of this view anchor their position 
on two reasons. First, there was no concrete attempt to address the appalling conditions in 
the Niger Delta, until the violent agitation started. Second, government intervention 
seems ineffective and appears bleak in view of the enormity of the conflict (Akpan, 
2008). Second, The senior government official interviewed for this study note that part of 
the environmental law states that where environmental degradation occurs due to third 
party intervention oil companies will not pay compensation but if the degradation is due 
to the negligence of the oil company, first they clean up, after which pay adequate 
compensation (Interview, Senior Government Official, July, 2009). The policy maker, in 
interview, notes that even when the environmental degradation is due to the negligence 
on the part of the oil companies, they normally divide the people by choosing some 
prominent people in the:  
 
‘community and say alright you are our peace maker and how much are we 
going to give you and the amount usually runs into millions of naira. This is 
not compensation; it is settlement because the oil company is settling one 
person in order not to pay compensation to the whole community’ 
(Interview, Policy Maker, July, 2009).  
 
In interview, the elder statesman notes that the implication of environmental degradation 
without compensation is absolute poverty because people eventually become jobless 
(Interview, July, 2009). The staff of ministry of environment notes that even when 
compensation is paid to the oil host communities, the standard is very low because it does 
not match the actual level of destruction (Interview, July, 2009).  
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Question 14:  Have you or anyone in your community suffered casualties as a result 
of government military operation with militants in the Niger Delta?  
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ANALYSIS: 
 
It is indeed plausible that more than half of the respondents used for this study or 
someone in their community have suffered casualty as a result of government military 
operation in search of militants. It will be recalled from the literature review that 
government reaction to protest started in the early 1990s after the peaceful protest in 
Ogoniland in Rivers State which led to the death of late kenule Saro-Wiwa and eight 
others (Afamefuna, 2008). However, communities like Odi, Umuechem, Iko, Bonny and 
others have suffered the same fate under government disguise in search of militants and 
they end up destroying the oil host communities (Akpan, 2008). In interview, the 
principal notes that:  
 
‘oil companies have been involved in what is classified as divide and rule 
system. What the oil companies do when people protest, they align with the 
federal forces, including the federal government, go there mount stands and 
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destroy these communities; where bribe and such things could not assuage 
the people they use this arrant force’ (Interview, July, 2009).  
 
When the president late Yar’Adua assumed office in 2007 he indicated that his key aim 
was to stabilise the crisis in the region. Unlike previous government that used force and 
military might, Yar’Adua went for peace, in the pursuit of his goal; he constituted a peace 
and reconciliation committee with the mandate to concentrate on conflict resolution in 
Niger Delta (Adedoja, 2007). According to the principal, in early 2009 government forces 
in search of a militant group in Delta State headed by Tom Polo, nearly twenty-seven 
communities were invaded and a good number of people were affected. The principal 
note that they raised this issue in a conference at Abuja in early May 2009, ‘where the 
president came out with a statement to stop the offensive, but in June the same year the 
federal government was still destroying communities. Government forces attacked 
Abonima in June 2009’ in pretence of removing militants (Interview, Principal, July, 
2009). In interview, the professor criticized government military action as uncivilized 
because in a civilized world the government do not attack protesters and where militancy 
exist the government identify them and deal with them accordingly rather than 
descending on the entire community with military might (Interview, July, 2009). 
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Question 15:  How would you describe government response to the plight of 
indigenes in oil host communities in the Niger Delta in cases of environmental 
pollution? 
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ANALYSIS: 
 
It is indeed revealing from the above chart that government response is ineffective in 
attending to the plight of indigenes in oil host communities in cases of environmental 
pollution. The policy maker interviewed notes that it takes a longer time for government 
to attend to issues associated with compensation, providing palliative measures and 
attending to environmental degradation (Interview, July, 2009). The staff of ministry of 
environment acknowledged that there are so many environmental agencies carrying out 
the same function and it is who gets there first that does the job. Accordingly, it also 
depends on when report of environmental degradation gets to us as an environmental 
agency and whether the logistics are available, if the incident occurs in the creeks or 
swampy areas, we cannot get there because we do not have boats or helicopters so in 
most cases we rely on the proponents to take care of the logistics (Interview, July, 2009). 
The community leader, in interview, used his community as an example, in the event of 
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environmental degradation the community first cry out to the government and second to 
the oil companies, but it is the oil companies that take care of the devastation. The 
community leader notes that ‘even though the rescue may not be as fast as one will want 
but at least immediately any devastation is known they send their experts to where it is 
happening and they try to take measures to correct the abnormal situation’ (Interview, 
July, 2009). It will be recalled from the literature review that the Niger Delta crisis started 
as a result of neglect on the part of the government to attend to the activities of oil 
multinationals which usually pollute the environment (Akpan, 2008).  
 
Question 16:  In general, how would you rate government performance to end the 
Niger Delta conflict through the provision of basic amenities in the region? 
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ANALYSIS: 
 
It is indeed revealing from the above chart that more than half of respondents rate 
government performance as poor and very poor, this shows that government policies to 
bring development into oil host communities is not working. It will be seen in chart 13, 
page 139 that the quality of life in oil host communities is low, which signals lack of 
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basic amenities and infrastructural development to meet the needs of the people. 
According to the community leader, government presence in his community is next to 
zero because of the political structure of the country. The community leader asserts that:  
 
‘if you have a political big weight or political juggernauts in government 
from a community, then the community will have what they want from 
government in terms of infrastructure, social or welfare needs of the 
community but in a community like mine, where we don’t have such 
political big weights, the government presence have not gone beyond the 
schools, no roads and other basic amenities’ (Interview, July, 2009).  
 
In interview, the professor notes that for oil host communities to feel government 
presence in terms of provision of basic amenities, the issue of corruption has to be tackled 
at all level of government [federal, state and local] (Interview, July, 2009). Accordingly, 
the principal acknowledge that previous governors from 1999-2007 have been accused of 
defrauding the people by not properly utilizing federal allocation in their states 
(Interview, July, 2009). It is indeed plausible that lack of implementation of government 
policies, Nigerian political structure and corruption have serious implication on 
government performance to bring development to the Niger Delta conflict.  
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Question 17:  Do you think the creation of Ministry of Niger Delta alongside the 
operation of Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) will end the conflict in 
the Niger Delta?  
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ANALYSIS: 
 
The above chart reveals that 45% of the respondents are not sure if the creation of 
Ministry of Niger Delta alongside NDDC will effect changes in the region and bring the 
Niger Delta conflict to an end. The reasons respondents gave to back their answers are 
that there is no sincerity in government implementation of policies towards the Niger 
Delta, the appointed officials to manage the NDDC are not conversant with the 
developmental problems in the region, creation of another ministry will not end the 
conflict because the ministry purpose will be defeated due to government interference, 
the NDDC has been there for long without meaningful development, the same top 
government officials who set up NDDC board set up the Ministry of Niger Delta and if 
not for the conflict in the region which turned into surge in militancy, government would 
not have thought of creating the new ministry. The reasons 39% of respondents gave are 
that previous commissions failed to discharge their developmental duties and the new 
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ministry will equally fail, the new ministry is just another government propaganda to 
deceive the Niger Delta people, the issue of corruption is still very much associated with 
government officials and the creation of a new ministry is already creating skepticism for 
government because there is still conflict to remove the ministry from Abuja to the Niger 
Delta. The reasons 13% gave for their answer is that Niger Delta has experienced some 
sort of development since government introduced these interventionist agencies and the 
new ministry will likely do the same.  
 
The principal, in interview, notes that the NDDC and the Ministry of Niger Delta:  
 
‘are just ways used by the new colonialist headed by the Hausa, Fulani’s, 
Igbos and the Yoruba [four major tribes in Nigeria] to still gimmick the oil 
producing minorities because the states here are small, the problems of the 
Niger Delta are enormous’ (Interview, July, 2009). 
 
Furthermore, such interventionist agencies will not solve the problems in the Niger Delta 
because the problems are far too enormous for them to handle rather let the federal 
government practice true federalism where every state will control its resources and pay 
tax to the federal government (Interview, Principal, July, 2009). The elder statesman 
described every action of the federal government as ‘deceitful’ and ‘punitive’ because 
they have no interest in the people of the Niger Delta (Interview, July, 2009). The elder 
statesman note that not until he confronted and quarrel the federal government over the 
headquarters of the ministry of Niger Delta being at Abuja, consideration would not have 
been in motion to bring the ministry to the Niger Delta region. The elder statesman 
further stressed that Nigeria is a federation and should practice true federalism where the 
state pay tax to the federal government rather than unitary system. Accordingly:  
 
‘It is only tax they should take and not the bulk of the money coming in and 
then sharing it here and there. No matter what they do, I have told them at 
Warri in Delta State that the military might federal government put in the 
Niger Delta to suppress the militants will not work, unless they wipe out the 
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whole race, the people will emerge again, no matter the settlement or how 
far you suppress them, the people will come out until the government 
justifies them’ (Interview, Elder Statesman, July, 2009).  
 
From the above chart and respondents comments, it is evident that majority of Nigerians 
view government plans and policies to bring development to the Niger Delta through 
interventionist agencies with suspicion.  
 
Question 18:  Who, in your opinion, engages more in developmental projects in the 
Niger Delta? 
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ANALYSIS: 
 
The above chart reveals that 34% of respondents are of the opinion that the NDDC 
engage more in developmental projects in the Niger Delta region. It will be recalled from 
the literature review that the former chairman of the governing board of NDDC noted that 
the commission does not receive the three percent of all monies from federal account as 
stated in the law but get arbitrary allocation from the nine states in Niger Delta for twelve 
months. This means the commission is not getting enough funds to execute projects and 
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achieve the targeted developmental goal spelt out in the master plan. Despite the 
commission [NDDC] is under funded, its impact is felt much more in various 
communities in Niger Delta than local and state government which receive thirteen 
percent derivation fund from federal government (Ero, 2007; Mamah, 2008). It is worth 
noting here that despite the innovation and developmental project executed by NDDC, 
the anger of the oil host communities in Niger Delta have not been completely doused 
because they still view government plans with suspicion, see chart 17, page 147. 
However, it can be said that the commission seems to have reduced the tension a little in 
the region (Aham, 2007). In interview, the principal notes that ‘it is true to say that the 
Niger Delta states were not doing well before these interventionist agencies like the 
NDDC and presently the Niger Delta ministry were set up’ because the state and local 
government have been accused of embezzlement and defrauding the people’s monthly 
federal allocation (Interview, July, 2009).  
 
The state government is the second on the chart, though previous Niger Delta state 
governors were accused of defrauding the people. It is indeed revealing from record [see 
diagram in 2.5.6, page 73] that the state and local government are not effectively utilizing 
their funds because NDDC which appears to be under funded has become an alternative 
government to which all demands are directed. State and local government seem to be 
doing less as indigenes complain of their inaction and acknowledge the presence of 
NDDC in infrastructural development (Ero, 2007). According to the professor, in 
interview, the issue of management has been raised against the Niger Delta state 
governors on accounts of lack of government presence in most oil host communities in 
their states (Interview, July 2009). The oil companies and the federal government are 
third on the chart; first, while the Niger Delta state governors have not shown enough 
commitment in partnering with NDDC, oil multinationals have shown some enthusiasm 
in partnering the commission to achieve a common goal in reinstating peace and stability 
in the region. One of such partner projects was with Shell Petroleum Development 
Company (SPDC) and NDDC in the construction of the nine and a half billion naira 
[approximately forty-five million pounds] Ogbia-Nembe road, which is a 29.818 
kilometre road comprising nine bridges (Ero, 2007). This shows that oil companies 
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engage in developmental project, although it does not appear to be much as only 11% of 
respondents acknowledge their developmental aspirations. Second, though the federal 
government established NDDC, however, they have been accused of not meeting the 
agreed funds meant for the commission. The principal, elder statesman and professor, in 
interview, argue that the federal government outreach to the Niger Delta through 
interventionist agencies will not bring adequate and meaningful development to the Niger 
Delta because the challenges are too enormous for them to handle unless they practice 
true fiscal federalism (Interview, July, 2009). It is very clear that NDDC tops the chart in 
meeting community development in the Niger Delta region despite it is under funded than 
federal government, state government, local government and oil companies.  
 
Question 19: Considering the wide spread of gas flaring in the Niger Delta, do you 
think it is contributing to global warming?   
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ANALYSIS: 
 
It is indeed plausible from the above chart that more than half of the respondents are 
aware of global warming which has serious implication on mans existence on earth. It 
will be recalled from the literature review that gas flaring is another aspect of risk issue 
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associated with environmental pollution brought about by the activities of multinational 
oil corporations. It will be recalled from the literature review that flaring natural gas from 
oil stations as a by-product of crude oil production has become a normal occurrence that 
dominates the skyline in the Nigeria’s Niger Delta region. Oil production began in Niger 
Delta about fifty years ago and so did the practice of ceaseless flaring of Associated Gas 
(AG) twenty-four hours a day. More Greenhouse gas (GHG) is flared in Nigeria’s Niger 
Delta region than anywhere else in the world and this placed Nigeria as the biggest gas 
flarer in the world. Currently, there are more than hundred gas flaring stations in Nigeria 
(Afamefuna, 2008; Idris, 2007; Ishisone, 2004; Friends of the Earth, 2004). The last 
democratic President, Olusegun Obansajo (1999-2007) signed a non-binding agreement 
with multinational oil companies to end gas flaring in the Niger Delta region by 2008 
(Friends of the Earth, 2004; Climate Justice Programme, 2005). However, at present there 
is no end in sight. According to the policy maker, in interview, the federal government 
has not put pertinent laws in place to end the issue of gas flaring in Nigeria. In 2009 
senate passed a law to end gas flaring without an implementation format. The gas law bill 
has not been accepted by the president, ‘it was just passed by the senate, the House of 
Representatives have not even passed it so it goes beyond what the host communities can 
do on their own because oil exploration as it were is of the exclusive risk in the 
constitution’ (Interview, July, 2009).  
 
It will be recalled from the literature review that within the conceptual framework of 
Foucauldian perspective, risk and safety are seen as fundamental facet of authority and 
domination and however a plan for the government of societies (Zinn and Taylor-Gooby, 
2006). Risk from this perspective may be understood as governmental scheme of 
regulatory power by which citizens are under surveillance and managed through the 
aspirations of neo-liberalism (Lupton, 1999). The aim of governmentality is not to 
confront a strong dangerous situation, but to foresee all possible forms of irruption of 
risk, this preventative measure that constitutes the social policy are now mainly used not 
only by citizens or individuals needing assistance by the state, but by permutation of 
factors which constitutes risk assessment that concentrate on the summative population 
and not the individual. Such state or government activities are carried out on supposed 
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possibility of consulting risk science as a basis for reducing harm to citizens of the state. 
‘The control of these probabilities, and protection of individuals from risk, becomes the 
responsibility of inter-locking agencies with varying levels of direct connection with the 
state’ (Denney, 2005: 35). The Foucauldian perspective on governmentality position on 
risk is far from ideal and not working in the Nigeria’s Niger Delta context because there 
is a twist in government policies to end the prevalent gas flaring as the issues is still 
dragging in government domain without a lasting solution.     
 
Question 20:  Are you aware of any time when indigenes of oil producing 
communities in Niger Delta ignored warnings of the risk involved in disrupting oil 
pipelines from authorities that led to casualties or deaths? 
 
CHART 20 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Delta Bayelsa Rivers
Total % Yes 56%
Total % No 37%
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ANALYSIS: 
 
The above chart illustrates that 56% of respondents are aware of casualties and deaths as 
a result of indigenes of oil host communities disrupting oil pipelines prior to warnings 
from authorities. The instances sighted by 56% of respondents are Idjerhe Jesse oil fire 
incident in Delta State 1998, where almost a thousand people lost their lives, another 
pipeline explosion in 2000 near the town of Jesse in Delta state killed about two hundred 
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people, Ilado fire incident near Lagos State in 2006, over three hundred people died and 
Okrika in Rivers State, Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) jetty fire in 
2007 which claimed forty lives. It will be seen from the different incidents date that 
individuals are still ignoring warnings despite the severe consequences of previous risk 
events that led to casualty and deaths. It will be recalled from the literature review that 
the social amplification of risk framework (SARF) starts from the concept of a risk-
related occurrence (Petts et al, 2001). These events pertaining to risks interact with a wide 
range of psychological, social, institutional and cultural processes which create 
interpretations that may heighten or attenuate risk perception and its manageability, 
thereby shaping risk behaviour (Murdock et al, 2003; Renn et al, 1992 in Breakwell et al, 
2001).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 155 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
5.0 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS / RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
This chapter seek to answer the research questions the researcher formulated as a 
response to a number of intriguing observations of the conflict in the Nigeria’s Niger 
Delta region. The research questions rely on known information and reasoning from 
library materials used for this study such as books, journal articles, newspapers 
publication and credible internet materials which helped to formulate the literature review 
for this study; second, research method such as the qualitative [interview] and 
quantitative [questionnaire] analysis the researcher generated which helped to inform the 
results’ presentation / data analysis. It is worth noting here that the five research questions 
connect the two methods [quantitative and qualitative] used for this study. That is, the 
quantitative questions were extracted from the literature review, specifically focusing on 
the key areas of the research questions – Niger Delta conflict, environmental risk issues, 
media, policy, trust and stakeholders [oil companies, government / policy makers and oil 
host communities]. The qualitative questions were designed from the quantitative 
questions with a specific focus on the research questions in order to probe beyond the 
structured questions in the questionnaires to get a fuller picture / knowledge of the issues 
in the study and to confirm the findings of both approaches. The findings generated for 
this study are discussed and analysed using the research questions as a focus.  
 
Research Question 1:  To what extent can media exposure influence policy maker’s 
perception about public opinion on issues relating to the Niger Delta conflict? 
 
It will be recalled from the literature review that agenda setting in relation to policy can 
be classified into three subfields: media agenda setting, the public’s agenda setting and 
policy agenda setting (Rushefsky and Patel, 1998; Porche, 2004). The plethora of  
research articles on agenda setting has conceptualized either media agenda setting, public 
agenda setting, or policy agenda setting as the dependent variable (Rushefsky and Patel, 
1998; Rogers and Dearing, 1988) in order to elucidate how it is influenced by other 
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factors (Whitney, 1991). Agenda setting scholarly articles demonstrates that the agenda 
setting process links the activities of public and media agendas in policy development 
(Berger, 2001, also see Rogers and Dearing, 1988). Thus, for media agenda setting to 
occur, issues must be given a significant amount of media coverage, which indicates the 
extent to which the media agenda has been set, and by extension, policy agenda-setting is 
marked by the emergence and importance of the issues or events in the public policy field 
(Rogers and Dearing, 1988 cited in Whitney, 1991). Although this is not a traditional 
agenda-setting study in that it does not track media content and its corresponding 
influence on publics or policy-makers, it is interested in exploring protagonists’ 
perceptions of the media’s agenda-setting role, and the dynamics behind this. Taking 
onboard the concept of media agenda setting, the researcher must first consider the level 
at which the Nigerian media investigates and disseminate issues linking public opinion 
and activities in the society in order to influence policy makers’ perception about public 
opinion. This, of course, directs this study to look at the underpinning factors that may 
impede adequate media coverage and investigation of public opinion on issues in Niger 
Delta in order to elucidate the extent to which the media can influence policy.   
 
First, one vital area the media can use to influence policy is to create an atmosphere 
where public opinion on issues in the Niger Delta are discussed with policy makers. The 
concept of the public sphere is vital to an understanding of how issues are directed and to 
what extent the mass media can help individuals learn about their environment, create an 
independent forum for public debate, thereby enabling the formation of public opinion to 
keep the state in check and also help citizens to reach informed political choices on issues 
of societal and personal interest (Dahlgren and Sparks, 1991). It is particularly revealing 
from Chart 8, chapter four, page 129 that the public perceive that the media rarely / very 
rarely gives indigenes of oil host communities the opportunity to partake in a public 
debate with policy makers on issues relating to the Niger Delta. Journalists also perceive 
this to be the case: The broadcast journalist, in interview, made it clear that the media 
seldom organises such opportunity, perhaps twice a year and it is only when there is crisis 
(Interview, broadcast journalist, July, 2009). This shows that the public sphere is far from 
ideal; the implication of this action on public opinion is that policy makers will not have 
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the opportunity to know the mind of the public concerning the scale of risk issues 
affecting their livelihood and environment. Arguably, on this occasion, the media have 
reduced citizens to passive audience observers rather than active. This is because 
representatives such as political groups, academic experts, professionals, pressure groups, 
journalists and a centralised electronic media in Nigeria, now dominates and influence the 
flow of information and public opinion (Butsch, 2007). 
 
Second, the data suggests that the frequency of media coverage and reportage on issues in 
the Niger Delta region determines the extent to which the public believe the media can 
influence policy makers’ perception about public opinion. It is indeed plausible that the 
indigenes of oil host communities in the Niger Delta have over the years campaigned 
against risk issues affecting their environment and economic activities as a result of 
environmental degradation by the activities of oil companies (Ransome-Kuti, 2007: 3). 
However, the violent agitation in the Niger Delta started as a result of government 
insensitivity to the plight of the oil host communities (Adedoja, 2007; Africa Action, 
1999). At this stage, it will be worth investigating the aspect of the conflict the Nigerian 
media seem to be covering the most. It will be recalled from the literature review that 
Ogunbunmi a journalist interviewed on media performance with regards to Niger-Delta 
crisis admitted that although the media are reporting the crisis, it is also imperative they 
draw attention via in-depth and interpretative reporting to the underlying cause [risk 
issue] of the crisis (Jimoh, 2008). It is particularly revealing in Chart 3, chapter four, page 
117 that the public perceive that the media has not covered risk issues and its 
consequences on economic activities and the environment enough to attract government 
attention. The professor, in interview, made it clear that media reportage on risk issues in 
the Niger Delta is weakened because there are no experts or indicators of environmental 
quality to monitor / record and disseminate the precise implications of environmental 
degradation to plants, animals and humans in the region through the media. Thus, media 
reporting is limited to only the physical events of the degradation, which does not match 
the actual consequences of the pollution. However, it is worth saying here that the 
Nigerian government has an environmental watch dog, which is the federal ministry of 
environment but in essence, the facilities the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) 
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have are substandard to the facilities that are in possession of the oil companies. As a 
result, the DPR rely on the information received from the oil companies in terms of 
environmental pollution ‘so how are you sure the information is correct and not tampered 
with’ (Interview, Professor, July, 2009).  
 
Third, access to the affected areas where environmental degradation and violent agitation 
occurs cannot be easily reached by journalists. On the one hand, in the event of 
environmental degradation, journalists find it difficult to get to the location because they 
are under equipped, lack the logistics and technical knowhow. In rare cases these oil 
companies aid only journalists that consult for them but with a caution for them not to 
mention what they see. According to the print Journalist, in interview: 
 
‘the oil companies don’t want you to mention anything about degradation but 
if you go to the oil producing areas you will know that a lot of damage has 
been done to the people that reside there. I happen to know much because I 
consult for Shell, I am one of those that if Shell is doing anything, they call 
on me to deliver one lecture or the other, they take me round and I see a lot 
even this creek they are talking about, it was Shell that took me on tour 
because I was delivering papers on the activities of the militants as it affects 
Shell. I said I will not talk whatever that I have not seen so they sponsored 
the trip to the creeks, the first time I can now tell you that I know what can 
be called creeks. I happen to know that a lot of damage has been done to the 
surroundings and to the creeks but sometimes because of company’s 
corporate image; they try to hide some of the things they are doing’ 
(Interview, Print Journalist, July, 2009).  
 
However, the print journalist asserts that funding to visit these affected locations is 
problematic because most media organisations have limited funds due to the enormous 
financial challenges in the setting up of facilities in media establishment (Interview, July, 
2009). Also there are restrictions placed by the government to certain affected region 
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where the public express their opinion perhaps through peaceful or violent agitation. The 
NTA journalist, in interview, notes that: 
 
‘in a crisis situation journalists cannot all move to that place for security 
reasons, security in the sense that when you are going into a war zone there 
are people that will make it possible for you to come there and be able to 
report, you don’t just go at your own will, you are free to go there but can 
you get to the place?’ (Interview, NTA Journalist, July, 2009).  
 
Thus, this has serious implication on journalists’ reportage because where journalists 
cannot get access to the affected region to get public opinion on ongoing events, their 
report will not be balanced and this may affect policy. The print journalist, in interview, 
gave an example of some journalists who wrote an article about an incident that happened 
in Gbaramatu community in Delta State about military action against violent protest 
without visiting the community. However, the report turned out to be over exaggerated 
and it did raise both public and government concern. The exaggerated report is as follow:  
 
‘the report that came to us was that the place was completely destroyed and 
there were no humans, animals or buildings remaining until the governor 
got there and found out that the reports were twisted. It was an alarm raised 
that the community was invaded, but when it was shown on television you 
could see humans, domestic animals and buildings apart from those they 
bombed’ (Interview, Print Journalist, July, 2009).      
 
Fourth, press freedom in Nigeria is another factor that can impede media coverage on 
issues in the Niger Delta. It will be seen from Chart 9 and 10 in chapter four, page 131 
and 133 that the press is perceived by Nigerians to be fairly free and has become better 
since democracy was installed. However, the print journalist argue that the press still 
faces handicaps and that is why reports on public protest over environmental degradation 
is on the low side because the freedom of information bill has not been passed into law, 
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hence  journalists are not allowed access to information. The print journalist notes that the 
government is not willing to sign the information bill because in Nigeria: 
 
‘those in authority see journalists as enemies and most times when the 
government wants to set up committees to look into the conflict, they keep 
journalists away so they will not know what is happening in the affected 
communities, because they believe that if journalists are there they will be 
forced to write what is happening. They have forgotten too that a journalist 
is an added advantage to help them know the problem of the area and if 
journalists exposes the problems of these areas, the problem is half solved 
but they are keeping many things out and it is what we know that we use’ 
(Interview, Print Journalist, July, 2009).  
 
In interview, the professor acknowledged that information control on the part of oil 
companies is problematic because the freedom of information bill has not been passed. 
Accordingly, the oil companies are not ready to give accurate information about their 
operations and this has however, affected in-depth media coverage on risk issues in the 
Niger Delta (Interview, July, 2009). Aside from the problematic nature of the information 
bill, the journalist from NTA notes that it is not easy for journalists to challenge the 
government and policy makers on risk issues relating to the Niger Delta conflict because 
there is no total press freedom. When journalists: 
 
‘voice out, some persons in some quarters will try to suppress what you are 
saying because they have the will power to do that. A typical example, is 
when you see some journalists been incarcerated because they gave reports 
on certain issues that some persons are involved who have personal interest 
in such areas, they don’t want such report to be public knowledge so they 
try to suppress it. There are other ways to suppress it, some journalists have 
become gullible therefore they succumb to the idea and things like that, so 
you find out that they work out their reports as the case may be’ (Interview, 
NTA Journalist, July, 2009).  
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Against this backdrop, the researcher concludes that the extent to which the Nigerian 
media can influence policy makers’ perception about public opinion on issues relating to 
the Niger Delta conflict is far from ideal. It is true to say that the Nigerian media are 
handicapped to a very large extent in information gathering due to the complex nature of 
the Nigerian government and conflict in the Niger Delta. Although, the media have 
covered and reported the crisis, they have not done so to a large extent because the factors 
that impede media performance as discussed above seem to be having a very clear effect 
in terms of media coverage as journalists are limited to certain aspect of the agitation / 
conflict due to information control. This might itself be interpreted as problematic 
because media reports are not in-depth enough to effect change in the policy field.   
 
However, this perception is not universal. For instance, the NTA journalist argues that:  
 
‘the media has done a lot, if not for the media government attention would 
not have been drawn to the issues in the Niger Delta, the people have been 
agitating for long, a lot of commission have been set up but have not been 
doing anything about the issues but with this current move by the media 
through writing, telecasting and other means of reaching out to the people; 
government saw the need to act because the situation in the Niger Delta was 
getting out of hand’ (Interview, NTA Journalist, July 2007).  
 
The principal, in interview, argue that the Nigerian government is interested in creating 
interventionist agency like NDDC and the Ministry of Niger Delta without looking into 
the root [risk issues] of why the Niger Delta people started protest in the first instance 
(Interview, July, 2009). It will be recalled from the literature review that the abysmal 
conditions in the Niger Delta have made most individuals dismayed and lead them to 
believe that government has no solid, measurable policies for the region. Those who are 
of this view anchor their position on two reasons. First, there was no concrete attempt to 
address the appalling conditions in the Niger Delta, until the violent agitation started. 
Second, government intervention seems ineffective and appears bleak in view of the 
enormity of the conflict which has defeated every tried solution (Akpan, 2008). This 
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shows that the government and policy makers did not effectively respond / act to the 
peaceful agitation over neglect, underdevelopment, violation of political and civil rights 
and environmental degradation in the Niger Delta region in response to the activities of 
oil multinationals over the years despite media coverage. It is indeed very clear that it 
was not until the agitation became violent and started affecting Nigeria’s oil receipts due 
to closures of oil wells by indigenes of oil host communities in most part of the Niger 
Delta region that the government / policy makers decided to take action by introducing 
some palliative measures / policies to calm down nerves in the region.   
 
To this end, this study reveals that the media agenda setting theory did not work on this 
occasion because the theory failed to consider the determinant factors that impede 
information gathering which affect media performance and coverage on the one hand, 
and on the other, the media did not play any significant role in influencing government 
agencies / policy choices. This is because journalists have no input into policy-makers’ 
decision making process. According to the print journalist:  
 
‘when the government wants to set up committees to look into the conflict, 
they keep journalists away so they will not know what is happening in the 
affected communities, because they believe that if journalists are there they 
will be forced to write what is happening. They have forgotten too that a 
journalist is an added advantage to help them know the problem of the area 
and if journalists expose the problems of these areas, the problem is half 
solved but they are keeping many things out and it is what we know that we 
use’ (Interview, July, 2009). 
 
This shows that the government / policy makers have their own agenda different from 
what the media has been depicting concerning public opinion on issues relating to the 
Niger Delta conflict. Against this, the NTA journalist contends that if not for the media, 
government attention would not have been drawn to the issues in the Niger Delta 
(Interview, July 2009). However, it is very clear from this study that government 
response in terms of policy formulation in attending to the Niger Delta conflict does not 
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always align with media depiction on issues in the Niger Delta because the harsh terrain 
of the Niger Delta region remains substantially unaddressed. It is indeed plausible that the 
media agenda setting theory does not work in real life crisis / conflict scenario because 
the theory was based on hypothetical findings rather than real life events.   
     
Research Question 2:  Can media exposure shape the Nigerian public’s perception 
on policy issues relating to the Niger Delta conflict?  
 
It will be recalled from the literature review that the literature on public agenda setting 
indicates that the media construct public agenda through media exposure, by influencing 
what is news and who and what is newsworthy (Dye 2002 cited in Porche, 2004). The 
mass media channel their attention to issues that will inform the public on what they 
should know, think and have feelings about. This hypothesized function of the media 
does not tell its audience or readers what to think but what to think about (Folarin, 1998 
in Nwanne, 2006; McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Rogers and Dearing, 1988). ‘While the 
mass media may have little influence on the direction or intensity of attitudes, it is 
hypothesized that the mass media set the agenda for each political campaign, influencing 
the salience of attitudes toward the political issue’ (McCombs and Shaw, 1972: 177). 
Although this is not a traditional agenda-setting study searching for correlations between 
media content and public opinion, to answer the research question above, the researcher 
has considered both the Nigerian public’s perception about Nigerian media and how the 
Nigerian public view policy implementation by policy makers. This enables a more 
nuanced understanding than that provided by traditional agenda-setting research of the 
media’s role in shaping the Nigerian public’s perception on policy issues relating to the 
Niger Delta conflict.   
 
In order to understand the level of influence media exposure has on the Nigerian public’s 
perception on policy issues relating to the Niger Delta conflict, it is worth looking at from 
where the Nigerian public mostly get their information on the Niger Delta conflict; 
second, how satisfied are they with media coverage on issues in the Niger Delta; third, 
what is the trust relationship between the media and the Nigerian public? First, it will be 
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seen from Chart 1, chapter four, page 113 that more than half of the respondents get their 
information from the electronic and print media; this shows that media coverage and 
reportage remains essential to the Nigeria public when seeking information on the Niger 
Delta conflict. It is particularly revealing in Chart 7, chapter four, page 127 that the media 
shapes most audience awareness about risk issues in the Niger Delta region. Accordingly, 
the media remain essential to the political process. They are the engine room where 
battles over defining, identification, conflict and risk management are fought out and 
brought to public knowledge in the Nigeria’s Niger Delta context (Bourdieu, 1998). 
Second, Chart 2, chapter four, page 115 reveal that most respondents are fairly satisfied 
with reportage / coverage. Thus the media shapes their awareness on risk issues and is 
also their preferred means of getting information on the Niger Delta conflict. Third, it 
will be seen from Chart 4, chapter four, page 119 that most Nigerians trust the media to 
tell the truth on risk issues in the Niger Delta region more than any other agency linked 
directly or indirectly to the conflict [although pressure groups come a very close second]. 
Against this backdrop, Nigerians perceive media depiction on risk issues in Niger Delta 
as truthful; hence they consult the media to shape their awareness on issues in the Niger 
Delta region indicating that they are fairly satisfied with media coverage. Thus, it can be 
said that the Nigerian media has the capacity to influence the Nigerian public on the risk 
issue.  
 
To understand the Nigerian public’s perception of policy issues relating to the Niger 
Delta conflict, it will be worth exploring how the Nigerian public views policy 
implementation in order to know the type of relationship that exists between policy 
makers and the Nigerian public. First, to get a clearer view of policy issues in the Niger 
Delta, it will be worth reviewing how effective previous policy implementations have 
been in the Niger Delta. It will recalled from the literature review that the direction of 
policy in the Niger Delta started as early as 1957 when the Niger Delta people and other 
ethnic minorities protested against the then regional and central government in the 
allocation of basic amenities. In 1961 the first ministry, Niger Delta Development Board 
(NDDB) was created to meet the developmental needs of the region (Nwabuawele, 2008; 
Bassey 2006 in Akpan, 2008; Niger Delta Crisis, 2000). As seen in the literature review, 
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from 1961 onwards different government regimes, both military and civilian established 
different policies that created commissions to see the developmental needs of the Niger 
Deltans but this aim was never achieved. In the wake of democracy in 1999 the then 
president Obasanjo went the old way to establish another commission known as Niger 
Delta Development Commission (NDDC); however, the commission failed to meet the 
summary of the commission’s directive which was to change the face of the Niger Delta 
through sustainable development because it was under funded by the federal government 
(Ero, 2007; Mamah, 2008). In 2007, the late democratic president Yar’Adua assumed 
office and continued with the vision of NDDC. In view of expanding this project he 
decided to create a new commission in 2008 known as Ministry of Niger Delta to work 
alongside NDDC because of the unabated agitation in the Niger Delta region (Reuters, 
2008). However, the move by the late president prompted debate between critics alike, an 
activist and human right lawyer noting that the Niger Delta ministry is more bureaucracy 
that will avoid the real issues in the region (Walker, 2008; Daily Trust, 2008). According 
to Akpan, previous years of government policies in the Niger Delta was perceived as 
‘half-hearted and mischievous in intent and negative in manifestation leaning towards 
incremental and or disjointed implementation theory of policy making’ (2008: 307). The 
failure of previous commission in the Niger Delta has made people to believe that the 
government has no solid, measurable policies for the region (Akpan, 2008). It will be 
seen from Chart 17, chapter four, page 147 that 45 percent of respondents are not sure if 
the creation of Ministry of Niger Delta alongside the operation of NDDC will end the 
conflict in the Niger Delta and 39 percent of respondents acknowledged that the creation 
of Ministry of Niger Delta will not end the conflict. In interview, the elder statesman 
notes that: 
 
‘the federal government created what they called the Niger Delta ministry; 
they say it is a fact, but it is a deceit and where did they put the head 
quarters, at Abuja. I said why did they put the ministry in Niger Delta and 
put a liaison officer at Abuja’ (Interview, Elder Statesman, July, 2009). 
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Furthermore, every action of the federal government is disciplinary, nothing to the 
interest of the people (Interview, Elder Statesman, July, 2009). The principal, in 
interview, acknowledge that the NDDC and currently the Niger Delta ministry will not 
help the problems of the Niger Delta because they are enormous and that it is another 
way of the government to hoax the people of the Niger Delta. According to the principal, 
these:  
 
‘interventionist agencies are not going to solve the problems of the oil 
producing communities rather, at best, they can aggravate because they will 
just be a small chunk in a deep sea because the problems are more than 
what these interventionist agency can handle. What we need here is 
resource control and true federalism, rather than these communities having 
small chunks but instead these communities will pay royalty to the federal 
government and the prospecting communities will pay tax as it is done in 
the United States of America’ (Interview, July, 2009).  
 
It is indeed plausible that direction of policy from 1961 to 2009 has not brought 
meaningful development to the Niger Delta. This shows that government policy to bring 
development to the Niger Delta through commissions is far from ideal; Chart 16, chapter 
four, page 145 revealed that 33 percent of respondents’ rate government performance to 
end the Niger Delta conflict through the provision of basic amenities as poor and 26 
percent of respondents rated government performance as very poor. It will be seen from 
Chart 13, chapter four, page 139 that 63 percent of respondents described the quality of 
life in oil producing communities in Niger Delta as low quality and 13 percent of 
respondents described the quality of life as very low. The community leader interviewed 
for this study notes:  
 
‘that there is nothing to write home about when it comes to the standard of 
life and development in the oil producing communities. These are people 
who still live in trash houses; in fact poverty level is at its peak in these 
areas, it is just a place they get the wealth and take to other places to 
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develop and that is the theme and pain of the oil communities because 
development here is at its lowest level. In fact there is no development let 
me say so, would you say that there is development? When people cannot 
eat two square meals a day, when the road to these oil producing 
communities are usually flooded and cars cannot move on the roads, lack of 
industries and of course no electricity, the electricity in these areas can 
hardly function, lets say two hours a day. In fact there is nothing in the 
Niger Delta especially in the oil producing communities’ (Interview, July, 
2009). 
 
It will be recalled from the literature review that the insensitivity of the government to the 
plight of the Niger Delta people over the abysmal condition in the Niger Delta region led 
to peaceful protest in the first instance before it then metamorphosed into surge in 
militancy, oil pipeline vandalisation and hostage taking of oil workers for ransom 
(Adedoja, 2007; Africa Action, 1999). It is indeed plausible that the Nigerian government 
response appears bleak to the plight of Niger Deltans. It will be seen from Chart 15, 
chapter four, page 144 that 33 percent of respondents note that government response to 
the plight of the people in oil host communities in the Niger Delta in cases of 
environmental pollution which brings economic embarrassment to the community is very 
slow and 27 percent rated government response as slow. This raises the issue of blame 
and trust for government on policy implementation on issues relating to the Niger Delta 
conflict. First, it will be seen in Chart 5, chapter four, page 121 that 64 percent of 
respondents blame / hold government responsible for the crisis in the Niger Delta region 
than any other institution linked directly or indirectly to the crisis. The reason 
respondents gave was that government failed to discharge their social responsibility 
effectively in the Niger Delta region by not providing the indigenes of oil host 
communities with basic infrastructural needs. Second, the issue of trust is raised here for 
government on risk issues in the Niger Delta region; it will be seen in Chart four, chapter 
four, page 119 that trust for government and politicians is in short supply and this has 
serious implications for policy acceptance by the masses as they view government plans 
with suspicion. Accordingly, the masses are key players in risk controversies and distrust 
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may lead to rejection of policy decision (Pidgeon et al, 2003). Thus, abstract systems 
depend upon trust; hence active trust must be won and maintained (Giddens, 1990). It is 
indeed very clear from this study that the abysmal condition in the Niger Delta region has 
led Nigerians to believe that the government has no meaningful plans for the Niger Delta 
region hence they blame / hold government responsible for the crisis. Arguably, this has 
made people living in the Niger Delta lose trust for government policies through another 
interventionist agency as previous ones did not work. This shows that the relationship 
between the government and the Nigerian publics is far from ideal as every move by the 
government towards policy implementation in the Niger Delta region is viewed with 
suspicion and doubts. 
 
Against this backdrop, the researcher concludes that it will be very difficult, if not 
impossible to positively influence the Nigerian public’s perception on policy issues 
relating to the Niger Delta region despite evidence that the Nigerian media can influence 
the Nigerian public on this risk issue. This is because the Niger Delta people are still 
faced / confronted with the abysmal condition in the region regardless of various policies 
through interventionist agencies in the past. Thus, this has made indigenes in the Niger 
Delta have doubts and believe that the introduction of another policy through 
interventionist agency by the current government will equally fail like the previous ones. 
It is indeed plausible that the relationship between the Nigerian public and government is 
not working due to lack of trust for government / politicians; hence Nigerians hold the 
government responsible for the crisis in the Niger Delta region. At this stage, media 
dissemination concerning policy issues in the Niger Delta will not be accepted because 
distrust for government / politicians already exists and this has, however, led to doubts 
and suspicion of another policy through commission by the Niger Delta people. It will be 
worth saying here that the media is only an avenue through which policy makers 
disseminate information; thus, the media can only draw the public attention to policy 
issues and does not tell its audience what to think but what to think about (McCombs and 
Shaw, 1972; Rogers and Dearing, 1988). This shows that the mass media have very little 
influence on the nature of audience perception or intensity of attitudes about policy issues 
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(McCombs and Shaw, 1972) because of  Nigerian policy-makers’ past performance and 
the role of direct experience of risk issues in the Niger Delta region. 
 
Research Question 3:  How effectively have the Nigerian media communicated risk 
issues on contemporary environmental degradation in the oil affected communities 
of the Niger Delta?  
 
It will be recalled from the literature review that Beck acknowledges that we now live in 
an era characterized by uncertainty which he termed risk society. This is an era obsessed 
with risk of ecological and natural disaster, accidents, technological errors, professional 
miscalculation and scientific uncertainty. Modern uncertainty has triggered public and 
political debate over defining risk as a concept (1995b: 21-6; see also Eldridge and 
Reilly, 2003) and the mass media are seen to play a key role in social transformation and 
channel through which risk-related events are mediated (Lundgren and McMakin, 2004). 
There is a prevalent belief amongst sectors of risk community, industry, experts and 
government agencies that the media exert significant influence on people’s responses to 
risk. Sociological approaches suggest that the media facilitates the awareness of public 
risk consciousness (Zinn and Taylor-Gooby, 2006). Taking on board the concept of 
media and risk on the one hand, and on the other, to get an ideal answer to this research 
question, it will be worth looking at how the Nigerian media have conveyed this risk 
information to the public.  
 
First, it will be recalled from Chart 11 in chapter four, page 134 that 30 percent of 
respondents [which was the highest in the chart] rated the operational standard by oil 
companies as low and 29 percent rated the standard as very low. This shows that the 
Niger Delta people have a sense of the operational activity of oil companies, perhaps as it 
affects their environment. However, it is also revealing that the standard of operation by 
oil companies has deteriorated. Chart 12 in chapter four, page 137 shows that 59 percent 
of respondents admitted that since democracy was installed in Nigeria the operational 
standard of oil companies has become worse. It is indeed plausible that the environmental 
standard by oil companies is very far from ideal and does not meet the safety standard 
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stated by the Stockholm conference 1972, which states that mankind has a fundamental 
right to freedom, right to dignity that permits adequate conditions of life in an 
environment of quality, right to equality and well being. Awareness about such 
conditions to life in the oil host communities has increased concerning these oil 
multinationals operations in the Niger Delta. It will be seen from Chart 6 in chapter four, 
page 125 that 59 percent of respondents perceive the risk of environmental degradation to 
humans, plants and animals as very high risk and 30 percent perceived the risk as high 
risk. Also, Chart 19 in chapter four, page 151 illustrated that 75 percent of respondents 
acknowledged that gas flaring is contributing to global warming. This shows that the 
indigenes of oil host communities are faced with unprecedented scale of environmental 
degradation. It will be recalled from the literature review that the Nigerian ministry of 
environment recorded four hundred and nineteen cases of oil spills within the first six 
months of 2008 (Ochayi and Okereke, 2008; Lawal et al, 2008). The principal, in 
interview, acknowledges that:  
 
‘the up stream and down stream activities of these multinational giants have 
polluted the waters so the eco system is polluted and the environment is 
also polluted. However, the oil host communities livelihood has been 
affected because the mangrove swamp which is saline breeds crabs, lobsters 
and so on. With these environmental hazards, the people of the oil 
producing communities who lives on these sea animals no longer catch 
enough for sale because the environment is polluted and the sea animals can 
not survive in such harsh terrain so their economy is affected, source of 
drinking water is affected’ (Interview, July, 2009).  
 
The professor, in interview, acknowledged that gas flared in flow stations in different 
communities in the Niger Delta contribute to: 
 
‘green house emission which is very high but we are unable to know 
precisely the level of carbon emission in the Niger Delta. Then water 
quality, if you go to many of the communities where you have oil, if you 
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dig just twelve feet you will get water, and you will see that the water is 
mixed with crude oil and this is where people look for water to drink; then 
crops, crops don’t grow well in these areas any longer and when people talk 
about it, its just like making a point and nothing to say. If you go to the 
Isoko areas in Delta State you will see that the vegetation is coated with 
black carbon. If you are driving from Isoko to Warri and to other parts of 
Ijaw communities [all mentioned locations are within Niger Delta] you will 
see that crops and fruits have carbon deposits and they don’t grow well any 
longer; acid rain is a reality in the Niger Delta’ (Interview, July, 2009).  
 
Second, having looked at the outcome of environmental degradation and how the 
indigenes of oil host communities perceive these risks, it will be worth looking at how the 
media have disseminated these risk issues to the public policy field. It will be seen from 
Chart 7 in chapter four, page 127 that 48 percent of respondents note that the media shape 
their awareness about risks of environmental degradation in the Niger Delta. However, 
this shows that more than half of the respondents prefer to get their information from 
other sources as shown in the chart rather than the media, so perhaps they are not too 
satisfied. Chart 2 in chapter four, page 115 shows respondents’ satisfaction on media 
coverage of the Niger Delta conflict; although, 40 percent which is the highest are fairly 
satisfied. It will be seen that the levels of satisfaction and dissatisfaction spreads across 
the chart. Chart 3 in chapter four, page 117 reveals the aspect of the conflict the media 
might be neglecting, perhaps that is why more than half of the respondents get 
information from other sources; hence their decision about media varies greatly within 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction as seen in Charts 7 and 2. It is indeed revealing from Chart 
3 that 45 percent of respondents note that the media have not brought the risks of 
environmental degradation to government attention and 20 percent of respondents are not 
aware if the media have actually conveyed risk issues to the government. This shows that 
media coverage / reportage is low on risk issues in the Niger Delta. It will be recalled 
from the literature review that the Nigerian media has in one way or the other played 
significant role in reporting the Niger-Delta conflict; however, research carried out by 
Ekeanyanwu (2005) revealed that sixty percent of news reporting in Nigeria on crisis 
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management concentrate on personality and lack in-depth analysis (Tobechukwu and 
Oluwaseun, 2008). The underpinning factor here is that the media try to set agenda for 
policy makers through media reporting by drawing attention to the violent agitation 
thereby ignoring the risk issues associated with environmental degradation in the Niger-
Delta region (Okanume, 2008). It will be recalled from the literature review that a 
journalist interviewed on media performance with regards to the Niger-Delta crisis 
acknowledge that the media are reporting the crisis, however, it is also imperative they 
draw attention via in-depth and interpretative reporting to the underlying causes [risk 
issues] of the crisis (Jimoh, 2008). In most circumstances, especially reporting risk issues 
[like oil spillage or oil pipe explosion] in the Niger-Delta, a journalist’s commitment to 
‘truth’ and ‘balance’ may not at all parallel actual risk occurrences because most media 
correspondents are not always on hand to cover risk occurrences the way they unfold 
(Ashong and Udoudo, 2008; also see, Kurfi, 2008). Studies like Hughes et al, (2006) and 
Kitzinger (1999) note that risk reporting guided by journalistic institutional traditions and 
norms have little matching to actual threat directions. Risk reporting clustering around 
major risk occurrences, ‘ignoring multi-causal, long-term or hypothetical risks and 
influenced by commitments to ‘balance’ and ‘truth’, both concepts liable to founder 
against the value-laden rocks of uncertainty when reporting risk’ (Bakir, 2008: 2: also 
see, Perez-Lugo in Campbell 2008). The professor, in interview, notes that the Nigerian:  
 
‘media can only report when they have indicators of environmental quality 
that have been well monitored and recorded but we don’t have such agency 
to monitor and report these issues. The only thing the media report is the 
physical characteristics of the degradation. What you see cannot match the 
actual consequences of the pollution’ (Interview, July, 2009).  
  
The print journalist, in interview, notes that to a very large extent there is handicap in 
reporting risk issues associated with environmental degradation:  
 
‘and the handicap is that people are not ready to give you the facts 
especially the government sector and that is why reportage of 
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environmental degradation is on the low side; either they don’t know or 
they deliberately withhold the information and without such information, 
how far can you go? Journalists work like the police, without a tip you can’t 
do anything and that is one of the reasons why the Nigerian press have been 
pushing for the freedom of information bill to make a law for any 
government official to willingly give you any information you ask for’ 
(Interview, July, 2009).  
 
Accordingly, the professor, in interview, notes that information control is a determinate 
factor that hinders journalists from getting accurate information from oil companies 
because‘there is an agreement the oil companies have about their operations which 
government may not have, if they give all the information they have about destroying the 
environment, government will sue them’ (Interview, July 2009). The print journalist, in 
interview, note that he consults for Shell hence he ‘knows that a lot of damage has been 
done to the surroundings and to the creeks but sometimes because of company’s 
corporate image; they try to hide some of the things they are doing’ (Interview, July, 
2009). In addition, the NTA journalist, in interview, acknowledges that it is not easy to 
confront the government with the risk of environmental degradation because there is no 
total press freedom, when journalists speak about the risk issues in the Niger Delta region 
some people in high places will try to suppress what they are saying because they have 
the authority to do so: 
 
‘They don’t want such report to be public knowledge so they try to suppress 
it; there are other ways to suppress it, some journalists have become 
gullible therefore they succumb to the idea and things like that, so you find 
out that they work out their reports as the case may be’ (Interview, NTA 
Journalist, July, 2009).  
 
Against this backdrop, it is very clear that the Nigerian media are reporting the daily 
agitation in the Niger Delta region; however, little or no attention is given to the risk 
associated with environmental degradation. It is plausible that several factors are 
 174 
responsible for low risk reportage and coverage in the region as discussed above. First, 
there is no total press freedom; there is information control on the part of the government 
and oil companies hindering free flow of information on environmental standards 
(Interview, Print journalist, July, 2009; Professor, July, 2009) and the government 
suppresses reports on risk issues in the region (Interview, NTA journalist, July, 2009). 
Second, there are no indicators of environmental quality to monitor and report the long 
term effects of the risks associated with environmental degradation through the media 
(Interview, Professor, July 2009). Third, journalists are not always on hand to cover risk 
events the way they unfold in the Niger Delta region (Ashong and Udoudo, 2008). This is 
because the mass media are unevenly attracted to risk; thus, the mainstream news media 
are poorly constructed to sustain attention of any specific future threat (Eldridge and 
Reilly, 2003). When a risk is still hypothetical and there are no proven casualties to 
interview, a story will be less attractive to news media (Hughes et al, 2006).   
 
It is true to say that media coverage and reportage on risk issues in the Niger Delta is on 
the low side, which indicates that the indigenes of oil host communities perceive risk 
from first hand experience as they are confronted with the hazard on a daily basis [see 
diagrams in 2.5.1 in Chapter two, page 57-8]. The indigenes are also aware that the risks 
in the Niger Delta region has increased as the operations of oil companies have become 
worse since the installation of democracy in 1999 [See Chart 12 in chapter four, page 
137]. However, the knowledge of indigenes of oil host communities are limited to the 
physical risk of environmental degradation without having a proper understanding to 
ascertain the long term dangers / effects of these risks because they are not adequately 
informed by the media or experts. This shows that the media are under performing in the 
dissemination of risk – particularly given that studies of media and risk assert that the 
mass media are seen to play a key role in social transformation and channel through 
which risk-related events are mediated (Lundgren and McMakin, 2004). ‘It can be argued 
that journalists should expand their narrative horizons to include not just facts about the 
risk in question but also how people feel about the risk and why’ (Palfreman, 2006: 38). 
Although risk reportage in the Niger Delta is on the low side, however, when journalists 
report about environmental degradation, they should report both the physical 
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characteristics of the events and the psychological subtext on how the public think about 
such risk issues.  
 
To this end, the researcher concludes that the Nigerian media have not effectively 
communicated risk issues on environmental degradation. It will be seen from the 
foregoing that media coverage / reportage of risk appears to be very low and limited only 
to the physical characteristics of the risk event. However, media reportage lacks long 
term effects of environmental degradation and psychological implication on public 
perception about such risk issues in the Niger Delta.  
 
Research Question 4:  What are the issues of trust between the Nigerian 
government, oil companies and the oil affected communities? 
 
In order to understand the theme of trust, the researcher will have to look at how the oil 
multinationals and Nigerian government operate with the indigenes in the oil affected 
communities in the Niger Delta region. It will be seen from Chart 4 in chapter four, page 
119 that trust in government is 17 percent and politicians 4 percent, showing that trust is 
in short supply. Trust for oil companies is 3 percent which is the lowest in the chart; this 
shows that trust for oil companies is almost non existent. Having seen the levels of trust 
for government / politicians and oil companies by indigenes of oil host communities, it 
will be worth looking at the determinant factors that are responsible for the short supply 
of trust in these agencies.  
 
First, the conflict in the Niger Delta started due to the operational standard of oil 
companies which the indigenes view as low / very low standard [see Chart 11 in chapter 
four, page 134] and also to be of a very high risk [see Chart 6 in chapter four, page 125]. 
It will be recalled from the literature review that risk issues associated with the operations 
of oil multinationals starts from the search for crude oil by seismic crew of the oil 
servicing companies (OSC’s) and during exploration / exploitation activities (Oji, 2008; 
Afamefuna, 2008; Omoweh, 1995; 1998). However, the implication of environmental 
degradation due to the activities by these multinationals in the Niger-Delta has left most 
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oil host communities impoverished due to oil leaks amounting to thousands of oil spilled 
into the environment, deep sea disposal of poisonous substances and air pollution by 
constant gas flaring into the atmosphere have left land, air and water unbearable for the 
inhabitants to cope with (Idris, 2007: Ransome-Kuti, 2007). At this stage, issues of trust 
are raised; first, over how these oil companies handle environmental degradation / 
pollution; second, obey the rules of compensation and third, their ambitions in the region.  
 
First, the ways in which oil companies handle pollution in the Niger Delta region 
determines the level of trust and conflict between the oil host communities and oil 
multinationals. It will be recalled from the literature review that cases of oil spill are not 
handled as a matter of urgency in the Niger Delta, for instance in July 2007 two 
communities [Osusu and Joukrama] in Rivers State complained of oil spills from SPDC 
but did not get the attention of the company until February 2008 (Breakfast Show, AIT, 
Saturday, 23rd February 2008 cited in Ashong and Udoudo, 2008). In interview, the 
broadcast journalist notes that in situations where oil companies delay or fail to attend to 
environmental pollution the affected communities cry out to the media in form of press 
release or conference before the: 
 
‘oil companies will kind of do a press release to also tell the world but it 
may be too late because by then, they must have carried a different side of 
the story which have to do with the community before the oil companies 
will go to the affected community and do a routine task by covering up the 
exact location where the degradation occurred’ (Interview, Print Journalist, 
July, 2009).  
 
It will be worth saying here that in this type of circumstances, trust becomes a factor as 
both the affected community and oil companies have different reports about the pollution. 
The community leader, in interview, notes that in cases of oil spill due to technical error, 
the oil companies do not respond quickly to correct the abnormal situation (Interview, 
July 2009). Issues like this led the King of Okpe kingdom in Delta State to refuse 
government proposals to bring oil companies into his community because according to 
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the king, the oil companies have oppressed them to the extent that it is impossible to 
allow them operate in his community (Interview, Elder Statesman, July, 2009). Issues of 
trust and credibility are constantly raised in oil host communities because there has been 
much anxiety about technological errors which has amplified lay people’s concerns and 
responses to risk messages and their unwillingness to accept proposals for activities 
perceived as risky; mobilized social and political protests to avert risks; led to lay 
questioning of the competence and credibility of the decisions of authorities and risk 
regulators – all issues raised by previous research into the media and risk (Kasperson et 
al, 1992; Petts, 1992; 1995; 1998; Flynn et al, 1993; Lofstedt and Horlick-Jones, 1999 
cited in Petts et al, 2001).  
 
Second, it will be recalled from the literature review that oil multinationals, in particular 
SPDC, claim losses worth four hundred and nine million naira [approximately two 
million pounds] daily to sabotage and illegal activities of oil bunkers in the Niger Delta 
(Ebiri, 2008). However, Omoweh contends that technical / human error, poor 
maintenance, sand cut and ruptured oil pipelines accounts for seventy percent of oil 
spillage in Niger-Delta and thirty percent are linked to sabotage (1998). Given the spate 
of crisis between oil multinationals and host communities on oil spill, the National Oil 
Spill Compensation Rate (NOSCR) was created to act as a guide for oil industry 
operators in arriving at a reasonable and accepted compensation to host communities 
whenever the need arises (Lawal et al, 2008). Over the years, the issue of compensation 
has been problematic and at times triggered crisis in the oil affected region. In interview, 
the policy maker notes that the indigenes of oil host communities are not actually 
compensated:  
 
‘if there is an oil spillage in the community, the first thing that is suppose to 
be done, is to curtail the spillage and when that is not done the communities 
will rise up either to block the passage or to cause crisis in the area and if 
there is any crisis, the oil companies will report to government and before 
you know, these people are arrested, members of the host community are 
arrested. When they are arrested, it leads to another problem, so instead of 
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paying compensation to them, what the oil companies normally do is to 
divide them by picking one person, a prominent man in the community and 
say alright you are our peace maker and how much are we going to give 
you and the amount usually runs into millions of naira. This is not 
compensation; it is settlement because the oil company is settling one 
person in other not to pay compensation to the whole community’ 
(Interview, July, 2009).  
 
Accordingly, the elder statesman, in interview, argues that the indigenes are not 
adequately compensated and that the oil companies in order to avoid compensation make 
some strategic people to become their contractors (Interview, July, 2009). This process is 
what the principal, in interview, referred to as divide and rule system used by oil 
companies to create problems in oil host communities (Interview, July, 2009). The 
community leader notes that the direction of conflict in his community is between 
indigenes and community leaders and the community versus the oil companies because of 
the practice of the divide and rule system used by these oil multinationals. At this level of 
communal conflict between these parties the issue of transparency in their dealings with 
the oil host communities is raised. Accordingly, the executives from oil multinationals 
conspire with community leaders in order not to pay the required compensation. 
However, transparency is:  
 
‘zero on the part of the oil company’s representatives and their liaison 
officers and the leaders of the community, there is no transparency. If they 
are given money to develop the community, they embezzle the money, the 
development will not be there and it has been so all along. There are fake 
contracts given to the leaders that are never carried out but they are paid so 
that is the situation in my community’ (Interview with Community Leader, 
July, 2009).  
 
The elder statesman, in interview, notes that the practices of these multinationals is 
problematic because at the end when nothing is done to remedy the situation on ground, it 
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leads to protest in the community and the oil companies will refer them to the leaders and 
this will tarnish the image of community representatives and bring division among the 
people (Interview, Elder Statesman, July, 2009). It will be seen from Chart 5 in chapter 
four, page 121 that community leaders is fourth on the chart to be held responsible for the 
Niger Delta conflict. The staff of ministry of environment, in interview, acknowledges 
that in terms of whether the indigenes of oil host communities are compensated he would 
say: 
 
‘yes and no, in the sense that if the degradation is caused by third party no 
compensation is paid. Third party, like vandals, criminality action; the oil 
companies will not pay compensation but if it is equipment failure, 
technical failures then they do something. It is the level of payment the oil 
host communities are talking about, the standard is very low. In most cases 
the level of compensation does not match the actual level of destruction’ 
(Interview, July, 2009).  
 
It will be recalled from the literature review that in Beck’s industrial phase risks are 
scientifically justifiable, industrially manufactured and companies do not pay for their 
pollution. Thus, in industrial societies there is an increasing sense of distrust for 
traditional authorities and social institutions (Lupton, 1999). It is indeed plausible that 
Beck’s notion of the industrial phase also applies to the Niger Delta situation. The 
indicators are risk associated with environmental degradation caused by oil companies 
[see Chart 19 in chapter four, page 151], distrust for oil companies / government and 
politicians [see Chart 4 in chapter four, page 119] and oil companies do not adequately 
pay for their pollution [see above quote].   
 
Third, the way degradation is handled and compensation is paid by oil companies have 
made most people question their ambition in the Niger Delta region. The elder statesman, 
in interview, argues that the oil companies are:  
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‘only here to take away oil, they don’t care about the damages they are 
causing to oil producing communities. If you go to different areas of these 
oil host communities, you will see gas flaring, oil spillage and toxins being 
buried. The most recent [2009] is in Ndokwa local government area in 
Delta State even at Ozoro here in Delta State they buried toxins, the report 
is there, the oil companies are trying to hide it but they can’t because 
lawyers have gone into the case, scientist have also gone to the location and 
confirm that they buried toxin, so they are not looking for anything other 
than to take away the oil and leave the people with nothing. They are not 
doing anything to bring good and conducive environment to the people 
rather they are always polluting the environment and that is one of the 
reasons why people will continue to act’ (Interview, July, 2009). 
 
It will be recalled from the literature review that the minister of state for energy and gas 
in 2008 noted that if oil companies had executed the necessary route to end gas flaring 
five years ago, the issue would have ended by now but instead, oil multinationals 
preferred to pay the fine imposed as penalty for continuous flaring of natural gas rather 
than to put an end to it (Aliu, 2008). The community leader, in interview, notes that the 
oil company’s ambition is to make money to the detriment of the oil host communities 
and when they find out that any community they are operating in is not as hostile like 
other oil communities they pay little or no attention to the developmental aspirations of 
the community (Interview, July, 2009). It will be recalled from the literature review that 
oil companies have a bad reputation of handling indigenous cultures and local people in 
their search for oil (Langford et al, 1999). Accordingly, societies are becoming more 
critical of the activities of organised irresponsibility of the industrial era that is 
systematically accompanied by that of risk, individuals starts to lose trust trying to 
measure what is rational and safe (Beck, 1996b).  
 
Second; the government and indigenes of oil host communities have a history of conflict 
which has indeed affected trust for government / politicians. First, government 
expenditure from oil sales raises questions of accountability by oil host communities 
 181 
because the amount of money government realise from oil sale [see 2.5.6 in chapter two, 
page 73] is more than enough to change the face of the Niger Delta. The abysmal 
condition in the Niger Delta region have made indigenes in the Niger Delta confront the 
federal government over resource control because the introduction of interventionist 
agencies over the years have not brought meaningful development to the region [see 
Chart 13 in Chapter four, page 139]. This has made most individuals dismayed and lead 
them to believe that government has no solid, measurable policies for the region (Akpan, 
2008). In interview, the principal notes that the introduction of another interventionist 
agency will not solve the:  
 
‘problems of the oil producing communities rather, at best, they can 
aggravate because they will just be a small chunk in a deep sea because the 
problems are more than what these interventionist agencies can handle. 
What we need here is resource control and true federalism, rather than these 
communities having small chunks but instead these communities will pay 
royalty to the federal government and the prospecting communities will pay 
tax as it is done in the United States of America’ (Interview, July, 2009).  
 
It will be seen from Chart 17 in chapter four, page 147 that 45 percent of respondents are 
not sure if the introduction of another interventionist agency [Ministry of Niger Delta] 
will work and 39 percent of respondents think that it will not work. This shows distrust 
for government policy to correct the abnormal condition in the Niger Delta; hence, there 
is campaign for resource control by Niger Deltans [see, Chart 4 in chapter four, page 
119]. Previous policies through failed commissions over the years to remedy the situation 
in the Niger Delta have led to distrust and rejection of policy by the masses.  
 
At the state level, the federal government have accused the Niger Delta state governors of 
not developing their states with the monthly allocation they receive. It was also clear that 
previous Niger Delta governors (1999-2007) were accused of  embezzlement and 
defrauding the Niger Delta people’s monthly revenue allocation to the state meant to 
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meet the developmental needs in the region (Interview, Principal, July 2009). The 
professor, in interview, notes that the Niger Delta state governors:  
 
‘are totally untrue people than the federal government and when some of 
them started talking of getting more from the oil resources in terms of 
propagating the adoption of true fiscal federalism by which they learnt that 
they will get more out of the oil revenue coming from the oil producing 
states. Then the former president Obasanjo raised the issue of management, 
it is on record that the Niger Delta state governors have actually got so 
much given to them from the federation account, to what extent have they 
applied it’ (Interview, July, 2009). For state allocation, see 2.5.6, page 73 
 
At the local government level in the Niger Delta region, the principal notes that the local 
government are ineffective in their roles despite the huge amount that they receive. This 
is because, they share among themselves the people’s monthly allocation meant for 
development at the local level (Interview, July, 2009). In interview, the professor notes 
that there is nothing to write home about on local government performance because if 
you consider their effort to meet the developmental needs of the Niger Delta people, the 
government will not score high marks because they have not actually addressed the issues 
in the Niger Delta region (Interview, July, 2009).   
 
In interview, the elder statesman accuses the government of being untruthful to the 
people in terms of revenue allocation and infrastructural development in the oil host 
communities. Accordingly, the government should come out and declare the actual 
amount they have spent on projects in the Niger Delta and then it will be known to the 
public they have done nothing (Interview, July, 2009). The principal, in interview, made 
known that federal projects that runs into billions of Naira are taken to non oil producing 
states in Nigeria for infrastructural development (Interview, July, 2009). The community 
leader asserts that Nigeria is:  
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‘political, if you have a political big weight or political juggernauts in 
government from a community, then the community will have what they 
want from government in terms of infrastructure, social or welfare needs of 
the community but in a community like mine, where we don’t have such 
political big weights, the government presence have not gone beyond the 
schools, no roads and other basic amenities, government effort in the area is 
next to zero’ (Interview, July, 2009).  
 
In interview, the elder statesman notes that government deceit goes beyond the money 
they get from oil revenue. He asserts that the government is not been truthful and when 
the Isoko oil well in Delta State was closed down, within a week the government said the 
community have lost one hundred and twenty-eight billion Naira. It is when government 
run into losses through conflicts or closure of oil wells they declare how much they have 
lost, but when they gain from oil sale, they will never disclose the amount to the public; 
‘who are they deceiving? They are deceiving themselves, their trouble will continue until 
they change’ (Interview, Elder Statesman, July, 2009).  
 
Another issue of distrust for government is that government support oil companies each 
time conflict arises between the indigenes of oil host communities and oil multinationals 
over environmental degradation. The policy maker, in interview, gave an instance of  an 
oil spill at Abalagada in Ndokwa east, Delta State in 2003, noting that it was almost 
impossible to bring the oil company involved [Agip] to Delta State House of Assembly 
[legislative arm of government] for investigation. This is because the oil companies are 
aware that Nigeria depends on oil and if they threaten to leave the federal government 
will ask them to stay even when we have all these laws put together. However, the federal 
government action has reduced the state legislative arm of government to mediator 
between the oil host communities and oil companies. Furthermore, policy making 
concerning environmental laws in Nigeria has been very slow and a stepping stone will 
be to abolish the land use decree act of 1978 which states that all land belongs to the 
federal government and start introducing new laws that are amendable and are in reality 
to the situation in the Niger Delta region. Accordingly:  
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‘when land belongs to the owners of the community, everybody will see 
themselves as stake holders but as it were today, government owns the land, 
the community suffers from oil exploration, compensations are not paid, 
agricultural crops are not growing and economic activities are on stand still’ 
(Interview, Policy maker, July, 2009).  
 
These are the issues that led the indigenes to protest and when this happens the 
government will mount military officials in the region and other oil producing 
communities to suppress the people. Government military might will not work unless 
they address the situation in the Niger Delta region (Interview, Elder Statesman, July, 
2009). The principal, in interview, notes that:  
 
‘it is worth bearing in mind that along side Shell, Chevron, Agip, Mobil and 
others; these oil companies have been involved in what is classified as 
divide and rule system. What the oil companies do when people protest, 
they align with the federal forces, including the federal government, go 
there mount stands and destroy these communities. Where bribe and such 
things could not assuage the people they use this arrant force’ (Interview, 
July, 2009).  
 
Against this backdrop, it will be seen why trust for government / politicians and oil 
companies are in short supply [see Chart 4 in Chapter four, page 119] and the reason why 
the oil affected communities also hold these agencies responsible for the crisis in the 
Niger Delta region [see Chart 5 in chapter four, page 121]. It is indeed very clear that the 
oil affected communities do not trust the operations of government and oil companies in 
their communities. It is particularly revealing that there are contentions over revenue 
allocation and corruption among the three tiers of government which also has affected 
trust over further increase of monthly allocation to states and local government by the 
federal government. However, the federal government dominates other arms of 
government at state and local government level to favour the course of operations by oil 
companies in the Niger Delta region. This shows that the federal government of Nigeria 
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and oil companies seem to have semblances of trust for each other in their dealings with 
the oil host communities. It is also clear that trust for community representatives by their 
indigenes is far from ideal due to the divide and rule system the oil companies employ to 
divide the people. It is indeed plausible that distrust for community leaders, government 
and oil companies led to the agitation in the Niger Delta, and its purveyors – oil 
multinationals and the government – are beneficiaries. The victims are, of course, the 
indigenes of oil host communities (Niger Delta Crisis, 2000).  
 
Research Question 5:  Are there any strengths or weaknesses of media exposure in 
influencing the Nigerian government’s policy relating to the Niger Delta conflict?  
 
This study so far has shown more weaknesses with little or no strengths on media 
performance relating to the Niger Delta conflict. It is plausible that the media are weak in 
certain areas that might affect the Nigerian government’s policy on issues relating to the 
Niger Delta. First, it will be seen from Chart 10 in chapter four, page 133 that the public 
perceive the media to have become better since democracy was installed; and, Chart 9 in 
chapter four, page 131 reveals that the public perceive the press to be fairly free. In 
response to this, the print journalist and professor, in interview, notes that the major area 
where the press is handicapped is the lack of access to information. Furthermore, until the 
information bill is passed into law, journalists cannot report effectively on the Niger 
Delta enough to influence government policy because both the government and oil 
companies withhold vital information hence risk reportage on environmental degradation 
is on the low side (Interview, July, 2009). According to the print journalist, on the one 
hand, there are laws reflecting Nigeria’s status quo such as ‘secret act’, ‘vote of six’ and 
others which hinders the government from passing the information bill and on the other, 
government view journalists with great suspicion and regard them as enemies and when 
they set up committees to look into the Niger Delta conflict, journalist are kept away. The 
print journalist contends that where there is no freedom of information there is no press 
freedom (Interview, July, 2009). The NTA journalist, in interview, acknowledges that the 
government has a vested interest in the Niger Delta because of the oil revenue they 
generate from the region hence they are always on guard and any hard news from the 
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Niger Delta region they try to suppress either by force or buying out journalists to work 
out their reports in order to keep such information out of public knowledge (Interview, 
July, 2009).  
 
Second, another area where media presence seem rather weak is offering the indigenes of 
oil host communities the opportunity to partake in public debate with government 
officials / policy makers on issues relating to the Niger Delta conflict. Chart 8 in chapter 
four, page 129 indicated that 37 percent of respondents acknowledged that the media 
rarely create such public sphere and 30 percent of respondents went for very rarely. This 
shows that the public sphere is far from ideal. According to the broadcast journalist, the 
media organise workshops twice a year and it is only when there is trouble they embark 
on emergency approach of trying to resuscitate the public sphere in order to sensitize the 
people (Interview, July, 2009). This type of approach by the media does not help shape 
policy because policy makers are more likely to have an excuse to ignore the issues until 
there is problem. Third, factor that impedes media coverage is access to the crisis-
affected areas in the Niger Delta region. On most occasions journalists find it very 
difficult to visit the areas where events like government military operation have occurred 
in their search for militants or protesters (Interview, broadcast journalist, July, 2009). 
Accordingly, the broadcast journalist, in interview, notes that because of inaccessibility to 
the affected location, ‘more often than not, media report is based on what they hear, 
receive as text messages, information they get through emails by these militants or 
individuals from affected communities in Niger Delta’. However, these claims and 
information are not verifiable and often lead to occasions where journalists mislead the 
public on incidents in the Niger Delta (Interview, July, 2009). Thus, inaccurate 
information on the Niger Delta conflict has serious implication in influencing government 
policy. On the other, financial constraints, lack of logistics and adequate equipment make 
it difficult for journalists to visit these areas where there is degradation (Interview, print 
journalist, July, 2009).    
 
Fourth, Nigeria’s media structure comprises of private and government media ownership, 
which affects the degree of press freedom that exists at a given time (Uche, 1989 in 
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Agbese, 2006).The twist in Nigerian media is that private media outfits have become 
ineffective in carrying out their responsibility in a democratic society due to commercial 
interest leaving the independent press open to personal monopoly for owner’s benefit. 
The principal, in interview, notes that that the national newspapers owned by private 
individuals from other tribes outside Niger Delta region have not been covering the 
conflict properly because they think the conflict is significant to the progress of the Niger 
Delta people (Interview, July 2009). Government owned media are mere loud speakers 
and propaganda machines for the government in power (Agbese, 2006; Olusola, 2008). 
According to the NTA journalist, in interview:  
 
‘we are all just machines, we try to justify a lot of things, I don’t know, 
opinion differs, yours could be different from mine as a journalist. This 
media agency is every government organ and we have to follow a phase, we 
try to do the two, even when we are reporting the truth as it were, we try to 
cushion the effect one way or the other’ (Interview, July, 2009).  
 
The broadcast journalist, in interview, asserts that:  
 
‘given the kind of society we are in Nigeria, access to information is always 
very difficult because government wants to cover up and even the oil 
companies wants to cover up, so more often than not, government media 
outfit tend to succumb to government side, it is only the private media outfit 
like guardian, vanguard and others that tend to report a little bit above 
average in the sense that their reporting may not be too balanced because of 
this lack of access to information’ (Interview, July, 2009).  
 
The journalists from the print and broadcast media, in interview, made known that in 
every media outfit proprietor matters a lot especially when dealing with the Niger Delta 
conflict as it is deemed sensitive (Interview, July, 2009). 
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Despite the weakness associated with the media which is enormous due to the nature of 
the conflict and the kind of complex society in Nigeria, the media still try to cover the 
events as much as possible but try not to aggravate or incite the tension in the region 
(Interview, NTA journalist, 2009). This has, however, made Nigerians trust the media 
more than the government [see Chart 4, chapter four, page 119] even though media report 
may be incomplete and not too balanced. The strength for media here is that what the 
media depicts about the protest may go a long way to affect some changes. The broadcast 
journalist acknowledges that:  
 
‘the media have done well because they have been able to attract the 
attention of the world to the plight of those in the Niger Delta and the media 
have also been able to make government to bend backwards to do some of 
those things they couldn’t have done over the years, like the setting up of 
the Niger Delta Ministry, Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), 
a lot of intervention agencies to enhance the welfare of those in the Niger 
Delta, if not for the media these things would not have come to pass. I 
believe that with time and with more access, funding and openness on both 
side, on the side of the militants and government, media will excel’ 
(Interview, July, 2009).  
 
To this end, it is very clear that the media have more weaknesses than strength; however, 
media strength is still weakened because what the media report is usually not too 
balanced due to the weakness experienced by journalists with regards to the Niger Delta 
conflict and if media coverage affects changes or policy implementation at all, then, of 
course, the implication of such policy will not at all meet the actual needs in the Niger 
Delta because the policy will only cover the aspect the media depicts and ignore other 
areas that media find it very difficult to access. In essence, policy implementation will 
have blind spots and will not effect the changes in the Niger Delta. The principal, in 
interview, acknowledges that the areas depicted by the media, is the focus of some 
policies; however, he contends that there should be a factor where the government is 
finally going to look into the origin of the conflict and why the violent agitation came up 
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in the first instance, and unfortunately, these issues have not been looked into (Interview, 
July, 2009). It will be worth saying here that until all aspects of the conflict are 
adequately covered by the media without distortion or interference of any kind, the media 
will not be able to shape government policies in the right direction to solve the problems 
in the Niger Delta region. Hence, previous policies through the creation of commissions 
failed to meet the developmental needs and aspirations of the Niger Delta people partly 
because journalists lacked adequate information on issues in the Niger Delta region.   
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5.1 SUMMARY OF KEY / INTERESTING FINDINGS 
 
Research Question 1: To what extent can media exposure influence policy maker’s 
perception about public opinion on issues relating to the Niger Delta conflict? 
 
The extent to which the Nigerian media can influence policy makers’ perception about 
public opinion on issues relating to the Niger Delta conflict is problematic. It is true to 
say that the Nigerian media are handicapped to a very large extent in information 
gathering due to the complex nature of the Nigerian government and conflict in the Niger 
Delta. Although, the media have covered and reported the crisis, they have not done so to 
a large extent because the factors that impede media performance seem to be having a 
very clear effect in terms of media coverage as journalists are limited to certain aspect of 
the agitation / conflict due to information control. This might itself be interpreted as 
problematic because media reports are not in-depth enough to effect change in the policy 
domain.  It is indeed very clear that it was not until the agitation became violent and 
started affecting Nigeria’s oil receipts due to closures of oil wells by indigenes of oil host 
communities in most part of the Niger Delta region that the government / policy makers 
decided to take action by introducing some palliative measures / policies to calm down 
nerves in the region. However, government response in terms of policy formulation in 
attending to the Niger Delta conflict does not always align with media depiction on issues 
in the Niger Delta because the harsh terrain of the Niger Delta region remains 
substantially unaddressed. This shows that the government / policy makers have their 
own agenda different from what the media has been depicting concerning public opinion 
on issues relating to the Niger Delta conflict. It was particularly revealing that the media 
agenda setting theory did not work on this occasion because the theory failed to consider 
the determinant factors that impede information gathering which affect media 
performance and coverage on the one hand, and on the other, the media did not play any 
significant role in influencing government agencies / policy choices. It is indeed plausible 
that the media agenda setting theory does not work in real life crisis / conflict scenario 
because the theory was based on hypothetical findings rather than real life events.    
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Research Question 2: Can media exposure shape the Nigerian public’s perception on 
policy issues relating to the Niger Delta conflict?  
 
The researcher concludes that it will be very difficult, if not impossible to positively 
influence the Nigerian public’s perception on policy issues relating to the Niger Delta 
region despite evidence that the Nigerian media can influence the Nigerian public on this 
risk issue. This is because the Niger Delta people are still faced / confronted with the 
abysmal condition in the region regardless of various policies through interventionist 
agencies in the past. Thus, this has led indigenes in the Niger Delta to have doubts and 
believe that the introduction of another policy through interventionist agency by the 
current government will equally fail like the previous ones. It is indeed plausible that the 
relationship between the Nigerian public and government is not working due to lack of 
trust in government / politicians; hence Nigerians hold the government responsible for the 
crisis in the Niger Delta region. At this stage, media dissemination concerning policy 
issues in the Niger Delta will not be accepted because distrust for government / 
politicians already exist and this has, however, led to doubts and suspicion of another 
policy through commission by the Niger Delta people. It will be worth saying here that 
the media is only an avenue through which policy makers disseminate information; thus, 
the media can only draw the public attention to policy issues and does not tell its 
audience what to think but what to think about (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Rogers and 
Dearing, 1988). This shows that the mass media have very little influence on the nature of 
audience perception or intensity of attitudes about policy issues (McCombs and Shaw, 
1972) because of  Nigerian policy-makers’ past performance and the role of direct 
experience of risk issues in the Niger Delta region. 
 
Research Question 3: How effectively have the Nigerian media communicated risk 
issues on contemporary environmental degradation in the affected oil communities of the 
Niger Delta? 
 
Risk reportage in the Niger Delta region is problematic due to information control on the 
part of the government and oil companies, there is no total press freedom, journalists are 
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not always on hand to cover risk events the way they unfold and there are no indicators of 
environmental quality to monitor and record the long term effects of the risks associated 
with environmental degradation through the media (Interview, professor, July, 2009). It is 
true to say that media coverage and reportage on risk issues in the Niger Delta is on the 
low side, which indicates that the indigenes of oil host communities perceive risk from 
first hand experience as they are confronted with the hazard on a daily basis [see 
diagrams in 2.5.1 in Chapter two, page 57-8]. The indigenes are also aware that the risks 
in the Niger Delta region has increased as the operations of oil companies have become 
worse since the installation of democracy in 1999 [see Chart 12 in chapter four, page 
137]. However, the knowledge of indigenes of oil host communities are limited to the 
physical risk of environmental degradation without having a proper understanding to 
ascertain the long term dangers / effects of these risks because they are not adequately 
informed by the media or experts. This shows that the media are under performing in the 
dissemination of risk because the concept of media and risk assert that the mass media are 
seen to play a key role in social transformation and channel through which risk-related 
events are mediated (Lundgren and McMakin, 2004). ‘It can be argued that journalists 
should expand their narrative horizons to include not just facts about the risk in question 
but also how people feel about the risk and why’ (Palfreman, 2006: 38). Although risk 
reportage in the Niger Delta is on the low side, however, when journalists report about 
environmental degradation, they should report both the physical characteristics of the 
events and the psychological subtext on how the public think about such risk issues.  
 
To this end, the researcher concludes that the Nigerian media have not effectively 
communicated risk issues on environmental degradation. It will be seen from the 
foregoing that media coverage / reportage of risk appears to be very low and limited only 
to the physical characteristics of the risk event. However, media report lacks long term 
effects of environmental degradation and psychological implication on public perception 
about such risk issues in the Niger Delta.  
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Research Question 4: What are the issues of trust between the Nigerian government, oil 
companies and the oil affected communities? 
 
The issue of trust between the Nigerian government, oil companies and the oil affected 
communities is far from ideal. It will be seen in Chart 4 in chapter four, page 119  that 
trust in government / politicians and oil companies are in short supply. Chart 5 in chapter 
four, page 121 shows that the oil affected communities also hold these agencies 
responsible for the crisis in the Niger Delta region. It is indeed very clear from this study 
that the oil affected communities do not trust the operations of government and oil 
companies in their communities. Findings from this study also revealed that there are 
contentions over revenue allocation and corruption among the three tiers of government 
which also has affected trust over further increase of monthly allocation to states and 
local government by the federal government. However, the federal government 
dominates other arms of government at state and local government level to favour the 
course of operations by oil companies in the Niger Delta region. This shows that the 
federal government of Nigeria and oil companies seem to have semblances of trust for 
each other in their dealings with the oil host communities. It is also clear that trust for 
community representatives by their indigenes is far from ideal due to the divide and rule 
system the oil companies employ to divide the people. It is indeed plausible that distrust 
for community leaders, government and oil companies led to the agitation in the Niger 
Delta, and its purveyors – oil multinationals and the government – are beneficiaries. The 
victims are, of course, the indigenes of oil host communities (Niger Delta Crisis, 2000).  
 
Research Question 5: Are there any strength or weaknesses of media exposure in 
influencing the Nigerian government’s policy relating to the Niger Delta conflict?   
 
It is very clear from the findings of this study that the media have more weaknesses than 
strength; however, media strength is still weakened because what the media report is 
usually not too balanced due to the weakness experienced by journalists with regards to 
the Niger Delta conflict and if media coverage affects changes or policy implementation 
at all, then, of course, the implication of such policy will not at all meet the actual needs 
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in the Niger Delta because the policy will only cover the aspect the media depicts and 
ignore other areas that media find it very difficult to access. In essence, policy 
implementation will have blind spots and will not effect the changes in the Niger Delta. 
The principal, in interview, acknowledges that the areas where media depicts is the focus 
of some policies, however, he contends that there should be a factor where the 
government is finally going to look into the origin of the conflict and why the violent 
agitation came up in the first instance, unfortunately, these issues have not been looked 
into (Interview, July 2009). It will be worth saying here that until all aspects of the 
conflict are adequately covered by the media without distortion or interference of any 
kind, the media will not be able to shape government policies in the right direction to 
solve the problems in the Niger Delta region. Hence, previous policies through the 
creation of commissions failed to meet the developmental needs and aspirations of the 
Niger Delta people partly because journalists lacked adequate information on issues in 
the Niger Delta region.    
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5.2 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
Utilizing empirical analysis within a specific theoretical framework on risk 
communication, this study demonstrates that media-policy-public agendas face specific 
problems in influencing one another on environmental risk issues in Nigeria’s Niger 
Delta region. The areas of media, risk and policy have now been outlined, so identifying 
areas needing further attention and work by stakeholders in the public policy field with 
regards to the Niger Delta conflict. 
 
In terms of media exposure and risk issues in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region, it is indeed 
clear that the media are reporting the conflict; however, little or no attention is given to 
the underlining factor of the crisis - risk issues (Jimoh, 2008). Past research shows that 
media reporting on risk events tends to focus on the physical characteristics, ignoring 
multi-causal, long-term or hypothetical risk associated with environmental degradation 
and psychological implications on public perception about such risk issues (Bakir, 2008, 
Palfreman, 2006). This pattern is confirmed by this study on the Niger Delta region. 
Interestingly, lack of media attention to effective risk communication in the Niger Delta 
region reflects the gaps in knowledge in media-risk research within the Sociology of 
News identified by Bakir (2010). Bakir suggests that new directions (longitudinal, 
historic, contextual and interpretative) are needed in media risk-research, and it is these 
very attributes that are also needed for media institutions to effectively communicate 
risks at micro and macro levels – for instance, ‘regarding policy-agenda-setting and 
modulating public acceptability of risks’ (Bakir, 2010: 13). Apart from media giving little 
or no attention to risk issues on the Niger Delta, the media are also handicapped in 
information gathering on risk issues because the freedom of information bill has not been 
passed into law [for more, see Research Question 3 in chapter five]. This, of course, has 
serious implications on the operations of media institutions in Nigeria and thus, affects 
the flow of adequate information in the public policy / government sphere. It can be said 
that until this problem of access to information is solved, the media cannot effectively 
play their role in a democratic society; that is, not just on reportage of risk issues alone 
but on other facets of socio, economic and political issues of the nation. The complex / 
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problematic nature of the information bill directs the researchers’ attention to what the 
print journalist refers to – where there is no access to information there is no press 
freedom (interview, July, 2009). The study revealed that the Nigerian press have 
improved since democracy was installed in Nigeria [see Chart 9 and 10, pages 131/133]; 
however, issues like government interference especially in government owned media and 
the problematic nature of the freedom of information bill makes it very difficult for the 
Nigerian press to be entirely free (Interview, Print and Broadcast journalist, July 2009). 
While the government owned media may follow a phase in dealing with societal issues 
such as the Niger Delta conflict (Interview, NTA journalist, July, 2009), both the 
government and private owned media seem to be lacking in creating a resuscitated public 
sphere on issues relating to the Niger Delta conflict. The failure of the Nigerian media in 
generating an active public sphere has led to gaps in knowledge on the mismatch between 
people’s perceptions of the risk in the Niger Delta, the diverging interpretations this 
generates and how these interpretations interact with the media practices when reporting 
on the risks. In this vein of study, the Nigerian media should pay greater attention to how 
visible risk debates between stakeholders can help to shape the public policy field on 
pressing issues in Nigeria especially the Niger Delta conflict. Following on from previous 
points, some of the issues raised about Nigerian journalism would clearly have financial 
consequences, given that this study identified [very interestingly] financial constraints as 
one of the factors which restrict journalists’ ability to access some of the pertinent 
geographical areas [environmental degradation / conflict zones] [together with other 
constraints relating to logistics and equipments]. This, in turn, raises more general issues 
of funding and ownership. However, the private and government owned media outfit will 
be more effective in terms of covering the most imperative aspects of the Niger Delta 
conflict [including risk issue], perhaps, if they are adequately funded as they will be self 
reliant when gathering information rather than getting information from official sources.  
 
Trust is problematic and in short supply between competing agencies - the media, policy-
makers and the public. Accordingly, in interview, the print journalist asserts that the 
government view journalists with suspicion and sees journalists as their enemies because 
they have something to hide and that is why the freedom of information bill has not been 
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passed into law (interview, July, 2009). Chart 4 in chapter four, page 119 revealed that 
public trust for government / politicians is in short supply, but that the media was the 
most trusted of all agencies. This outcome tends to affect the media-public-policy field in 
response to the Niger Delta conflict. It is particularly revealing from this study that the 
lack of mutual trust between journalists, policy-makers and lay public have made it 
difficult for key institutions to positively effect change towards issues in the Niger Delta 
region. In understanding how trust interacts with risk communication geared toward 
policy change on risk issues in the Niger Delta, this study revealed that Nigerians trust 
the media more than any other institution involved directly or indirectly in the crisis. 
However, despite public trust in media, it is indeed clear that the media cannot influence 
the public on policy issues due to lack of trust for policy makers. This research confirms 
previous assertions that social trust in risk communicators and policy-makers ‘cannot be 
assumed but must be cultivated and maintained with key audiences prior to, and during, 
risk communication’ (Bakir, 2006: 16) and policy implementation. Where trust in 
government / politicians is in short supply, this, of course, will definitely affect public 
acceptance of policy decision. Thus, abstract systems depend upon trust, hence, active 
trust must be won and maintained (Giddens, 1990, also see Bakir and Barlow, 2007; Zinn 
and Taylor-Gooby, 2006). In terms of research focus, trust emerges as a pertinent field 
needing further exploration, and future empirical studies into policy-agenda setting could 
examine, productively, how trust in expert systems affects the media-public-policy field 
in terms of risk issues in the Niger Delta region.  
 
Policy formulation / implementation in form of a commission by the government is 
heavily viewed with suspicion as previous commissions over the years did not work and 
did not effect change to either the environmental or living standards of the oil host 
communities. In interview, the principal acknowledges that government policies through 
interventionist agencies seem to ignore the root cause of the conflict – risk issues 
(interview, July, 2009). Other government policies that should look at environmental 
degradation are problematic in terms of enforcement (interview, policy-maker, July, 
2009) and that is the reason why oil companies will continue to use the cheapest way of 
production, for instance, dispersing untreated waste into the rivers and atmosphere since 
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the polluter [oil companies] does not have to include them in its production cost. Greene 
referred to this act as the ‘tragedy of the commons’, where access to a common resource 
is unregulated and not checked by pre-existing laws, each user continues to take 
advantage of the situation to the maximum destructive conclusion, ‘even if each user 
involved is well intentioned, well informed, and exercising only its traditional and legal 
rights’ (2006: 459). Meanwhile the cost / consequences of such unregulated activities and 
over exploitation by oil companies is shared by all of the oil host communities (Greene, 
2006). The indigenes of oil host communities will continue to act until the Nigerian 
government effectively enforces pre-existing laws, abolishes laws that are controversial 
and problematic like the degree act of 1978 and introduces more effective policies 
amenable to change. It is the responsibility of the Nigerian government to develop 
modern techniques for overseeing its citizens and achieving national goals. It will be 
recalled from the literature review that within the conceptual framework of Foucauldian 
perspective, risk and safety are seen as fundamental facets of authority and domination 
and however a plan for the government of societies (Zinn and Taylor-Gooby, 2006), 
which have therefore added to the manufacturing of certain kinds of rationalities, 
schemes and subjectivity (Lupton, 1999, for more on governmentality perspectives see 
Denney, 2005). Thus, most would agree that state control and regulations is an effective 
way to oversee the welfare of its citizens and managing the local or national resources 
within its territory, for this reason, it is the responsibility of the Nigerian government to 
be strong in enforcing its laws to protect citizens from harm (Greene, 2006). In terms of 
research focus, policy emerges as a pertinent field needing further exploration and further 
empirical studies into policy formulation and implementation in Nigeria’s Niger Delta 
region could examine, productively, how the current president [who assumed office in 
May 6th, 2010 after the death of the former president Yar, Adua in May 5th, 2010] will 
effect changes in Nigerian policy with regards to the Niger Delta region.  
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5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Understanding the gaps in media exposure, policy-agenda setting and risk communication 
through theoretical and methodological advances in this research, the following 
recommendations are made by the researcher to assist the Nigerian government / policy 
makers, media, oil companies and indigenes of oil host communities to understand 
thereby bridging the gap surrounding the Niger Delta conflict. The areas that should be 
given priority attention are as follows. 
 
First, the twist in the Niger Delta conflict, is that, while the indigenes of the Niger Delta 
are agitating and trying to influence government to bring development to the region, the 
people are also divided and having conflict among themselves at community level over 
oil funds given by oil companies through the use of the divide and rule system. This 
system used by these oil companies to pay compensation or bring about change through 
community projects is indeed problematic and produces more losses than gain and thus, 
affects government efforts to bring a lasting solution to the Niger Delta conflict. The 
government should introduce a legitimate way / policy for oil production companies to 
pay adequate compensation to the right people in the oil producing communities rather 
than oil companies going through community leaders / representatives. The oil companies 
should be more transparent in their dealings with oil host communities, that is, show 
willingness to partake in community development, curtail their waste product and quickly 
attend to environmental degradation whenever it occurs to prevent harm to life and 
economic embarrassment to the host communities. It will be seen from this study that 
public trust for oil companies is almost non-existent; however, if the oil companies 
continue to operate in the same way, they will continue to experience opposition from 
communities where they operate and it will lead to more closures of oil wells which will 
in turn affect the nation’s oil receipts. 
 
Second, this study showed more weaknesses than strength for media, and even the media 
strength is weakened. This, of course, on the one hand, raises the issue of access to 
information; journalists argue that where there is no access to information, there is no 
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press freedom (interview, print journalist, July, 2009). In order for a democratic society 
like Nigeria to function adequately, the government should sign into law the freedom of 
information bill to assist journalists in their access to information. The potency of the 
freedom of information bill, if passed into law, will create a resuscitated public sphere as 
citizens / institutions can get access to public information through dialogue, debate and 
discussion, thereby generating trust between the government, media and citizens. The 
information bill will give media institutions liberty to report information without 
restriction or fear of being harmed (Ashong and Udoudo 2008; Olusola, 2008). 
Furthermore, government interference / control on the operations of media should not be 
encouraged if there is to be total press freedom in Nigeria. Accordingly, the Nigerian 
government should work closely with journalists in order for them to adequately know 
the areas needing policy change or urgent attention. However, beyond changes to 
government policy, journalists need to address their own risk reportage. When covering 
risk events in the Niger Delta, journalists should not report only the physical events of the 
risk, there is need to cover the psychological, longitudinal, historical, contextual effects 
and how it relates to the environmental and living standard of the indigenes of the oil host 
communities. This study also identified financial constraints as one of the factors which 
restrict journalists and Nigerian environmental agencies’ ability to get adequate 
information on risk issues as they find it difficult to access some of the relevant 
geographical regions. The Nigerian media [government and private] are in need of 
funding to enable journalists work out their reports correctly through the provision of 
logistics / adequate equipments in order for journalists to have easy access to the relevant 
geographical areas to get first hand information. In addition, this research suggests that 
the Nigerian government should adequately fund / provide environmental agencies with 
contemporary equipments / logistics to enable them access relevant geographical areas 
where risk issues [environmental degradation] have occurred and also encourage research 
on the effect of environmental degradation in order to acquire accurate information on 
risk issues / events rather than go through oil companies for information. The media, 
government, oil companies and community leaders should regularly organise debates, 
forums and seminars in form of public spheres in oil host communities in order to explore 
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the flows and impacts of trust, understand the diverse knowledge of risk awareness and 
experiences of locals to help shape and direct policy agenda setting in the right directions.  
 
Third, issues over how development should be brought to the Niger Delta in form of 
policies through the creation of government commissions is still unresolved, disputed and 
viewed with doubts as previous commissions failed. It will be seen from this study that 
indigenes of the Niger Delta are not sure and do not believe the creation of another 
ministry will solve the problems in the Niger Delta or end the conflict. Here, the issue of 
trust and accountability is raised, not just on the creation of policies but their 
implementation. This shows that government policies in all areas linked to the Niger 
Delta conflict is in need of review, that is, existing policies that does not work or is 
controversial should be scrapped and new polices amenable to changes should be 
introduced in order to effectively meet the challenges in the Niger Delta region. This 
suggests that the Nigerian government [federal, state, local] should be more transparent, 
accountable and act responsibly in their dealings with the Niger Delta problems 
especially with the revenue meant for the purpose of development in the Niger Delta 
region.  
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APPENDIX 1 (Quantitative study) 
 
Faculty of Creative and Cultural Industries,                                                               
Dept of Media and Communication, 
The Atrium, 
University of Glamorgan, 
Cardiff, Wales, 
United Kingdom. 
CF24 2FN. 
 
Dear Respondents, 
 
I am a research student at Glamorgan University, UK, currently in the second year of my Doctorial 
study. My research investigates Media Exposure, Policy Agenda-Setting and Risk Communication in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). A Case Study of Nigeria’s Niger Delta Region. The selected areas for this 
survey are Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers State; and the target population are individuals both male and 
female of twenty-one years and above.    
 
Taking part in this survey is completely voluntary. I hope you will provide the best possible 
information about your views and experiences as your co-operation is fundamental to the conduct of 
this research and your answers are valued. If it is easier for you, please ask a friend or family member 
to help you fill in the questionnaire, but please make sure the answers given are about your views and 
experiences, not theirs. On completion of the questionnaire please return to the bearer as soon as 
possible. 
 
Once the survey is completed, answers will be securely confidential. Only the anonymised overall 
result will be used for this study; after which, the questionnaires will be securely destroyed. 
 
If you have any more questions or need further assistance filling in the questionnaire, please contact 
me on edafienenekingsley@yahoo.com or call +234 (0) 7039763658. 
 
Thank you very much for your time 
 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Edafienene .A. Kingsley. 
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Thank you for taking time to answer these questions. Please answer the questions in section A and B 
by ticking in one box for each question. Your response will be completely confidential. 
 
 
SECTION A: 
 
Q1  Are you male or female?               Male                        Female 
            
Q2  Please indicate your age range     21-30                       31-40                    41 or above 
 
Q3  Where are you resident?               Delta                        Bayelsa                 Rivers 
 
Q4  What is your profession?              Student                     Employed             Unemployed 
 
 
SECTION B: 
 
Q1 Which is most important to you when getting information on the Niger Delta crisis? 
 
A:  Television               B:  Radio              C:  Newspaper             D:  Magazine               E:  Internet             
F:  Fiction film             G:  Word of mouth                                    H:  Other 
 
Q2 In general, how satisfied are you with media reporting and coverage on the Niger Delta 
crisis? 
  
A:  Very satisfied                    B:  Fairly satisfied                      C:  Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 
D:  Fairly dissatisfied             E:  Very dissatisfied 
              
Q3: Do you think the media has brought the risks of environmental degradation to government 
attention through heavy media coverage? 
 
A: Yes             B:  No             C:  Don’t know 
 
Q4: Who do you trust to tell the truth on risk events (environmental degradation) linked to the 
conflict in Niger Delta?  
 
A: Media institutions              B: Government              C: Private agencies             D: Oil companies 
E: Politicians                          F:  Pressure groups  
                                      
Q5:  Who, in your opinion, should be held responsible for the conflict in Niger Delta? 
 
A:  Government             B:  Oil companies            C:  Militants            D:  Organised Interest group 
E:  Community leaders             F:   Indigenes of oil host communities              G:  Politicians  
H:  International community 
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Please give reasons for your answer in the box provided below 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q6:  How do you perceive the risks of environmental degradation caused by oil companies to 
humans, plants and animals in the Niger Delta? 
 
A:   Very high risk              B:  High risk                 C:   Low risk             D:   Very low risk 
 
Q7:  Who precisely, would you say, most shapes your awareness about risks of environmental 
degradation caused by oil companies in Niger Delta? 
 
A:   Culture                B:   Religion                      C:   Interest group            D:   Individuals 
E:   Media                  F:   Government                G:   Internet                      H:   Destiny / Luck                     
 
Please give reasons for your answer in the box provided below 
 
 
 
 
 
Q8:  How often does the media offer indigenes of oil host communities the opportunity to 
partake in a public debate with policy makers on environmental degradation and the conflict in 
Niger Delta?   
 
A:  Very often            B:   Often                            C:   Rarely                         D:    Very rarely 
  
Q9:   How would you categorise press freedom in present day democracy in Nigeria? 
 
A:  Very free              B:  Fairly free              C:  Neither free nor repressed                
D:  Fairly repressed                                         E:  Very repressed 
 
Q10:   Do you think press freedom has actually become better or worse since democracy was 
installed in Nigeria? 
 
A:   Better                   B:   Worse 
 
Q11:   How would you rate the environmental standard of operation by oil companies in the 
Niger Delta? 
 
A:   Very high standard             B:   High standard            C:   Neither high nor low standard 
D:   Low standard                      E:   Very low standard 
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Q12:    Do you think the environmental standard of oil companies has changed for the better or 
worse since democracy was installed in Nigeria? 
 
A:    Better                                 B:    Worse 
 
Please give reasons for your answer in the box provided below 
 
 
 
 
 
Q13:  How would you describe the quality of life in the oil producing communities in the Niger 
Delta? 
 
A:  Very high quality                B:   High quality               C:  Neither high nor low quality                             
D:  Low quality                         E:   Very low quality 
 
Please give reasons for your answer in the box provided below 
 
 
 
 
Q14:  Have you or anyone in your community suffered casualties as a result of government 
military operation with militants in the Niger Delta? 
A: Yes                                         B:  No  
 
Q15:   How would you describe government response to the plight of indigenes in oil host 
communities in the Niger Delta in cases of environmental pollution? 
 
A:  Very quick               B:  Quick              C:  Neither quick nor slow              D:  Slow 
E:  Very slow                F:   No response 
 
Q16:  In general, how would rate government performance to end the Niger Delta conflict 
through the provision of basic amenities in the region? 
 
A:   Very good               B:  Good               C:  Neither good nor poor                D:  Poor 
E:    Very poor 
 
Q17:  Do you think the creation of Ministry of Niger Delta alongside the operation of Niger Delta 
Development Commission (NDDC) will end the conflict in the Niger Delta? 
 
A:  Yes                           B:  No                    C: Not sure                     
 
Please give reasons for your answer in the box provided below 
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Q18:  Who, in your opinion, engages more in developmental projects in the Niger Delta? 
  
A:  NDDC               B:  Federal government             C:  State government               
D:  Local government               E: Oil companies               F:  Others 
   
Q19:  Considering the widespread gas flaring in the Niger Delta, do you think it is contributing 
to global warming? 
 
A:  Yes                     B:   No 
   
Q20:  Are you aware of any time when indigenes of oil producing communities in Niger Delta 
ignored warnings of the risk involved in disrupting oil pipe lines from authorities that led to 
casualties or deaths?   
 
A:  Yes                    B:   No                    C:   If yes, please give an instance 
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APPENDIX 2 (Qualitative study) 
 
Faculty of Creative and Cultural Industries,                                                               
Dept of Media and Communication, 
The Atrium, 
University of Glamorgan, 
Cardiff, Wales, 
United Kingdom. 
CF24 2FN. 
 
 
Dear Respondents, 
 
 
I am a research student at Glamorgan University, UK, currently in the second year of my Doctorial study. My research 
investigates Media Exposure, Policy Agenda-Setting and Risk Communication in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). A Case 
Study of Nigeria’s Niger Delta Region. The surveys are across three states in Nigeria namely; Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers 
State, and the target population for the interview are with a range of key people whose profession deals directly or 
indirectly with environmental degradation by oil companies and the conflict in the Niger Delta (policy-makers, 
community leaders, journalists, PR officials of oil companies, federal and state environmental agencies and organised 
interest groups).   
  
 
Taking part in this interview is completely voluntary. I hope you will provide the best possible information about your 
views and experiences as your co-operation is fundamental to the conduct of this research and your answers are valued. 
The interview will last about an hour or an hour and a half; please ensure that there would be no distraction during the 
interview. The instrument that will be used to store information during the interview is the tape recorder as it will help 
guide against the researcher substituting the words of expressed opinion of the interviewee for his. 
 
 
Once the interview is completed, answers will be securely confidential. Only the anonymised overall result will be used 
for this study; after which, the tape used for the interview will be securely destroyed. 
 
 
If you have any more questions or query on this before the set date of the interview, please contact me on 
edafienenekingsley@yahoo.com or call +234 (0) 7039763658. 
 
 
Thank you very much for your time 
 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Edafienene .A. Kingsley. 
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TRANSCRIBED INTERVIEW 
 
Introduction: I am Kingsley Edafienene, a research student at University of Glamorgan, 
United Kingdom. I am currently conducting research on Media Exposure, Policy Agenda-
Setting and Risk Communication in Sub-Saharan Africa, using Nigeria’s Niger-Delta 
region as my case study.  
 
INTERVIEW 1: JOURNALIST (BROADCAST MEDIA) DELTA STATE 
 
Question 1: As a journalist, how would you rate media performance with regards to 
the Niger Delta conflict? 
 
I think the reporting has been balanced, it has been exposing, in the sense that the media 
because of the difficult terrain of the Niger Delta they have gone the extra mile to get 
information from the militants on the one hand and government on the other. I will say 
media performance is above average, lets say 70 percent so far because most of the 
information they get is from the militants. The militants will either send their information 
through text messages, emails or telephone calls. More often than not, some of these 
claims by the militants are not verifiable because it is from what they tell journalists that 
they write, but at times journalists go the extra mile by reaching out to the Joint Task 
Force (JTF) of the Niger Delta Crisis who at times take journalists down to those areas to 
see for themselves; but more often that not, the coverage is based on what they hear, 
receive as text messages, information they get through emails by these militants in Niger 
Delta. I think media performance is above average.  
 
Question 2: What are the factors that determine journalists’ commitment to truth 
and balance when reporting issues on environmental degradation (such as pipeline 
explosion, oil spills) in the Niger Delta region?  
 
It is accessibility, journalists report will not be balance if they don’t have access to such 
areas where there is pipeline vandalisation and others. If journalists don’t have access and 
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don’t see for themselves, then journalist report may not be balanced but if journalists see 
for themselves what is going on like the degradation you are talking about then their 
report may be balanced. At times journalists visit these areas affected by oil spillage and 
other environmental pollution and based on these events, they write and what they write 
is essentially based on what they see and so with news writing, facts are based on what 
you see and not what you imagine. First, access to the information is imperative. Second, 
given the kind of society we are in Nigeria, access to information is always very difficult 
because government wants to cover up and even the oil companies wants to cover up, so 
more often than not, government media outfit tend to succumb to government side, it is 
only the private media outfit like guardian, vanguard and others that tend to report a little 
bit above average in the sense that their reporting may not be too balanced because of this 
lack of access to information.  
 
Question 3: Considering the enormity and diversified nature of the Niger Delta 
conflict, has the media in any way drawn attention through in-depth and 
interpretative reporting to the risk posed by environmental degradation? 
  
Yes, I think they have to a very large extent that is why the world is now aware of what is 
going on in the Niger Delta. Apart from the CNN and the BBC, more often that not, the 
information international news outfit get are from the local media. By constantly 
reporting the Niger Delta, the media have been able to draw the attention of the 
international community to the plight of those in the Niger Delta. I think the media have 
done a very fantastic job. Since this crisis started there is no day you read any national 
paper that you won’t see a report on the Niger Delta crisis, either front page, centre 
spread or back page, so they have to a very large extent done well and attracted the 
world’s attention to the plight of those in the Niger Delta. 
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Question 4: In the event of environmental degradation such as pipeline explosion / 
oil spills, who are the sources that provide journalists with information? 
 
First, the affected communities normally cry out, like I said the oil companies will want 
to suppress it, they don’t even want it published, they want to make sure they attend to it 
quickly and hide it under the carpet, but the communities because of delay in attending to 
such oil spills will cry out in form of press conferences, press releases to the media before 
the oil companies will kind of do a press release to also tell the world but it may be too 
late because by then, they must have carried a different side of the story which have to do 
with the community before the oil companies will go to the affected community and do a 
routine task by covering up the exact stooping of water above and what they are doing to 
attend to the oil spill. 
 
Question 5: How often and in what ways does the media offer indigenes of oil host 
communities the opportunity to partake in a public debate with policy makers on 
environmental degradation and the conflict in the Niger Delta?  
 
What they do, they normally organise workshops, apart from organising workshops for 
journalists they also organise workshops for most oil host communities where they 
educate them on their activities and what they are doing to alleviate their sufferings in the 
Niger Delta. The government also on its part normally organise workshops, town hall 
meetings and sensitization visits to these oil producing communities. It is essentially the 
avenue they use to let the people know of their activities. Although, it is not too frequent, 
because you discover that it is only when there is a problem that they will embark on this 
fire brigade approach of trying to call the people together and sensitize them but it is not 
frequent, may be they do it once, twice or three times in a year. The one that is more 
frequent, like for the journalists, they do it twice a year, some companies do it once a year 
but the government normally do it more often than even the oil companies.  
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Question 6: Have the press always been free from repression in Nigeria? 
 
No, there is no where in the world that the press is free, even in the United State and 
Britain. Although, in Britain, you discover that, like what is going on in the house of 
parliament over MPs expenditure, where there are claims from the news agencies that 
have been running it since the day the news broke. In Nigeria, not so, when you talk of 
press freedom, we can say its eighty percent but the repression is there in terms of closing 
down of media houses, in terms of not giving access to the media, lack of access to 
information. It is a little bit better under the democratic settings than it was during the 
military regime but in total the press is not free. Press freedom is better now, far better 
than what we use to obtain in the military era because in the military era there was 
nothing like freedom, you write what they want you to write but even in the state owned 
media outfit there is nothing like freedom, you can’t write against the state. The state 
owned media outfit is more like a public relation organs of government, it is only the 
national papers or Nigeria Television Authority (NTA) that are kind to show a semblance 
of print, but generally if you want to analyse, the press have more freedom now than 
during the military era because this is a democratic setting. More importantly because the 
outside world is watching and the image of Nigeria has been dented over the years, so in 
order to re-brand the image of this country (Nigeria) the government now allow a little bit 
of freedom but all the same it is better now than what it use to be in the military era.  
 
Question 7: Has the press in anyway gotten better or worse since the installation of 
democracy in Nigeria? 
 
Yes, it has gotten better, if you pick the newspapers you will know it has gotten better 
even the government state owned radio and television now criticize but constructive 
criticism, just pick any national newspaper you will see that from the first page to the last 
page there are reports of fraud, corruption and all forms of vices that you can mention. 
The press is growing in Nigeria, like some of these governors that were arrested, some of 
the activities of fraudulent people in the society or these politicians, it is the press that is 
responsible for drawing the attention of these anti-corruption agencies to them. Without 
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the press, if it doesn’t break as news, the agencies will not act even if they know such 
things exist, I think there is growth in all areas of both the print and electronic media.  
 
Question 8: As regards Niger Delta conflict, do media institutions or journalists go 
after stories that sell or facts?  
 
Story that sell is what the media go for, what obtains in Britain is what is obtained in 
Nigeria, we have this no culture of reading, people prefer to listen more to radio than 
reading newspapers because they don’t have time, for media to sell, their story must be 
away from the ordinary, it must be exclusive, so they write sensational reports and 
headlines to draw the attention of the people, it goes beyond the normal news reporting, 
story must be put in such a way that it will attract the reader and in doing that, they fall 
short of some of this ethics of information.  
 
Question 9: Overall, what are your views on media depiction and the Niger-Delta 
conflict?  
 
I think the media is reporting what is going on in the Niger Delta; I believe that, if they 
are given proper access to the affected areas, there reports will be comprehensive and 
balanced, but more often than not like I said, their reports are based on what they hear or 
what they get as emails or reactions from the militants and also from the government 
side. I strongly believe that the media have done well because they have been able to 
attract the attention of the world to the plight of those in the Niger Delta and the media 
have also been able to make government to bend backwards to do some of those things 
they couldn’t have done over the years, like the setting up of the Niger Delta Ministry, 
Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), a lot of intervention agencies to 
enhance the welfare of those in the Niger Delta, if not for the media these things wouldn’t 
have come to pass. I believe that with time and with more access, funding and openness 
on both side, on the side of the militants and government, media will excel.  
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INTERVIEW 2: EDITOR / JOURNALIST (PRINT MEDIA) DELTA STATE  
 
Question 1: In what ways does the operation of print media differ from broadcast 
media when reporting on the Niger Delta conflict? 
 
This print media is hundred percent owned by the government and we have a focus and 
the focus is to report and sell Delta State. We are not competing with any other 
newspaper, we have a definite function to perform and that is exactly what we are doing 
and fortunately Delta is part of the Niger Delta so whatever we do we encroach on the 
Niger Delta, we speak for the Niger Delta. The major difference between the print and 
electronic is very clear and permanent. The print is a permanent form, the electronic 
comes and goes and that is why they sue the newspaper on various occasions than the 
electronics because no body is interested to record what is said even if you record, you 
can only record the voice and not with pictures because Nigeria is not as sophisticated as 
developed countries where they have facilities to carry out such functions. If the print 
documents, you will find out that in the next hundred years to come you can still keep in 
touch, but if I ask you what was said on television or radio yesterday, you may not be 
able to tell me except of course you have retentive memory so it is very clear. 
 
Question 2: Are there any forms of limitations associated with the print media in 
reaching out to the rural oil producing communities on issues relating to the Niger 
Delta conflict?  
 
Absolutely no, I will be very open because you are doing a research, if am talking to a 
government official I withhold certain information but I will be very opened with you. 
This administration (present government, 1997) came in with a three point agenda and 
the first agenda is peace and security so whatever we are reporting we have the first 
agenda at the back of our mind that this administration wants to maintain peace and 
security so anything that will counter peace and security you may not see it on our 
newspaper but anything that promotes peace and security we are ready so you can see the 
trail line. If there is any gagging, it is not visible to the eyes, it is only those who are 
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inside that will know exactly what is happening, those outside may not know; like any 
other newspaper too, the proprietor matters a lot. They accuse this newspaper for not 
talking against the government, yes. I was reading the guardian newspaper when you 
came in; the guardian also will not see anything wrong with their proprietor and tribune 
newspaper will not see anything wrong with its proprietor, when concord newspaper was 
on, concord did not see anything wrong with the proprietor so the state newspaper or 
government newspaper is not an exception. The government is there to serve the people 
so anything that promotes that service is what we are ready to propagate.    
 
Question 3: Are there any challenges faced by the print media in the production and 
sales of newspaper? 
 
Yes, very much, the challenges are enormous. First of it is funding, newspaper production 
is capital intensive, so many things go into newspaper production that the price is 
prohibiting. Is it the chemical? Is it man power? Is it the computer? So many things go 
into the production of newspaper so it is very capital intensive that is why very few 
people go into it, funding is a major part. Second, one form or the other of interference is 
another, then adequate personnel is the other factor. However, funding is the most 
important part because when you have enough funds then you can provide the facilities, if 
the facilities are not there, then there is nothing you can do. Considering the epileptic 
power supply, electricity is also a major factor to put into account because when you 
came yesterday there was no electricity supply and the generator was faulty and if the 
government says they can’t afford generator for now, then what can we do? You know, it 
is only 350 kg generator that can power this place and yesterday it was the small 
generator that was on, until the government decides to provide us with a generator that 
can power this place, so funding remains a major factor because every other thing 
surrounds it.  
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Question 4: Does the print media in any way amplify or down play the risk of 
environmental degradation and conflict in the Niger Delta region?       
 
Yes, it is a running battle, why I say it is a running battle is that the oil companies don’t 
want you to mention anything about degradation but if you go to the oil producing areas 
you will know that a lot of damage has been done to the people that reside there. I happen 
to know much because I consult for shell, I am one of those that if shell is doing 
anything, they call on me to deliver one lecture or the other, they take me round and I see 
a lot even this creek they are talking about it was shell that took me on tour because I was 
delivering papers on the activities of the militants as it affects shell. I said I will not talk 
whatever that I have not seen so they sponsored the trip to the creeks, the first time I can 
now tell you that I know what can be called creeks. I happen to know that a lot of damage 
has been done to the surroundings and to the creeks but sometimes because of company’s 
corporate image; they try to hide some of the things they are doing. However, the print 
you can not hold them back because it is one of their social responsibilities they owe to 
the people to report the things they know or to report the things they heard which they 
have confirmed. The print is doing a lot to expose some of these things that are being 
hidden by these international companies because they want to operate and go, they have 
nothing at stake and they are being aided by some Nigerians who also came from some of 
these states and that is why they can come to Nigeria to dump toxic waste and go. Who is 
interested when the society is not enlightened enough to know the consequences of the 
action of this people, there is nothing that happens in this country that is not been aided 
from within. It is difficult for a white man to come and do damage in this country without 
a Nigerian been involved, Nigerians aid and abate in one way or the other. The 
degradation they are talking about, one or two persons must have conspired to take what 
ever belongs to the community, as far as that is concerned. The white man you know 
them, they will say they have paid for the damage done to the environment and to the 
people but when you critically look at it you will find out that it is the wrong person they 
gave the money and the people continue to complain. 
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Question 5: Are there any form of control or self-censorship practiced by journalists 
or editors when reporting on the Niger Delta conflict? If yes, what are the 
implications of such practices?    
 
Like I told you, nobody will come out to say they don’t do this or do that; as a profession 
you know what to do when you are reporting an event. The censorship comes when they 
find out that you are not just creating what is right, I have always told people that there 
are two sides to a report and its like a coin, the coin has two sides, hence there is always 
the need to balance your report. For example, if we are reporting an event on the Niger 
Delta and we take only the government side that means we have erred, what we do is to 
also look at the people’s side, they must have something to say. Whether you believe it or 
not, let the reader find out or be the judge, for instance, if somebody calls you to order 
and say don’t report one side of the story also take a look at the other side in order for 
you to have a balanced report, it is not censorship but just correction. Censorship is when 
the clear sets of people say don’t do this, but as far as I know, nobody has said so in the 
reportage of the Niger Delta. The main thing, always ensure you balance your story 
because it is injustice to look at one side of the story, the coin that has one side is fake 
likewise the report that carries one side of the story. However, taking two side of a story, 
in that sense there is no censorship, but in clear case of censorship, you are asked not to 
report a side of the story even if you are seeing it, don’t report it. I have never seen the 
government or any media owner take such a step to report only one side of a story, the 
only thing they will sound into your ear is always ensure you balance your report. 
Unfortunately, some media proprietor will not be proud to tell you that when they want to 
be mischievous they report one side of a story and that is when you have crisis. A report 
that has one side is an avenue to crisis because you can’t step on someone’s toes and 
expect them to keep quite, they will react to what have been said and in such case there is 
no censorship. However, a correction is not censorship but that is what people will 
assume to be censorship. 
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Question 6: As an editor in a government print media, are there directives from the 
government on what to publish on the Niger Delta conflict? 
 
I think I have answered this question indirectly, there is none, but that is not to say they 
don’t call us to order, not to put fire into an already burning place. What do I mean, an 
event has taken place in the Niger Delta, instead of reporting what has happened, 
journalists go ahead to report what they have not seen, I will give you an example; When 
the Joint Task Force (JTF) (government soldiers) invaded Gbaramatu (an oil producing 
community in the Niger Delta), the report we heard including our own reporter said there 
were no survivals in the place, everything in the community went down. The governor 
took some press men including the person who sent us that report on a tour to Gbaramatu. 
When they got there, the governor said what I am seeing is different from what the media 
have reported. The media have reported that there was no soul left, no building and 
nothing left in the place but what are we seeing today? I have used this to give you an 
example of what I mean that there is nothing like that, except of course, when they want 
to do things right and that is not censorship. During the military and in any administration 
nobody will say don’t report this or that.  
 
Question 7: How in-depth and interpretative does the print media report on the risk 
associated with environmental degradation in the Niger Delta region? 
 
To a very large extent there is handicap, and the handicap is that people are not ready to 
give you the facts especially the government sector and that is why reportage on 
environmental degradation is on the low side; either they don’t know or they deliberately 
withhold the information and without such information, how far can you go? Journalists 
work like the police, without a tip you can’t do anything and that is one of the reasons 
why the Nigerian press have been pushing for the freedom of information bill to make a 
law for any government official to willingly give you any information you ask for. 
Unfortunately, the bill has been in the national assembly for years, it is either they want 
to kill it or throw it out because nobody wants to open or give information and that is a 
major factor and it is affecting the report from the government angle. If you go to the 
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creeks they are talking about and ask question, you will be surprised at the answers you 
get, I was in a town hall lecture in Warri [a city in Delta State] where they invited some 
of these traditional rulers and other notable persons to the meeting and when shell asked 
them what they wanted in their communities, some of them preferred to be taken to the 
United States to spend holiday to the detriment of their people, others said give me the 
money you want to give to my people, only me will take the money to them, I speak for 
them so whatever you are going to give it will pass through me. Contrast to this, if you 
ask somebody that you think is enlightened, what is happening by way of environmental 
degradation you will be amazed what they will say, a different thing all together, so 
ignorance is a factor.  
 
Question 8:  Who are the sources journalists get their information from when they 
are not on hand to cover environmental degradation and conflict the way they have 
occurred in the Niger Delta? 
 
The Niger Delta is not an exception; the sources of information that are available to the 
press are very many. First, you can use the people as the source of information, people 
who are experienced and live in the community where the incident has occurred, you talk 
to them and interview them because they will be able to know. Second, post 
documentation of what is available if you come across them because they can be very 
useful piece of information. The radio, television and newspapers already published there 
sources of information but the most reliable are those who experienced it, you can not 
fault it because they are the participant people who live in the area and know much of 
what has happened. The problem we sometimes encounter when trying to get information 
on issues arising from the Niger Delta is how enlightened are the people living in the 
affected communities.  
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Question 9: In the event of government military operation in search for militants 
and protesters in the oil producing communities, are journalists given access to the 
affected communities? If yes, do they report facts or sensationalize the report? 
 
I think I tried to pre-empt things when I gave you the example of the Joint Task Force 
(JTF) attack on Gbaramatu; it is a typical example of government invasion. Government 
invaded a place where they thought militants were hiding; the reports that came out was 
over exaggerated, like I said, the report that came to us was that the place was completely 
destroyed and there were no humans, animals or buildings remaining until the governor 
got there and found out that the reports were twisted. It was an alarm raised that the 
community was invaded, but when it was shown on television you could see humans, 
domestic animals and buildings apart from those they bombed. How do we limit our 
reports to facts, there are occasions when journalists go to the water side (creeks) in 
Warri, hearing that there was crisis in a village, nobody saw the number of deaths, I used 
this as an example in a lecture in Warri, I got hold of five different newspaper and all of 
them gave different figures of deaths, no newspaper reported the same number of deaths. 
If you are a reader how will you know the truth of deaths that occurred? If you are an 
indigene of a place and you hear a large number of people in your community have been 
killed how will you react? Instead of bringing down tension in the area such alarmist 
report can increase tension which government may not be able to control, so if journalists 
base their reports on facts and not fiction then it will help the government to solve the 
problem. However, if journalists report is not facts but fiction or they imagine things even 
before getting to the place the incident occurred, it is wrong. Reports should be based on 
facts if we are to help the government solve a problem.  
 
Question 10: How would you describe press freedom in present day democracy? 
 
Press freedom is relative in the sense that what is freedom here may not be freedom else 
where. You can not compare the Nigerian standard in terms of press freedom to what 
happens in Indian or even in South Africa. Press freedom where journalists are not 
allowed freedom to information and that is the genesis of this freedom of information bill. 
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It was sponsored by Nigerian Union of Journalist (NUJ) to have access to information; 
the government is still sleeping on it. When I gave a lecture a year ago, some people 
verbally attacked me on the bases of newspaper that I was aiding the government because 
I said that government may not be able to give a stable backing to the freedom of 
information bill. The government believe that journalists are their enemies so if you give 
them that freedom then they are not safe because they have something to hide, if they 
have nothing to hide then why will they delay to pass the freedom of information bill into 
law so that journalists can get access to information and that is what obtains; because of 
this handicap, we can not talk of press freedom, it is not there. As government continue to 
have vote of six, secret acts and others, they are laws that are holding back from signing 
into law the freedom of information bill, as long as these laws continue to reflect in our 
status quo, we can not talk about this bill. There are certain things you may not know as a 
general institution and there is a law to that effect, it is a colonial law, the whites made 
that law and the government have not been able to scrap it and that is what journalists 
wants them to do but because of one thing or the other they want to withhold, they don’t 
want to do it; as long as that continues to happen we can not talk of press freedom.  
 
Question 11: What are your views on media representation on the Niger Delta 
conflict? 
 
My views are very personal, personal in the sense that I am not talking as a journalist. 
The Niger Delta is a very sensitive terrain and you may not believe, if you live in this 
country you will know that those in authority see journalists as enemies and most times 
when the government wants to set up committees to look into the conflict, they keep 
journalists away so they will not know what is happening in the affected communities, 
because they believe that if journalists are there they will be forced to write what is 
happening. They have forgotten too that a journalist is an added advantage to help them 
know the problem of the area and if journalists expose the problems of these areas, the 
problem is half solved but they are keeping many things out and it’s what we know that 
we use. I believe that if the government does not have anything to hide they will not 
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delay in signing the information bill. Government hide from journalists, if they bring 
journalists close it will help solve the problem half way.  
 
INTERVIEW 3: JOURNALIST [NIGERIA TELEVISION AUTHORITY] NTA  
 
Question 1: As a journalist, are there any government media policies to consider 
before reporting key issues on the Niger Delta conflict? 
 
Yes there are, you see, the Niger Delta issue is a very touching issue, it is not something 
people should just delve into and speak random about. As a Nigerian, despite the fact I 
am a journalist, even when reporting an event that has occurred in the Niger Delta, you 
have to be accurate first and foremost. As a journalist you have a duty that you owe to the 
public to report what is happening at any particular place at any give time. However, 
when reporting you should be careful not to incite an unrest especially in the case of the 
Niger Delta issue, we know it is a very touching issue, we know it is capable of either 
making or marring the Nigeria context. Whatever you report, I want to give you an 
insight, I went to Gbaramatu kingdom with the governor of Delta state to see the extent of 
damage in the community, the first report that was written about the incident (JTF 
invasion) prior to the visit, was on a hear and say bases, some newspapers did not visit 
the community but because they heard or the people involved gave them a little leaflet, 
they wrote a story about it, talking of complete destruction and all what not. When we got 
to Gbaramatu with the same journalist that wrote the first story in the newspaper, he was 
shocked because the devastation he was talking about was not as much as it was 
portrayed. As a journalist, you have to be accurate in your report; it will help people 
know exactly what is happening, when it happened and how it happened especially in 
places like this. If we have not gone to Gbaramatu prior to the first information, we 
would have gone by the report we read from the newspapers, so even when you are 
reporting you should be careful because Nigeria does not need to be disintegrated. The 
problem in the Niger Delta is a problem that could have been solved before now anyway, 
but hence it was left to linger, that does not mean we should fuel it. 
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Question 2: In the event of government military operation in search for protesters 
and militants in oil producing communities in the Niger Delta, are journalists given 
access to these affected region? If yes, are journalists allowed to report the incident 
the way it is without distortion?  
 
That brings us back to what I just said, you know, in a crisis situation journalists can not 
all move to that place for security reasons, security in the sense that when you are going 
into a war zone there are people that will make it possible for you to come there and be 
able to report, you don’t just go at your own will, you are free to go there but can you get 
to the place? That is another thing. In our own case, government had to liaise with the 
soldiers that patrol the place and they created an avenue for the journalist to come in and 
have a first hand assessment and that was why we were able to go there and see things for 
ourselves and that was why we were able to write and produce video clips from a first 
hand information, having been at the seen, we conducted some interviews and that was 
how we knew what was going on there, no longer form grapevine. In essence, 
government aid journalists to get to certain areas especially in conflict situations. What’s 
the second question? Are journalists allowed to report the incident the way it is 
without distortion? It is a two way thing; in all honesty it is a two way thing. If you say 
distortion, if you go into a war zone for instance, you have to pick your interview after 
picturing things for yourself, writing from your own perspective of things you see around 
you there, you need people who are on ground to also tell you what has been happening 
there before you came, now two people can say one thing from two different 
perspectives. The people who feel oppressed give you their own side of the story, the 
people who they think are the people oppressing them give you their own side of the 
story. It is now left for you to meet them in the middle; in essence, from point A it could 
be distorted some where, from point B it could be distorted so it is left for you to take 
what point B has said, what point A has said and put it out and let the public decide for 
themselves. I don’t know if that constitutes distortion for the end user or reader, it is a 
relative term as well. 
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Question 3: How often does journalists challenge the government and policy-makers 
on the risk associated with environmental degradation?  
 
As often as we can, it is not easy to confront the government; for example, there is no 
total freedom of the press, I am emphatic about that, there is no complete freedom of the 
press, a lot of factors contribute to it. When you voice out, some persons in some quarters 
will try to suppress what you are saying because they have the will power to do that. A 
typical example, is when you see some journalists been incarcerated because they gave 
reports on certain issues that some persons are involved who have personal interest in 
such areas, they don’t want such report to be public knowledge so they try to suppress it. 
There are other ways to suppress it, some journalists have become gullible therefore they 
succumb to the idea and things like that, so you find out that they work out their reports 
as the case may be.  
 
Question 4: Are journalists in any way pro-government or propaganda machines 
for their proprietor when reporting issues on the Niger Delta conflict? 
 
Yes, yes, we are all just machines, we try to justify a lot of things, I don’t know, opinion 
defers, yours could be different from mine as a journalist. This media agency is every 
government organ and we have to follow a phase, we try to do the two, even when we are 
reporting the truth as it were, we try to cushion the effect one way or the other; that is 
why I said that even when you report, you should make sure you are not inciting, so you 
don’t excite conflict in other areas. As regards the issues of the Niger Delta, using 
Gbaramatu as an example, the first report that came out was this is what they did and all 
what not. Subsequent reports were aimed at what happened, how come it deteriorated to 
this extent for it to have taken this tune. In reality, follow up reports don’t need to remind 
the people that their homes were destroyed, in our reports we also showed the cash and 
ammunitions that were recovered from the militants indicating that their struggle has 
already turned into criminality. Subsequent reports no longer showed cash and 
ammunitions, we no longer showed the destructions, we now show the riverine areas and 
say things have happened here and what is the way forward because the federal 
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government would not want a situation were you continue to show all these things about 
the conflict and then you aggravate the tension in the area because they have plans for the 
amnesty and for the amnesty to work, you don’t have to continue to bring into focus these 
destructions as people will not accept it like that, people will see it different; they can turn 
a blind eye to what you are saying, because by trying to show them the past, they will 
remember about their destruction and give you deaf ears, if it will amount to this, then we 
don’t need it.  
 
Question 5: How often does Nigeria Television Authority (NTA) broadcast conflict 
and environmental degradation in the Niger Delta on national news at 9pm?  
 
As often as possible, it all depends on the agro in the region. We tell you these things are 
there and then we try to tell you why they are there at this particular time, we report on 
what can be done to make sure things get better. Oil spillage in the Niger Delta by these 
oil foreign companies, we bring it to the notice of the whole world, why do we do that? 
So that the attention of the government and stakeholders will be drawn and they will 
begin to think of how to make things better and that is the essence why we always report 
things like this.     
 
Question 6: How would you describe press freedom in modern day democracy? 
 
We have not gotten there yet, I told you before, press freedom is a white elephant project, 
everybody wants it, yet nobody wants to make it happen. The legislators, when issues 
concerns them, they want their issues to be broadcasted but when it comes to someone 
else they want to suppress it because they feel if you give them the room they will go 
over the board and it will get to us also. It is neither there nor here, we are not there yet 
until they pass the freedom of information bill then we can have press freedom. As 
journalists, we do as much as we can and leave the rest to fate.  
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Question 7: Does the government in any way suppress journalists report on the 
Niger Delta conflict? 
 
The three tiers of government [federal, state and local] have vested interest in the Niger 
Delta because it is the major source of income, the oil that comes from the oil wells; if 
anything will destruct the economic activities in that area, it will affect the whole country. 
Therefore, they are always on guard when it comes to anything concerning the Niger 
Delta. When government came together and thought about amnesty, they saw that 
continuous report of hard news concerning the Niger Delta will distort the amnesty plans. 
They made an appeal that reports coming from that area should be padded so that it will 
not initiate aggression. You as a journalist and as a Nigerian, you are a beneficiary of 
whatever comes from the area, from derivation that are distributed to states because you 
benefit from it indirectly or directly. Therefore, you will not want the crisis there to 
continue so when government tells you lets pursue peace to cushion the effect of all these 
things, as a human being, will you not go along with that, it doesn’t mean you are telling 
lies, it doesn’t mean you have buried the truth, it only means you are in a project of 
realising a better condition for everyone.  
 
Question 8: What are your views on media reporting and the Niger Delta conflict? 
 
The media has done a lot, if not for the media, government attention would not have been 
drawn to the issues in the Niger Delta, the people have been agitating for long, a lot of 
commission have been set up but have not been doing anything about the issues but with 
this current move by the media through writing, telecasting and other means of reaching 
out to the people; government saw the need to act because the situation in the Niger Delta 
was getting out of hand. The government started by creating the Niger Delta ministry and 
gave amnesty to militants. This all happened because the media came with full force to 
say the government have to do something to avert more conflict, if we haven’t done that, 
I don’t think anything will be done by now, Yes the media have done a lot.  
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INTERVIEW 4: HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY [POLICY MAKER-ENVIRONMENT 
COMMITTEE] DELTA STATE 
 
Question 1: How would you describe the standard of environmental condition in the 
oil producing communities in the Niger Delta region? 
 
It is in a very bad state, the oil producing areas and their environment is polluted, it is 
devastated. It is a pity that you are here today; if you had come six months ago (January 
2009), you would have seen what we are talking about live whenever there is oil spillage; 
the environment is totally devastated.  
 
Question 2: In the event of environmental degradation in oil producing 
communities, how does this information get to policy makers?  
 
The Delta State House of Assembly (DTHA) has passed a law requiring that under the 
ecology law 2005, all state ministry of environment should be informed whenever there is 
oil spillage, I doubt if they are actually informed. Whenever we have petitions from the 
oil host communities, it must have taken over four months before it gets to us.  
 
Question 3: Are there any mechanisms put in place to assess environmental 
degradation in oil host communities by policy makers? 
 
Yes, there are mechanisms, the state government has Delta State Environmental 
Protection Agency (DSEPA), and there are also federal government laws which ensures 
that when ever there is spillage, the oil exploration companies should inform these organs 
or agencies of government. The truth of the matter is that these things are not done, 
government have actually put in place these mechanisms but they are not been adhered 
to.  
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Question 4: How fast do policy makers respond to the plight of indigenes of oil host 
communities in the event of environmental degradation? 
 
How fast? Is it in terms of compensation? or in terms of providing palliative measures? or 
in terms of putting a hold to where the spillage occurred? I don’t know the area you want 
to look at, but the truth of the matter is that it takes a longer time for even government to 
respond to such situations, it takes a longer time. 
 
Question 5: Considering the wide spread of gas flaring and oil spillage in the Niger 
Delta, is it of concern to policy makers?  
 
Yes, it is of great concern to policy makers; when you look at gas flaring and oil 
exploration, the problem of the Niger Delta can be said to be of a national out look. Why 
I am saying it is a national out look is that the federal government per say have not put in 
place relevant laws so to say to arrest the situation of gas flaring. Not until two weeks ago 
(June- 2009) the senate passed a law on gas flaring and oil was discovered in Nigeria far 
back 1960s, till now they are just putting in place a law to stop gas flaring and that is a 
law, what of the implementation? so it is a big problem as federal government has not 
taken the bold step. Gas flaring, we were made to understand, was suppose to have 
stopped in 2006 but they keep on postponing it till this year 2009 and as we are talking 
today, the bill itself has not been accepted by the president, it was just passed by the 
senate, the house of representatives have not even passed it so it goes beyond what the 
host communities can do on their own because oil exploration as it were is of the 
exclusive risk in the constitution.  
 
Question 6: What are the causes of environmental degradation in the Niger Delta 
region? 
 
Causes of environmental degradation in the Niger Delta region is purely oil exploration, 
purely oil exploration and it has affected the environment badly. 
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Question 7: Are there environmental laws in Nigeria? If yes, are these laws observed 
by oil companies and in what capacity do the government / policy makers enforce 
these laws? 
 
I will say yes and no, like I just said not until 2009 a law to prohibit the flaring of gas in 
Nigeria was just passed by the senate of the national assembly. Before then, we have had 
agencies like Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA), which is a board of its 
own and other agencies that deals with oil exploration issues but the truth of the matter is 
that these agencies are not given the tips to implement either the guidelines or the law. In 
Delta State, the ecology law states that if there is an oil spillage and after twenty-four 
hours, it is not contained, then the companies involved in that act should pay 
compensation. Though I can’t remember the said amount to be paid, but it is for each day 
and if you multiply the amount into one or two months it will run into millions of Naira 
but nobody enforces the law, nobody. I remember the last case we had between the host 
communities and Agip Oil Company. When Agip refused to pay compensation to the 
host community, the lawyer of the host community cited that part of the ecology law and 
when they found out that the law could be used they decided to use other means by either 
arresting the members of the host communities or using what I call divide and rule 
method, dividing the community against one another causing crisis and this is what they 
always do.  
 
Question 8: At present, are there any plans by policy makers to improve the 
standard of environmental condition in oil producing communities in the Niger 
Delta? 
 
Yes, there are plans; I would say there are plans because government is a progressive 
system and with these laws that are being presently passed by the senate, I believe that 
other laws are also being considered and do not forget that the problem of the Niger Delta 
is also a problem of decree 1978. The decree of 1978 has to do with the land use act and 
this have basically affected so many problems in the Niger Delta and with this climate 
change that the world is preaching, I think the government is actually looking at how they 
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can solve the Niger Delta problem. There are plans, here in Delta State we are thinking of 
how to bring in another law over the conservation law with a view to solving the 
ecological process of the environmental problems in the Niger Delta.  
 
Question 9: In what ways are the indigenes of the oil host communities compensated 
for their loss in the event of environmental degradation? 
 
In what ways? I don’t know, but the truth of the matter, are they actually compensated? if 
there is an oil spillage in the community, the first thing that is suppose to be done, is to 
curtail the spillage and when that is not done the communities will rise up either to block 
the passage or to cause crisis in the area and if there is any crisis, the oil companies will 
report to government and before you know, these people are arrested, members of the 
host community are arrested. When they are arrested, it leads to another problem, so 
instead of paying compensation to them what the oil companies normally do is to divide 
them by picking one person, a prominent man in the community and say alright you are 
our peace maker and how much are we going to give you and the amount usually runs 
into millions of naira. This is not compensation; it is settlement because the oil company 
is settling one person in other not to pay compensation to the whole community. 
 
Question 10: What are the challenges policy makers encounter when enforcing and 
implementing laws in the state to curb environmental degradation? 
 
In 2003, there was oil spillage at Abalagada in Ndokwa east, before we could bring Agip 
to this office (DTHA) for investigation, it took a long time. Oil companies are aware that 
the economy of the nation is based on how much that is derived from oil revenue, they 
may decide not to comply and federal government will at every point in time back them. 
Even when you have these laws put together, if the oil companies are threatening to 
leave, there is a possibility that federal government will ask them to stay. There is little or 
nothing policy makers can effectively put in place because oil exploration is an exclusive 
thing, the State has little to do, the only thing they can do is to call the oil host 
communities together like we have always done in this office (legislative arm) or at the 
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executive arm of government; we invite the oil host communities and the oil exploration 
companies and see how we can resolve the crisis, that is how far we have gone. 
 
Question 11: What do you have to say about policy making and environmental laws 
in Nigeria? 
 
In general, policy making has been very slow concerning environmental laws in this 
country. I would rather say that government should try to put these things together, if you 
look at other countries the way oil exploration is being conducted, it is not the way it’s 
done in this nation and that is because, like I said from 1958 till now, there have been no 
laws and when there are no laws, jungle law is the order of the day. First and foremost, 
the government should put proper laws into place. The government should try and see if 
the land use decree act of 1978 can be abolished as it will be a stepping stone. When land 
belongs to the owners of the community, everybody will see themselves as stake holders 
but as it were today, government owns the land, the community suffers from oil 
exploration, compensations are not paid, agricultural crops are not growing and economic 
activities are on stand still. I think the best way out is for the government to first and 
foremost abolish the land use decree of 1978, then begin to enact laws that are amendable 
to changes, laws that are in reality with the present situation so that the people of the oil 
host communities will begin to feel that the oil taken from their shore which is destroying 
their environment, when it is taken, something will be put back. When oil is taken and 
nothing is put back it is the people that suffer. Government should be able to ensure that 
if you take you put back, if one tree is fell from one place how many are you planting. 
The world is preaching about green house today, Nigeria is not talking about it; if you go 
to the mangrove farm in the Niger Delta, the whole mangrove farm is destroyed, the 
ecology is destroyed, how much are the oil companies putting back, nothing. There are 
also places oil is drilled at the centre of the community, if you go to other Niger Delta 
States, may be Rivers State or other communities you will see gas flaring on top of the 
communities, everybody in that areas suffers. A university in Lagos did a study in Warri, 
Delta State, they said because of the gas flaring and oil exploration, Warri as a city now 
suffers from acidic rain. What have government done since the outcome of that finding, 
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nothing. People dying from sudden death, different diseases, cancer and nothing is being 
done. Government should first and foremost, think of how to give palliative measures to 
communities that are producing the oil, that their environment is destroyed, that are 
having ecological problems. I think it is the best way to solve the major problem in Niger 
Delta today, all the crisis you see in the Niger Delta is as a result of environmental 
degradation. One day the oil will dry up and when it dries up and the oil companies have 
left, what will happen to the people leaving in the Niger Delta.  
 
INTERVIEW 5: MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT DELTA STATE  
 
Question 1: How effective are environmental laws in the Niger Delta especially in 
the oil host communities? 
 
To some extent the laws are there, but it is the implementation that is some how a little bit 
faulty, they are not hundred percent adhered to. The environmental laws are many, we 
have the federal environmental laws, state environmental laws and at the local 
government level, we have bye laws. These oil companies often obey federal laws 
because they feel the federal government is the biggest and so whatever law they 
formulate takes care of state and local government. At the state level we have 
environmental laws on effluent discharge, ecological law and waste management laws. 
All these laws are in place and the oil companies do obey them but at times due to some 
constrains they find it difficult to obey. For example, when there is an oil spill, the 
communities stops the oil companies from cleaning up their mess unless they pay 
compensation first and the oil companies will say this is as a third party interference; in a 
situation like this, they can not just comply with the laws. Where such incident happens 
we often intervene in order for the communities to give peace a chance so that the oil 
companies can clean up the mess. We have forestry laws in the state and the oil 
companies do obey these laws, before they carry out any operations, if it is in the forest 
reserve, they often contact the department in charge of forest reserve and make sure that 
they enumerate the trees they want to damage and pay compensation to forestry 
department. In communal land, they pay compensation to land owners but the only 
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problem they encounter at times, is that they pay to the wrong hands; some community 
leaders collect this money and they don’t give it to the actual owners of the land. Their 
land tenor system is individual family and so when somebody who is prominent in the 
community collects this money, it does not get to the actual family and these are some of 
the areas where conflict arises from.   
 
Question 2: How often does environmental degradation such as oil spill, pipe line 
explosion occur in the Niger Delta region? 
 
From reports getting across to us, we can not say its monthly; it comes as when not 
predicted but a good number of them occur. 
 
Question 3: What are the environmental implications of gas flaring in the Niger 
Delta? 
 
Gas flaring has its own tone, and in the Niger Delta, the policy to stop gas flaring has not 
been implemented so the environmental implication comes along with it as long as it is 
flared. 
 
Question 4: How would you rate environmental standard of oil producing 
communities in the Niger Delta? 
 
The environment whether in the Niger Delta or other oil producing communities as long 
as human activities occur there, it is bound to affect the environment. The oil production 
or oil prospecting in the Niger Delta has its own tone in environmental degradation. The 
environment in the Niger Delta is not as it were when oil was not being produced; now 
that oil exploration has been going on in the Niger Delta for so long the depreciation 
keeps coming, in terms of water quality, forest degradation and so on. 
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Question 5: Does the oil multinationals observe the state environmental laws in their 
search for crude oil and during exploration?  
 
This is a difficult question in terms that most of the oil companies rely on federal, once 
they get their license from federal, they believe federal is everything, even when we tell 
them that the environmental issue is concurrent, they refer us to federal. They oblige 
federal laws than state laws and that is the bottom line. 
 
Question 6: In the event of environmental degradation in oil producing 
communities, which agency comes to their aid and how quick? 
 
In Nigeria so many agencies are doing one and the same thing, we don’t even know who 
is carrying out these functions. I believe it’s who gets there first that does the job. It 
depends on when the reports get to us and whether the logistics are available, like if it 
happens in remote areas where it is swampy, if you don’t have boat and helicopter you 
can’t get there. The agency that has these equipments will get there and do it and in most 
cases we rely on the proponents to take care of the logistics and take people to the site to 
do some assessment and whatever.  
 
Question 7: Are oil host communities compensated in the event of environmental 
degradation? 
 
Yes and no, in the sense that if the degradation is caused by third party no compensation. 
Third party, like vandals, criminality action; the oil companies will not pay compensation 
but if it is equipment failure, technical failures then they do something. It is the level of 
payment the oil host communities are talking about, the standard is very low. In most 
cases the level of compensation does not match the actual level of destruction.  
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Question 8: Are there mechanisms put in place to end gas flaring?  
 
All along the federal government gave target for 2008, and then it went to 2010 that all 
oil companies should stop gas flaring, between 2008 till now, there has been a lot of gas 
gathering, injection of gas into oil wells to stop flaring but the rate at which the oil 
companies are reducing it is rather too slow, not that I will say there are no mechanism to 
stop flaring but when gas flaring will eventually stop I can not tell you.  
 
Question 9: What are your views on environmental degradation in oil producing 
communities in the Niger Delta? 
 
During oil production there are a lot of things that goes on and you know that land is a 
commodity that can not increase, the oil companies continue to depreciate the land every 
year as long as they dig and if you take this land from this people there will be no 
alternative for them other than agitation because the land is a means of their livelihood. In 
most cases when the oil companies write them that they want to employ the youths of oil 
host communities, it all boils down to how they visualize each other as long as the oil 
companies take their natural heritage from them. One thing is to make documentation 
another thing is to follow it faithfully; probably because all the agreement reached 
between the oil host communities and the oil companies are not adhered to as it were, that 
is why there is agitation all over the place. If the agreements are adhered to and 
everybody is satisfied, I don’t think this agitation will come up. Whatever activities 
anyone is doing, there is bound to be interference with the environment and the oil 
exploration and production is not excluded from such activities as long as they continue 
to operate because it has its own effects on the environment and the host communities. 
Finally, if the agreements are not reached, one party will not be satisfied and that is why 
we have this problem in the Niger Delta. 
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INTERVIEW 6: INDIGENE OF OIL HOST COMMUNITY (WRITER ON THE 
NIGER DELTA CONFLICT / PRINCIPAL OF A COLLEGE IN OGU-BOLO AN 
OIL PRODUCING COMMUNITY IN RIVERS STATE. 
 
Question 1: How would you describe the standard of life in oil producing 
communities? 
 
I am a comrade and I have written on the Niger Delta revolutionary struggle on the 
various tribes seeking justice since 1956 to date. In my book, the Niger Delta 
revolutionary struggle, we have pointed out particularly some multinational giants such 
as Chevron, Agip, Mobil, and Shell which is the major stakeholder and a few others that 
has just come into the main stream. The condition of oil host communities is really bad 
per say because oil was found in Oloibiri in 1956, today Oloibiri is almost a desert, there 
are no roads, schools and no means of communication; that is to say, they are not 
assessable to the out side world. Precisely, after 1956 oil was stuck in other communities 
of the Niger Delta. In Ogoni oil was struck in large quantities in the early 1960s, they too 
were not feed well because the multinational giants act as people who have this concern 
with the federal government and are not dealing with the developmental aspect of these 
communities. The oil companies say they pay tax and therefore the federal should look 
into the development of these oil producing communities, since we have on-shore and 
off-shore, the development in the brackish fresh water, saline mangrove forest is even 
worse because there is where the oil is discovered in commercial quantities. The up 
stream and down stream activities of these multinational giants have polluted the waters 
so the eco system is polluted and the environment is also polluted. However, the oil host 
communities livelihood has been affected because the mangrove swamp which is saline 
breeds crabs, lobsters and so on. With these environmental hazards, the people of the oil 
producing communities who lives on these sea animals no longer catch enough for sale 
because the environment is polluted and the sea animals can not survive in such harsh 
terrain so their economy is affected, source of drinking water is affected. Like I said 
before, the federal government and oil companies are just paying lip service to the 
development of these communities. For instance, after the Willink commission in 1957 
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which brought out its recommendation in 1958, they brought out the Niger Delta 
development authority within 1958 and 1960, and Sir Henry Njoku was the first chairman 
of the board. In 1962, they brought out Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) and this 
time around, it was for the whole country not the Niger Delta alone so what the Niger 
Delta people sort for became a national cake. Since then nothing much until 1992 when 
Oil and Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC) was 
established, these interventionist agencies failed. There were ways both the colonialist 
and the newly independent nation wanted to assuage the fears of the minority in oil 
producing communities but in all they were mainly lip service because they did not 
cushion the effects of the hardship of these communities.  
 
In 1999 during the campaign of former president Obasanjor, he promised the Niger 
Deltans that he would commission a lasting legacy that will assuage their fears and 
problems so he initiated the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). The NDDC 
was on parliamentary act but of course two hundred and twenty-five million dollars was 
the first stake which did not do much, NDDC itself is under funded, it needed more funds 
injected into it in order to really face the task of improving the rural communities in the 
Niger Delta. However, improving the living standard of the people through the provision 
of rural roads, building schools and other basic amenities all these things cannot be met 
with such little funds. After the creation of NDDC there was still agitation which brought 
about the Niger Delta Ministry in 2007 which was promised by the present president 
(Yar’Adua and Jonathan government), the Niger Delta Ministry is on board and its first 
stake is about four hundred and fifty million Naira, which could not do much to improve 
the condition of the Niger Delta oil producing communities.  
 
In 1999 as a result of People Democratic Party (PDP) trying to win the election some 
gangs were armed, which led to the causes of militancy, culticism and violence in the 
Niger Delta; some groups were armed and these groups metamorphosed into what we 
now have as militancy. The present militancy have done so much harm to both the 
communities and the oil sector, a barrel of oil stumbles up and down in price, up to 
hundred and twenty dollars per barrel which is the major cause of energy crisis globally.    
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Question 2: Are there issues of environmental degradation such as gas flaring / pipe 
line explosion associated with oil producing communities? 
 
In 1993, the Ogoni issue is a very good example; the Ogoni’s are one of the major 
stakeholders in the Niger Delta who produce about twenty to twenty-five percent of oil in 
Rivers State. Late Kenule Saro-wiwa as an environmental activist earlier saw the 
degradation of the Ogoni eco system and environment; he raised alarm because Shell was 
the major multinational in Ogoni land. The Ogoni’s discovered that they could not 
produce much food as it use to before oil was discovered in Ogoni land, he saw that the 
water was polluted, they could not catch much fish and they started experiencing air 
borne diseases because the environment was very polluted. If we are talking about 
environmental degradation, the rate is almost eighty to ninety percent degradation in the 
Niger Delta particularly in Ogoni land which was a case study per say and the Ogoni’s 
did not always stop Shell from production. When they raised alarm in the 1993 world cup 
when Nigeria was playing against Italy, Ken Saro-wiwa shared flyers at the International 
field indicating red card for Shell and that was the first instance where Nigerians got 
alarmed, which led to his final execution on charges of killing five Ogonis. The case of 
Ken Saro-wiwa is a good example of the environmental degradation of the Niger Delta.  
 
Question 3: In what ways do the indigenes of oil host communities make their voices 
heard in the event of environmental degradation and provision of basic amenities in 
oil host communities? 
 
Like I said, since 1957 the Niger Delta people have been raising alarm on how their 
environment have been polluted and depreciated by oil companies. There was the Rio 
conference in 1992, which was the greatest summit in which the Niger Delta people’s 
voice was heard. It resulted into the federal, state and local government signing the new 
Environmental Impact Assessment, prior to this time, there was nothing like that until the 
Rio conference of 1992; so the Niger Delta people have raised enough alarm to tell the 
world that their environment is being polluted, degraded and endanger the species there 
in.  
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Question 4: How will you describe the directions of conflict in the Niger Delta on 
environmental degradation and resource control in the Niger Delta? 
 
In 1957 the chiefs and people of the River State went to London and placed before her 
Majesty and the British parliament the problems of environmental degradation, the 
effects of oil exploration and exploitation, which I said is about the Henry Willinks 
commission. In 1966 late major Isaac Adakaboro also raised alarm on the effects of oil 
production, exploration and exploitation. He launched a twelve day revolution to show 
the world the effects of environmental pollution and how it can lead to earth quakes and 
the submerging of the earth surface and other hazards, however, his twelve day revolution 
was defected by the federal government. There after the civil war, it did not end there, 
after Isaac came Ken Saro-wiwa in 1992 who was hanged in 1995, Ken brought to the 
world’s knowledge the effects and hazards of oil exploration and exploitation. It is not as 
if the Niger Delta people folded their hands while these things were going on, they did 
not. They have been able to show the world that the effects of these things could be 
everlasting; at present people like Asari Dokubo the new militants fighting to make the 
world aware of the oil exploration and exploitation activities and how it endangers this 
part of the world, at a time oil will stop and the effects will be devastating to the Niger 
Delta people.  
 
Question 5: At present, are there any mechanism put in place by the government to 
end the Niger Delta conflict? 
 
In the days of former present Obasanjo (1999-2007), he some time called Alhaji Asari 
Dokubo the leader of the new militancy and he also called Ateke Tom who is the head of 
the Niger Delta vigilante in Rivers State; others from Delta State like Tom Polo, Sobama 
George and the emergent new leaders of some of these groups then were not called. As 
we are talking now the present government of Alhaji Yar’Adua has embarked on an 
amnesty which some people and critics say it’s porous because granting an amnesty to a 
group of people. There should be a factor where the government is finally going to look 
into the root of why these people came up in the first instance, unfortunately, these issues 
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have not been looked into, but as a blanket amnesty for the militants presently, some 
militants have agreed to heed. MEND which is a coalition of militant groups in the Niger 
Delta is still carrying out the peace operation because they say the blanket amnesty is just 
like the former amnesty that was embarked upon by the previous government and that is 
also going to fail. Federal government has come up with some ways to assuage the Niger 
Delta militancy but these things do not really have home and feet so to say.  
 
Question 6: In what ways do you think the creation of Niger Delta ministry along 
side the operation of Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) will end the 
conflict in the Niger Delta? 
 
Like I said earlier these two bodies, the NDDC and currently the Niger Delta ministry are 
just ways used by the new colonialist headed by the Hausa, Fulani’s, Igbos and the 
Yoruba (four major tribes in Nigeria) to still gimmick the oil producing minorities 
because the states here are small, the problems of the Niger Delta are enormous. The 
Niger Delta ministry took off with four hundred and fifty million Naira and the NDDC 
started off with two hundred and forty million dollars, what are we talking about because 
it is on record that the Warri – Port Harcourt express road (the major road linking the 
Niger Delta states) takes the first budget of the Niger Delta ministry. Look at the brackish 
saline mangrove communities that are almost dead from the devastation of oil production, 
exploitation and exploration, therefore such interventionist agencies are not going to 
solve the problems of the oil producing communities rather, at best, they can aggravate 
because they will just be a small chunk in a deep sea because the problems are more than 
what these interventionist agency can handle. What we need here is resource control and 
true federalism, rather than these communities having small chunks but instead these 
communities will pay royalty to the federal government and the prospecting communities 
will pay tax as it is done in the United States of America.  
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Question 7: Was there any time in the Niger Delta oil producing communities 
suffered as a result of government military operation with militants? 
 
There are many instances; we have the Umuechem community in Rivers State completely 
destroyed and the King, elders, women, men and children killed at close range. We also 
have the Odi community in Bayelsa State devastated as a result of some militants killing 
about twelve military personnel during the Obasanjo regime, air, land and sea arm forces 
were sent and Odi was completely destroyed. We also have Odioma community which 
was destroyed as a result of protest to better the loss of the community as a result of pipe 
lines passing through and flow station in this community. It is worth bearing in mind that 
along side Shell, Chevron, Agip, Mobil and others; these oil companies have been 
involved in what is classified as divide and rule system. What the oil companies do when 
people protest, they align with the federal forces, including the federal government, go 
there mount stands and destroy these communities. Where bribe and such things could 
not assuage the people they use this arrant force.  
 
There is what we can call intra-communal clashes, which are, per say sponsored by the 
ruling government. A good example is Okuruama community where the forces of Ateke 
Tom in connection with former governor of Rivers State, Peter Odili (1999-2007) 
completely destroyed the community, so we have many communities that have shared the 
same fate and presently we have six communities like that in Delta State. When the 
government force went to destroy camp five of Tom Polo, in doing this an old woman of 
over ninety-five years was killed and a good number of people who could not escape 
from the air, land and sea forces, nearly twenty-seven communities were destroyed. This 
issue we raised in a conference at Abuja in early may 2009, where the president came out 
with a statement to stop the offensive but in June the same year the federal government 
was still destroying communities. Government forces attacked Abonima in June this year 
(2009), where Abonima was attacked in pretence of removing militants. Many 
communities have been affected through this type of devastation by the federal might, 
using the tax payer’s money to purchase arms to destroy the oil producing communities. 
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Question 8: Do you think the media has done enough reporting and coverage of the 
Niger Delta conflict? 
 
Well, prior to this time, since 1999 we could say the local tabloids owned by private 
individuals in the Niger Delta have done well but the national newspapers or newspapers 
owned by the executive directors from the major tribes have not been covering the Niger 
Delta properly until recently because they thought that the Niger Delta people wanted to 
show the rest of Nigeria they own the oil and therefore it is significant to their progress. 
Today we have so many local tabloids that have been doing well to cover the activities of 
the oil producing companies and the devastation they bring to the oil producing 
communities, the militants being revolutionary fighters or genuine fighters because 
between them we have people who have genuine intentions to better the loss of the Niger 
Delta oil producing communities, in as much as we have the criminals among them; who 
embark on kidnapping and other such activities in order to amass wealth. 
 
Question 9: Who engages more in developmental projects in the Niger Delta?  
 
We have three types of government, the federal, state and local government. All along the 
federal government has been saying they are giving allocations to the state government 
and they should develop their state, been that as it were, the various past governments 
have lived on what one could call defrauding the populace by not properly utilizing these 
federal allocations to the state; some previous democratic governors 1999-2007 have 
been accused in the Niger Delta states. The six core states in the Niger Delta, namely; 
Edo, Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, Cross Rivers and Akwa-Ibon, all their governments have 
been accused of embezzlement, defrauding the people’s monthly revenue allocations. 
Therefore, it is true to say that the Niger Delta states were not doing well before these 
interventionist agencies like the NDDC and presently the Niger Delta ministry were set 
up. The local governments are just jamborees like one will call them, the allocations 
come and they just share within themselves, they have not been playing vital role in their 
communities despite the enormous allocation. There is what the federal government call 
federal projects, these projects are not brought to the Niger Delta rather they are mostly 
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taken to the northern part of Nigeria because of leadership since the Niger Delta people 
can not hold positions of presidency and few ministerial positions.           
 
Question 10: What are your views on the Niger Delta conflict? 
 
My views on the Niger Delta conflict, is that the federal government should come out 
with a more human face by agreeing to the terms of the Niger Delta people, like I said 
earlier, resource control and true federalism. The resource control, the communities who 
own this oil will embark on the production and pay royalties to the government and in 
true federalism, like you know in the United States of America, there must be a round 
table conference in which the various nationalities are going to speak about how they 
want to live in a nation that they believe is called Nigeria. The minorities must have a 
voice, they must be assuaged of their fears and presently nothing like this is in operation 
because the constitutions we have had, apart from the 1960 independence constitution, all 
other constitutions have been panel beaten by dictatorship. The 1999 constitution which 
we are talking today does not give room to the progress of the Niger Delta minorities who 
produce this oil, until these constitutions are amended where the people really sit down 
and discuss and place before Nigerians how they want to live, what they really need and 
what is obtainable, until these things are done we will never have a true federalism. 
 
INTERVIEW 7: ELDER STATES MAN / POLITICIAN AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVITISTS FROM OZORO AN OIL PRODUCING 
COMMUNITY IN DELTA STATE   
 
Question 1: As one of the early pioneers to stage protest over environmental 
degradation by oil multinationals in your community, what instigated you to take 
such action? 
 
The discovery of oil in our land was originally conceived to be a blessing to the entire 
area especially Delta State. When you look at the report of Willink Commission in the 
early days especially during the colonial administration, it was clear that the places called 
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Niger Delta were peculiar places and so they defined the geographical areas into these 
states: Delta, Rivers, Bayelsa, Akwa-Ibon and Cross rivers. These areas originally were 
not conceived to have oil; it was regarded as a geographical location of the nation. The 
region’s political leader made by inter-areas, who was the leader of opposition those 
years, happened to come from Delta State and he said being a peculiar area, they must be 
addressed properly. Before, they were regarding places like Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa-Ibon 
and Cross Rivers as eastern Nigeria, then Delta and Edo were regarded as western 
Nigeria. But because of the peculiar environment of these areas, regarding us as major 
fish supplier to the nation and it was a peculiar geographical environment, quit distinct 
from the rest of Nigeria and for the region to develop there must be proper attention of 
the federal government being focused on it and that led to what we called Niger 
Development Cooperation and its aim and objectives was to focus on these areas but it 
did not work.  
 
Then in 1957 oil was discovered in Oloibiri in present day Bayelsa State, later oil was 
discovered in all the oil producing communities in Delta State and Shell with other 
multinationals started looking for oil. The people in the oil producing communities 
opened their minds that it was going to be reciprocal as the oil companies are coming to 
take their oil they will in turn do something to prosper or better the life of the people but 
the contrary became the case. When the oil companies came up, their concern was to 
make wealth and take this wealth to other areas; in terms of employment, they will bring 
people from Britain, and other major tribes in Nigeria and the indigenes of the oil 
producing communities were not given attention, the only jobs they gave to the indigenes 
were low quality jobs like cleaners, messengers, clerical officers, chef but people who 
came from the major areas of Nigeria took the opportunity of important positions and 
started dictating for the people of oil producing communities. When there are vacant 
positions they will go home and bring their people to take the jobs so our people were 
being treated as slaves. In order not to better the people’s condition, the oil companies 
after exploration will leave the effect of the devastation like oil pollution, gas flaring 
every where with no attention given to it, so we found the situation to be odd and 
intolerable. Hence, I led a group that the company should stop operation until they are 
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able to provide for the people, give them recognition, develop the area and that led to our 
decision that you (the researcher) is now referring to, we have not abandoned our 
struggle; it is a continuous exercise even in this present dispensation.  
 
Before oil was discovered, what was sustaining the country economically was money 
from groundnut and cocoa; the revenue allocation at that time to the areas producing 
these items was fifty percent of the total production but when oil was discovered here in 
the Niger Delta because they are majority tribes, they removed it completely and that was 
when the trouble started. First and foremost, the revenue allocation to oil producing 
communities became two percent, so we challenged them; it went from two percent to 
three percent, then five percent and later thirteen percent so it keeps going up any time 
there is trouble. The major tribes have seen oil to be the major source of income for 
Nigeria, they abandoned the production of groundnut, cocoa and other agricultural 
products that were flourishing in the north, west and east because oil is there and they 
started planting their people in the circle of government. We felt that until the issue is 
addressed and the oil producing communities enjoy the equal opportunity as they did, 
when cocoa and groundnut were in circulation and let the benefit of the people who own 
the oil be pronounced. As a matter of fact we call Nigeria a one country, a country of 
democracy, a country classified as federal government, is that how federal system is 
being practiced overseas? The Nigerian government now created an artificial federal 
system of government that says what I have I should not enjoy, they who are strangers 
will come and take over what the Niger Delta people are suppose to enjoy and take it 
overseas and other states. What is practiced in Nigeria is not a federal system of 
government, it is a unitary government because no autonomy given to the state and local 
government to exercise its own system. What is there is that after collecting the revenue 
from oil sales they go to Abuja the capital of Nigeria located in the middle belt, before it 
was Lagos in the west and share the money in such a way that part of it even will be not 
disclosed and we see revelation about all this things even up till date, they are sharing the 
money, part of it is excess crude reserve, it is not suppose to be so. What we are asking 
for is our fair share, we allow the federal government to say one Nigeria but let it be put 
into practice, it is a federal system of government so let the Nigerian government do what 
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federal system dictates in other countries. It cannot be peculiar to Nigeria alone that when 
you talk of federalism they are practicing unitary system of government, it will not work, 
not until the issue of equity, fairness and justice is addressed, the agitation will continue.  
 
Question 2: How would you rate the operational and environmental standard of oil 
multinationals in the Niger Delta? 
 
They are only here to take away oil, they don’t care about the damages they are causing 
to oil producing communities, if you go to different areas of these oil host communities, 
you will see gas flaring, oil spillage and toxins being buried. The most recent (2009) is in 
Ndokwa local government area in Delta state even at Ozoro here in Delta state they 
buried toxins, the report is there, the oil companies are trying to hide it but they can’t 
because lawyers have gone into the case, scientist have also gone to the location and 
confirm that they buried toxin, so they are not looking for anything other than to take 
away the oil and leave the people with nothing. They are not doing anything to bring 
good and conducive environment to the people rather they are always polluting the 
environment and that is one of the reasons why people will continue act.  
 
Question 3: In the event of environmental degradation who comes to the aid of the 
community and how quick? 
 
It is the authority, the federal government of Nigeria because the companies come in as 
employees, they negotiate with them and enter into drinking sort of agreement before 
they start operation and if the government heed to what ever they tell them and neglect 
it’s people, it is left for that government to do whatever is appropriate. If they want the 
people to die unnecessarily and the oil taken away and the people remain in their poor 
state it is left for the government. The federal government of Nigeria is solely responsible 
for taking care of its own people and the environment. The laws concerning oil, they put 
a lot of them in place like the land use decree act, is a law to make the federal 
government to be in total control of land to the detriment of the people who are in the 
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environment; and you have gas laws, oil laws, none of these laws is to better the life of 
the people. 
 
Question 4: Considering oil sales accounts for about ninety to ninety-five percent of 
Nigeria revenue, how would you rate the standard of life in oil producing 
communities in the Niger Delta? 
 
Indirectly, I have said that the revenue gotten from oil is going to the federal government 
pocket, it is not being given to the oil producing communities. For instance, like Abuja 
the federal capital territory, sharing revenue allocation, one percent of the total revenue 
because they made it federal capital and the whole of Niger Delta you can not give them 
even half the percent of the revenue. Recently, the federal government created what they 
called the Niger Delta ministry, they say it is a fact, but it is a deceit and where did they 
put the head quarters, at Abuja. I said why did they put the ministry in Niger Delta and 
put a liaison officer at Abuja, so if the head quarter is at Abuja and I want to see the 
minister or any higher officer, it means that I will have to pay transport to Abuja and pay 
for a hotel and also take feeding allowance. Why is the head office not in the Niger Delta 
region? every action of the federal government is punitive, nothing to the interest of the 
people; the Minister of state came here two days ago, I asked him and he said master that 
statement you made last time is true, when you came out to say openly that the ministry 
of Niger Delta should not be at Abuja that it should come to the Niger Delta, the federal 
government have now considered it and they are making preparation to move it to the 
Niger Delta and that is the condition. If they come nearer here and they want us to reason, 
we will rub our minds and see what they can do but I doubt it.  
 
What we call confederation, until Nigeria becomes a confederation or a federal system of 
government whereby what you produce in your place is for you but then pay tax to the 
federal government. It is only tax they should take and not the bulk of the money coming 
in and then sharing it here and there. No matter what they do, I have told them at Warri in 
Delta State that the military might federal government puts in the Niger Delta to suppress 
the militants will not work, unless they wipe out the whole race, the people will emerge 
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again, no matter the settlement or how far you suppress them the people will come out 
until the government justifies them.   
 
Question 5: What are the implications of environmental degradation in the Niger 
Delta using your community as a reference point? 
 
It is poverty, absolute poverty because people have no land to farm, no water to fish, 
anywhere to run to; rather they become beggars roaming about and no employment. If 
you stay at my place for about five to six days, you will see many people coming here to 
beg for alms. I make sacrifice, sacrifice to those that I can, but can I keep giving them 
money, so even if you say there is a blow up, is it not because of some of us telling them 
this suffering will be over? there will be a general blow up and its going to be the whole 
of Niger Delta, the government is now trying to suppress Gbaramatu and other 
communities, it is not so, there will be a blow up unless urgent action is taken to redress 
the Niger Delta situation.  
 
Question 6: How often and in what capacity do your community and other oil 
producing communities experience environmental degradation by oil companies? 
 
Every time, every time when they are doing exploration, if you go to some places, you 
will see the effect of oil production, you will not find any domestic animal again, all fish 
ponds are polluted including the rivers. The Ijaws and Itsekiris were the major areas 
producing fish for the Niger Delta; they are now living on ice fish imported from Poland 
and other countries, which I consider to be rubbish. People are dying and nobody knows 
the type of disease that are affecting them, the man who wakes healthy this morning 
before night falls you hear he is dead, no good medical facilities being put in place. We 
are living in a very dangerous environment, what I will call predicament, which the 
government really needs to take seriously, very serious predicament; we don’t know 
where we are in this country, we don’t know. Oil production is a curse and not a blessing 
to the people of the Niger Delta rather it is a set back to the life of the people.  
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Question 7: Have your community at any time experience conflict between indigenes 
and community leaders over oil funds from government or oil multinationals? 
 
When there is money for people who live in poverty to share, there must be problems 
because you have the lion share and the other have the rat share it becomes a problem; 
but that is not the issue. The issue is if you satisfy the people and bring something for the 
people to share and there is a master plan or the people see the money on ground, they 
will know how to share it. The question of saying that there are some prominent leaders 
taking the money and don’t give it to the youths, it is deceit; they just want to cause 
division among the people. Why can’t the oil companies convert the money into other 
aspects of development? If you know that if you give money to the people they will not 
make good use of it, then convert the money or use it to do other things so the people can 
benefit from it? As they are getting this money from oil, why can’t they put infrastructure 
in place so that people can work, why can’t they provide agricultural farms all over the 
place, why do they not have fishery establishments all over for this people to fish? The 
money they give to the people is peanuts; they are giving peanuts only to scatter the 
people, the money is peanuts, they are not making available funds necessary for the well 
being of the people. I have told you before about this revenue allocation, lets assume its 
five hundred billion Naira the government gets from oil sales, they give oil producing 
communities twenty billion Naira and the rest distributed to Abuja and to other states that 
are not oil producing and that is exactly what is happening. How much can the 
government say they have spent on infrastructures in Ozoro, Gbaramatu or other oil 
producing communities? Why can’t the government say these are the billions we have 
spent in these areas? these are the infrastructures and projects we have put in place in the 
oil producing communities, let the government publish them and look at the cost of all 
these projects together, they cannot be more than ten or twenty million Naira and they are 
talking of projects, so they are trying to incite the people in the oil producing 
communities.  
 
The king of Okpe kingdom came out when we where holding a meeting at government 
house Asaba, the capital of Delta State, to say that the government promised to bring 
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electricity, gas and other infrastructural development to his kingdom through oil 
companies, he refused and said he does not want Shell, Agip and other oil companies 
because they have oppressed them to the extent that we cannot allow any of them to enter 
into our land and that was what the King of Okpe said in presence of other traditional 
rulers and others prominent people. The issue is this, the government is not been truthful 
and when the Isoko oil well was closed down, within a week they said we have lost one 
hundred and twenty-eight billion Naira. It is when they loose you hear the amount of 
money they are losing, but when they get, you will never hear the money they are 
receiving, who are they deceiving? They are deceiving themselves, their trouble will 
continue until they change.  
 
Question 8: Considering the enormity of the Niger Delta conflict, how would you 
rate government performance to end the Niger Delta conflict? 
 
The government can end Niger Delta conflict; first, get a proper description of what they 
call Niger Delta, if you are talking of oil producing states or areas, it is only on that, you 
can pass your judgment. Niger Delta is suppose to be the following states, Edo state is not 
part of Niger Delta but because during the agitation Edo and Delta was called defunct 
Bendel State and at Galegale and Oronigbe they discovered oil there, but being that we 
were in the same state (defunct Bendel state) we can now accommodate them as part of 
Niger Delta but Edo definitely by Willink commission of inquiry did not include Edo 
state as part of the Niger Delta. Niger Delta is composed of the following states: Delta, 
Bayelsa, Rivers, Cross Rivers and Akwa-Ibom. Abia state does not belong to the Niger 
Delta but if you are talking of oil producing communities, it is there you can have Edo, 
Ondo, Abia, Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, Cross Rivers, Akwa-Ibom and Imo state. Oil 
producing state is quit different from actual Niger Delta, in order to bring the major tribes 
to enjoy the oil production; they now formulated what is called the Niger Delta and added 
Abia, Imo, Edo and Ondo. This is an embodiment of the confusion they created in other 
that the major tribes will benefit so that the majority tribes will continue to support the 
Hausa tribe in the north; this is another problem they have created. There are various 
commission of inquiries they made like the Willink commission of inquires, then the 
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report of general Ogomudia, the present report committee set up and headed by Mitie 
amplified this differences and they said call Niger Delta proper as it is embedded in 
Willink report inquiry and not bring other areas and add it to the Niger Delta. We are not 
helped by that composition. Until the laws and their stipulations to committee reports are 
put together properly and implement them, there could be no peace. 
 
Question 9: In the event of environmental degradation, in what ways are the 
indigenes compensated? 
 
The indigenes are not adequately compensated, what the oil companies do, is to look for 
some strategic people and they normally make them contractors and instruct them to 
carry out functions, all these things are personal. People can really say oil companies are 
doing much when they put infrastructure in place like good schools, hospitals, fisheries, 
industries, agricultural farms and technical know how in places and that is what people 
will say they are benefiting. When the oil companies give peanuts to a traditional ruler 
and tomorrow when there is trouble, they will say they gave money for the people to the 
traditional rulers and he has eaten it in order to blackmail him and cause confusion in his 
own domain. That is not what the people require; the people want proper developmental 
projects to be sited in their area, the young ones to be employed and in the management 
positions, their sons and daughters should take control of this oil sector and not to bring 
other tribes to take control but let indigenes mount this resources or be at the head of this 
resources, it is there you know the tricks they are playing because they will not allow it.  
 
Question 10: How would you rate the level of transparency the oil companies and 
community leaders exhibit when dealing with the indigenes in your community? 
 
I do not see them, but when they come they look for traditional rulers and some little 
chiefs, and whatever they do is behind closed doors. When you came into my compound 
did you not see the gates wide open? because God is my security. The traditional ruler 
takes what they want and close their gates and the companies instruct them to tell their 
people we have done this, were as what they have done is to either the traditional rulers 
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or their small chiefs and it does not get to the people. We are not looking for peanuts, 
what we want is for the oil companies to say we are visiting an oil producing community 
today and let the leadership and people of the community be there and say this is the 
package we have for you and let the people discuss with the oil company. It is the people 
that will set up a committee to discuss with the company and not individuals because they 
hold positions, therefore they are representing the people entirely, it is wrong. Let the oil 
companies make themselves available to the people but they do not do it, instead they try 
to tarnish the image of whoever is there as much as possible. Myself, when I got my 
trouble with the oil companies in the early 1970s, I closed down the flow station in my 
community; do you know what the oil companies did? They arrested me, and after my 
release and I said what was the point, the oil company said they want to settle me, and I 
said myself, they said yes and I said alright you can settle me, then they carried me to 
police headquarter in Benin, Edo state (defunct Bendel State) where I met with their boss 
and other member and they asked if they have done anything for me, they said no, so we 
came back, and you know what they did, they brought documents to make me a 
contractor and I said this is not what I am fighting for, what I am fighting for is massive 
development of my area, I will not take anything from you. Since then, Shell does not call 
me, they ran away because they found me to be a difficult man but let me call Isoko 
people today, and say this is what we have, Isoko people will follow me because the oil 
companies have tested me and the my people (Isoko people) know they can’t win me 
over. If the leaders were to be like myself, these oil companies would have stopped their 
nonsense, they do not bring out what they have for the people to enjoy. It is 
developmental projects that we want, put our children to head the oil companies, reduce 
the unemployment and if you want to pay anything to the people, pay it publicly to them 
for all to see and don’t hide it.  
 
Question 11: As an elder statesman, what is the way forward as regards the Niger 
Delta conflict? 
 
The way forward is this; the federal government should be involved particularly in all 
negotiation, not to say because these boys came out and they are militants, where as I do 
 252 
not call them militants, I call them freedom fighters because they have been in prison for 
a long time, they want to free themselves out of the situation. The federal government 
should have a bearing in oil producing communities, particularly the areas where oil is 
been produced. For example, in the United States, I was in the US about two months ago 
(May, 09) and while in US I was flying from place to place for two weeks to see things 
for myself, the effects of oil, you will never find, I met some people in oil producing 
communities that say their government tell the oil companies to produce the same number 
they recommend.  
 
The oil producing communities will put their demands on the table, the federal committee 
will put their demands on the table and those overseas will be the mediators so that we 
can see what is obtainable in their place to avoid crisis. Without doing this, the 
government is wasting their time because God did not make us as their sacrificial lamb 
for their own intrigues, the battle will continue even if we die today our children will 
continue and it will not stop. Unless we form a committee of other nationals using their 
laws to see how they distribute oil wealth to different areas in their countries, it will not 
work; these nationals have to be present here or else if our government have to send 
representatives from Nigeria they will send people from other tribes and when they return 
they will twist the law. If you go to UC in US everything is in other, they pay tax to the 
federal government; there was a town we went to after Los Angelis, it took me four hours 
by road, when I got there, I met a man who took me to his house and showed me a meter 
recording his oil usage, and he said to me that the oil belongs to him and that is his 
blessing, he only pays tax to federal government depending on the usage. There must be a 
proper committee in Nigeria and then invite other producing oil countries to come and 
produce the laws they operate with to set a standard here, for without that, their will be no 
peace.  
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INTERVIEW 8: OPPOSITION COMMUNITY LEADER AGAINST 
CORRUPTION BY OTHER COMMUNITY LEADERS IN OWEVWE AN OIL 
PRODUCING COMMUNITY IN DELTA STATE 
 
Question 1: In what ways do the indigenes of your community relate the 
developmental needs of the community to the oil multinationals operating in your 
community? 
 
The main oil company operating in my community is Shell Petroleum Development 
Company (SPDC). As it is, the way we relate with the oil companies, we ask for some 
kind of assistance in terms of development for the community. The community has a set 
of committee, which is called the community leaders and the committee executive is 
made up of president general and other members of the executive from the community. 
These are the people who relate with SPDC to tell them their developmental needs like in 
the areas of roads, human capital development, the welfare of the elders of the 
communities and then, of course, what can be done to cushion the effect of the oil 
exploration and expectation in the community.  
 
Question 2: In response to the developmental needs of the community, in what ways 
does these oil multinationals get back to the indigenes of your community?  
 
Well after making the request, sometimes they have meetings in form of a forum of the 
representatives of the oil community and the officials of the multinationals and what they 
can do, they tell the executive of the community, led by the president general of the 
community.  
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Question 3: Considering the operations of oil multinationals in your community, 
how would you rate the environmental standard? 
 
The environmental standard is poor because, there is this gas flaring which has flared up 
the whole place, then you have oil pollution which is not adequately taken care of; the oil 
companies are not doing much about the environmental issues in the community. 
 
Question 4: In the event of environmental degradation, who comes to the aid of the 
community and how quick? 
 
First, the community cries to the government, to make their plight known and secondly to 
the oil companies, in most cases the pressure is on the oil company to effect the set of 
measures to be able to compensate for the degradation. It is mainly the oil companies that 
take care of the devastation. In most cases environmental degradation which affects the 
aquatic life of the place, if it is not quickly and adequately done, they put the community 
in economic embarrassment. Even though the rescue may not be as fast as one will want 
but at least immediately any devastation is known they send their experts to where it is 
happening and they try to take measures to correct the abnormal situation.  
 
Question 5: Is your community currently experiencing any form of conflict between 
indigenes, community leaders and oil multinationals? 
 
The answer is yes. First, we talk of indigenes in the community versus the community 
leaders and second, the community versus the oil companies. There have been series of 
protest against SPDC to bring in some development especially with the rig they are 
presently establishing in the community. The rig, the gas plant and of course, the laid oil 
pipes and you know the community has about twenty-one oil wells and if you get there 
the rigs are nothing to write home about and this is where they reap billions of dollars 
annually but the SPDC will not do anything about it and so that is why this protest is 
always there. Although, not to the extent of militancy like it is in the other part of the 
Niger Delta.  
 255 
Question 6: Considering oil sales accounts for ninety percent of Nigeria revenue, 
how would you rate the quality of life in oil producing communities in the Niger 
Delta using your community as a reference point? 
 
Well, may be since you came to Nigeria to conduct this research, you must have actually 
gotten into the oil producing communities and I know that you must have gone there and 
you must have seen things for yourself, there is nothing to write home about when it 
comes to the standard of life and development in the oil producing communities. These 
are people who still live in trash houses; in fact poverty level is at its peak in these areas, 
it is just a place they get the wealth and take to other places to develop and that is the 
theme and pain of the oil communities because development here is at its lowest level. In 
fact there is no development let me say so, would you say that there is development? 
When people can not eat two square meals a day, when the road to these oil producing 
communities are usually flooded and cars can’t move on the roads, lack of industries and 
of course no electricity, the electricity in these areas can hardly function, lets say two 
hours a day. In fact there is nothing in the Niger Delta especially in the oil producing 
communities.  
 
Question 7: Who engages more in developmental projects in your community? 
 
We have public spirited people who do that, then of course government, lets say 
government mainly because the schools in my community, like the primary and 
secondary are established, announced and funded by the government. There is no 
presence of oil companies in all these; the only thing you can think of in the community 
is just a cottage hospital and nothing more and of course the roads, even as the roads are 
at present, it is government we cry to, NDDC that is actually suppose to be in charge of 
this issue have been paying lip service to the community, they put it in the budget that 
they will publish for tender but nothing has been down. In the area of assistance in 
agriculture, nothing is being done so the people have to care for themselves.  
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Question 8: How would you rate the level of transparency the oil companies and 
community representatives exhibit when dealing with the indigenes in your 
community and the rest of the Niger Delta? 
 
Fraudulent; fraudulent because the executives from the oil companies also connive with 
the representatives of the oil communities to short change the community. Even though 
we are saying that no development there, we cannot also exonerate the community 
leaders from the pressure of what is happening, well everything also boils down on 
poverty. With, may be some two million Naira bribe here and there in the hands of the 
community leaders the oil companies can go and rest and that is what is happening. When 
we talk of transparency, it is zero on the part of the oil company’s representatives and 
their liaison officers and the leaders of the community, there is no transparency. If they 
are given money to develop the community, they embezzle the money, the development 
will not be there and it has been so all along. There are fake contracts given to the leaders 
that are never carried out but they are paid so that is the situation in my community. 
 
Question 9: What are your views on the operations of oil companies, government, 
community leaders and the media as regards the Niger Delta conflict? 
 
Well, talking about the media, the media is fine, whether you call it print or electronic 
media because they actually bring out the problems of the communities except the ones 
that are gagged by government. Then when you talk of rating the oil companies in oil 
producing communities, their business there is to make money and when they find out 
that the community is not hostile like what we have in other Niger Delta region, for 
example, the typical Ijaw land, they continue to express the situation and pay less 
attention or pay no attention to the community development. The leaders, like I have told 
you, if I want to rate them, I will rate them very low because most of the things 
happening there, if the leaders are not compromising the oil companies will do much 
more than what they are doing or they will have taken giant steps to ensure the 
development of the area but this is not the case. When you talk of government, you know 
this country is political, if you have a political big weight or political juggernauts in 
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government from a community, then the community will have what they want from 
government in terms of infrastructure, social or welfare needs of the community but in a 
community like mine, where we don’t have such political big weights, the government 
presence have not gone beyond the schools, no roads and other basic amenities. 
Government effort in the area too is next to zero and these are my views of oil 
exploration by multinationals, the community leaders, media and the government in my 
community.   
 
INTERVIEW 9: GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE ON INTER-ETHNIC 
MATTERS IN DELTA STATE   
 
Question 1: Are there inter-ethnic conflict in oil producing communities in Niger 
Delta?  
 
The answer is yes and no; yes because we have had to experience some inter-ethnic 
conflicts particularly in Delta State within the Niger Delta. We can not readily say that 
those inter-ethnic conflicts were directly linked to oil exploration; they were underlined 
in primordial sentiments of which with some political decisions had to spark off. But 
again, within the Niger Delta region we can say where there are boundary issues between 
communities where there are oil wells; yes, they have had cause to experience such 
crisis? 
 
Question 2: Considering the enormity of the Niger Delta conflict, what are the 
mechanisms government has set in place towards conflict resolution? 
 
Well, I can state specifically for Delta State, starting from the previous administration 
(1999-2007) in response to what the crisis was during that time, government had to set up 
a ministry specifically for conflict resolution and that ministry was headed by a 
commissioner in charge of inter-ethnic relations and conflict resolution. That ministry 
worked hard to bring about peaceful resolution of the crisis that have engulfed Delta State 
and also disarmament of the restive youths in the various communities as at that time. 
 258 
Since then the tempo of peace building has been set up, even now as we speak the current 
government has built more on the peace structure; we have the ministry of security and 
peace development in Delta State, supervised directly by the government himself, who is 
assisted by the various agencies such as the water ways security committee which is in 
charge that peace is maintained along the water ways within Delta State. We also have 
other offices to meet the special needs of the governor such as the office of the special 
adviser in charge of oil and gas who engages companies involved in hosting oil 
installations and also engages the companies that are involved in oil explorations. We 
also have the office of the senior social assistant to the governor on community affairs, 
the office of the senior social assistant to the government in youth development, all 
charged with the responsibility of ensuring that there is harmony between various 
communities, among members of the same communities and the troop of militants 
coming in; so I will say so far so good. The government have tried to ensure that the 
escalation is contained, that is why we have what the government has established to bring 
peace.  
 
At the federal level, you are aware that the federal government has established the 
ministry of the Niger Delta in addition to Niger Delta Development Commission 
(NDDC) which has been an interventionist agency to ensure the development of the 
Niger Delta region. Well, so far I think the people in government are doing their best 
even though they can do more and a few weeks ago the president of the federal republic 
of Nigeria granted amnesty to militants as a way to reduce the tension in the Niger Delta 
region. There are enough structures and institutions in place to manage the Niger Delta 
conflict.  
 
Question 3: How quick and in what ways does the government respond to the 
plights of indigenes in oil producing communities as a result of environmental 
degradation? 
 
As for environmental degradation there are laws, statutory provisions, in fact one of the 
laws created an agency known as Nostra, which is empowered to be the interventionist 
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agency when ever there is any oil spillage or any happening that affects the environment. 
There role is to enforce environmental laws, sometimes when we talk of environmental 
degradation, it is caused by third party intervention, it may not be due to technical failure 
of negligence of the company but because of this going agitation sometimes or by some 
unscrupulous elements that temper with flow lines, even at that, the law made adequate 
provision to remedy such situations. When there is no third party intervention, the oil 
companies takes full responsibility for, first, cleaning up, remedy the environment and 
pay compensation to the affected communities. We have had cause to intervene and 
ensure that such affected communities are adequately compensated, we have had to 
negotiate compensation plans and packages for all such communities that has adversely 
been affected. On the other hand, where the spill is due to third party intervention, of 
course the law provides that no compensation will be paid; there is a procedure that when 
ever there is any spill, there is a team made up of federal and state government officials, 
the oil companies and the communities. It is that team that goes to ascertain the cause of 
the spill, they will decide if it was due to equipment failure, negligence on the part of the 
company or it was due to third party intervention and when that happens it is the 
responsibility of the oil company which is limited to first, clean up the mess and remedy 
the environment.  
 
Question 4: Considering both peaceful and violent agitation in the oil producing 
communities in the Niger Delta, what are their demands? And in what ways does 
the government respond to their demands? 
 
Of course, if I may take you down memory lane, the call for agitation for development 
did not just start today, it dates back to the 1960s, when Isaac Adakaboro striked, that was 
violence, this was followed by the peaceful movement in Ogoni land led by late Ken 
Saro-wiwa and today we have genuine agitation from concerned Niger Deltans but the 
truth is the place (Niger Delta) remains under developed. There are other elements who 
have seized the opportunity of agitation to perpetrate criminal activities against the 
people so of course, government has had to respond in various ways. The response of 
government started from 1.5 percent oil derivation then went to three percent and now we 
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have thirteen percent derivation from oil sales, even though the current agitation is that it 
is rather too low because we operate a federation and in a federation we are suppose to 
operate true federalism. It does not have to be within politics so that is a genuine agitation 
so of course criminals take undue advantage of this crisis from this realm on the innocent 
citizens, no government will just close their eyes to this things like abduction of oil 
workers, vandalisation of oil equipment, of course the appropriate government security 
agencies will have to react in order to secure life and properties.  
 
Question 5: In regards to inter-ethnic conflict and the Niger-Delta agitation in what 
ways have the federal government amnesty been effective, using Delta State as a 
reference point? 
 
The amnesty is just starting, it may be too early for us to assess the effectiveness or 
otherwise of the amnesty. We are to lead the plan because his Excellency the governor of 
Delta State has taken the leadership of the crusade for the success of the amnesty. Only a 
few weeks ago there were stakeholders in the governors’ office, where the governor, the 
panel established by the federal government for the purpose of amnesty, all of us gathered 
and we brain stormed on the issue. We are believing that at the end of the day the 
amnesty is going to take off because the implication is this, if you have a genuine 
agitation come let us talk and we hear you out even if you have committed any crime 
over this years, forget about the crime, nothing is going to happen to you but it doesn’t 
have to be open ended. There must have to be a limit so if at the end of this period of 
amnesty any of the genuine agitators fails to take advantage of this opportunity and at the 
end adhere to carry out any criminal activities, then of course, the obvious conclusion is 
that your guess will be as good as mine.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 261 
Question 6: Have the government at any time amplify or downplay information on 
military operation in the event of inter-ethnic clashes and agitation in the Niger 
Delta? 
 
I don’t think so because information gathering and dissemination actually should not be 
the exclusive business of government. The press has that responsibility resting on their 
shoulders because it is not even the government that should, it may be borrowed a bit 
from the civilized world that they should really disseminate information. However, 
government have had the course to address the nation on a number of occasion even the 
recent crisis at Gbaramatu kingdom there have been regular press briefings by 
government officials and also sometimes from the militants; so I would say the answer to 
your question is yes to a very large extent, but when you now juxtapose that with what 
the Nigerian press have been reporting, we will say yes, because we have the pipeline 
press and the press is the return of civilian regime. The press has done so well to ensure 
the maintenance of democratic tenure. 
 
Question 7: What is government commitment to peace and security in the Niger 
Delta? 
 
Of course, without peace there can be no development, the primary responsibility of 
government is to maintain law and order, and law and order can not be separated from 
peace and security so the government commitment is irrevocable. The government is 
committed to peace. 
 
Question 8: What are your views on inter-ethnic clashes and the Niger Delta 
conflict? 
 
Inter-ethnic clashes are clashes or conflicts that are neither good nor bad, when we 
experience conflicts, the problems comes when that conflict is not well managed because 
conflict simply means somebody wants to execute what has been going on in the mind. 
Conflict if well managed can even lead to innovation, creativity, friendship; it is only 
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when it is not well managed that it generates to crisis. My views are that they are 
inevitable because no community or nation is an island of its own even the stronger 
nations depends on the weaker ones to survive, so in the process of that interaction there 
are bound to be conflicts. Like I have earlier said, the problems arises when such conflicts 
are not well managed because what does conflict situation really demands, they demand 
that people come together and negotiate, but when ever they are coming to negotiate, if 
the agitation is bottled up, of course the obvious consequences is explosion and it can be 
damaging. My views are that the inter-ethnic conflicts have been there, some are well 
managed and peace returned, for example, three tribes in Delta State the Uhrobos, Ijaws 
and itsekiris were engaged in inter-ethnic wars for sometime but because of the way that 
crisis was managed these tribes came together as friends. The man who have been feeling 
deprived will not know the other person has the same feeling and those who thought they 
were dominating, will also not know they have been dominating some other persons 
because man by nature is selfish so there have to be a platform where all the interest are 
allocated and satisfied if not but to a large extent. My view on the Niger Delta conflict is 
that so far so good.  
 
INTERVIEW 10: PROFESSOR  MANAGEMENT SCIENCE (BAYELSA STATE) 
Question 1: To what extent have the government been able to manage the Niger 
Delta conflict? 
 
When you say government, you have to identify the level of government that you are 
referring to, there are three levels of government in Nigeria; we have the federal, state 
and local government. Let’s start from the federal government; the federal government 
has been trying to tackle this problem by adopting the method of interventionism; that is, 
setting up of agencies that should address the developmental problems of the Niger Delta. 
Now if we should take our minds back, let’s say we begin from 1990, the federal 
government under Ibrahim Babangida regime (1985-1993) established the Oil Mineral 
Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC). OMPADEC actually tackled 
the problem of defects in the area from the point of view of making developmental 
facilities available. It is also part of our history now that the federal government did not 
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do well in terms of ensuring that the resources that were allocated to OMPADEC where 
actually released by the time OMPADEC was winding up in the mid 1990s. It was very 
clear that government did not obey its own vision in terms of ensuring that money 
allocated to OMPADEC was released promptly. Then mid way, there was this agitation 
from other parts of the country that after all oil resources are not just meant for oil 
producing areas and the dividends of the oil resources should hold on. Government now 
established Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) and appointed the former head of state, the 
person of Buhari (1983-1985) to take charge and it is on record that these agencies that 
where meant to provide supplementary facilities actually took care of the non oil 
producing areas much more than the oil producing areas. I remember a particular 
situation when the military governor at that time in Delta State dispatched a team of 
members of a development committee which eventually went to visit PTF and the 
Chairman of PTF snubbed them several times and they were unable to see him. When 
they eventually saw him, the chairman said they should go and manage their own 
business in Delta State and that PTF is not for oil producing states. When Obasanjo 
government (1999-2007) set up the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), it is 
also clear now that federal government did not actually do anything in terms securing 
development through the agency that was set up, because it did actually bring 
development to the state. Now the present government has created the ministry of Niger 
Delta and we also know that what has been allocated to both the ministry of Niger Delta 
and the NDDC under the 2009 federal budget is just about half of what was allocated to 
NDDC during the 2008 budget year; so you can see we are not really so sure whether the 
federal government is really interested in addressing the problems of developmental 
facility.  
 
Then when you come to the state level of government, the Niger Delta states, we have not 
actually done well because the Niger Delta states government are totally untrue people 
than the federal government and when some of them started talking of getting more from 
the oil resources in terms of propagating the adoption of true fiscal federalism by which 
they learnt that they will get more out of the oil revenue coming from the oil producing 
states. Then the former president Obasanjo raised the issue of management, it is on record 
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that the Niger Delta state governors have actually got so much given to them from the 
federation account, to what extent have they applied it. My intention is that not much 
have been done, well we can say like Delta State where we have another agency called 
Delta State Oil Producing Areas Development Commission (DESOPADEC) which is 
meant to use the derivation funds from the federation account for the purpose of 
specifically developing the oil producing communities. DESOPADEC is now there for 
more than two years and you know that during this period the revenue flowing from oil 
has been very volatile, prices of crude oil crashed and because of that, what the state 
government is getting from the derivation funds is declining and for now that has been a 
constraining factor on the ability of DESOPADEC to actually reach the people in terms 
of our own development aspirations. May be if the funds were there they would have 
done better because they equally have a number of plans in terms of providing better 
health facilities for people in the riverine areas and also to provide other basic amenities.  
 
Then as for the local government, nothing to write home about, if you put all these 
together you wouldn’t give government credit or score them high mark because in terms 
of whether they have actually addressed the issue. Beside this, we know what initiated the 
conflict but what is presently propagating it we are not so sure because the situation has 
gone beyond what it was; when the crisis started nobody was kidnapping any human 
being for ransom.  
 
Question 2: Considering the enormity of the Niger Delta conflict, who are the 
stakeholders responsible for the conflict? 
 
The stakeholders are people who are interested in propagating a common course, because 
they are affected by common issues. If you ask me who are the stakeholders, we can say 
all of us are the stakeholders, but will you really say that those who are propagating this 
crisis are actually stakeholders? If they are, to what end, because now we are talking 
about militants, are the militants really the stakeholders? What are they fighting for? Now 
if we cast our mind back to the early 1990s, they started with the agitation of the Ogonis, 
they had the Movement of the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), it was quite clear 
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at that time what they where asking for, they believed that the oil companies had not done 
enough to develop their land and they also believed the activities of the oil operators were 
degrading their environment and they carried it in a civilized manner, they went to the 
newspaper, television even as far as to the United States. They were able to mobilize and 
showed films about what is going on in the Niger Delta and how oil industrial activities 
are impacting negatively on the environment. At that time issues of compensation, issues 
of higher proportion of oil revenue going to the oil producing state and of course these 
were carried from that initial struggle up to the period of the constitutional conference 
and it was at that level that a decision was taken that a certain percentage of the total 
revenue from oil resources should be set aside for the development of the oil producing 
communities and this will go directly to the state government. We now have in the 
Nigerian constitution which states that thirteen percent of oil revenue will be given to the 
oil producing communities, so that was very clear what they were talking about at that 
time fiscal federalism, so fiscal federalism is the true political counterpart of a 
constitutional federalism. If you are operating a federal government then you should 
practice true fiscal federalism, a situation in which the lower levels of government will 
exercise some autonomy, in deciding some sources of revenue and whatever they get, the 
people operating the economy can now pay taxes to the government either to the state or 
federal government, these were the issues at that time, but these issues were later 
captured by people who we believe were not actually part of the original talk, the 
militants we are talking about today. Who are they? It is possible some people are fueling 
their activities, encouraging them to keep on fighting but what are they really fighting 
for? I don’t believe that the militants are truly stakeholders because the objectives for 
which they are fighting is not well known. Some people even believe that if you want to 
probe why the militants are fighting it will reveal so many things about corruption in 
Nigeria system. Some of these boys who have now turned militants were being built and 
acted as fronts for people who were hiding things in the society like military officers, 
politicians of highest votes and some of these militants were the people who has been 
fronting for them and at some point in time may be the deeds where not right and these 
young men now felt that they were sufficiently grown to go their own ways. The battle 
for the control of resources is licking in the drain because we are told that so many highly 
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placed officers and individuals in Nigeria have their own oil plot and they have the 
freedom to drill oil, it is not a common cook that drill oil, so if they are stakeholders what 
interest is there? It is interest of self or of the oil communities. The stakeholders to me are 
those people like you and I who are now visibly affected negatively by the activities of 
the militants and the people who are backing them up.  
 
In the recent crisis in Delta State you know military men are trained to kill and in the 
same way trained to die in war so in the civilized world the military man looses his life in 
the war zone, is it not so? You can see that in the civilized world if an American civilian 
dies some where the government will ask where and how it happened, is it not so? In one 
of the versions in the Niger Delta some military persons where killed and because of that 
the military turned its full force on the entire community. If we where in a civilized world 
the issue of the military would have been to identify those persons, who they think they 
know, identify them and deal with them.  
 
Question 3: How would you describe the standard of life in oil producing 
communities in the Niger Delta? 
 
Very poor, we have had a number of studies, although the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) on human development resource for the Niger Delta in 2006, there 
were indications that human development index plus so many fix for the Niger Delta was 
relatively higher than the average for the entire country which is supposing that life for 
the average is better in the Niger Delta than in other parts of the country, but that is not 
true because if you go to the interior of the Niger Delta you will see people drinking 
water from the pit and some times from the river which in most cases people defecate in. 
More than eighty percent of youths in Bayelsa don’t have jobs, have you ever traveled on 
the Warri-Port Harcourt express road? You will see that the road is very bad. Life in the 
oil producing communities is very terrible particularly in the riverine communities, there 
are no roads and other basic amenities, government presence is very negligible and I will 
say that the government can do more.  
 
 267 
Question 4: Aside social unrest in the Niger Delta, have the media reported in-depth 
on the implications of environmental degradation in oil producing communities? 
 
In this area, it is not just the media because the media can only report physical things that 
people see on television. There are no stations in the Niger Delta for monitoring pollutant 
level in terms of particle matter, in terms of oxide of sulphur, oxide from nitrogen and 
even the areas where gas is flared and there is no information on the level of carbon 
emission which is a very potent factor here in the Niger Delta. You are very aware that 
Nigeria is the largest flarer of gas in the world; we flare the largest quantity of gas which 
means that gas flared in flow stations and other parts of oil producing communities, when 
you add all of them together, they contribute to green house emission which is very high 
but we are unable to know precisely the level of carbon emission in the Niger Delta. Then 
water quality, if you go to many of the communities where you have oil, if you dig just 
twelve feet you will get water, and you will see that the water is mixed with crude oil and 
this is where people look for water to drink; then crops, crops don’t grow well in these 
areas any longer and when people talk about it, its just like making a point and nothing to 
say. If you go to the Isoko areas in Delta State you will see that the vegetation is coated 
with black carbon. If you are driving from Isoko to Warri and to other parts of Ijaw 
communities (all mentioned locations are within Niger Delta) you will see that crops and 
fruits have carbon deposits and they don’t grow well any longer. Acid rain is a reality in 
the Niger Delta, so as it were, the media can only report when they have indicators of 
environmental quality that have been well monitored and recorded but we don’t have 
such agency to monitor and report these issues. The only thing the media report is when 
there is an oil spill or pipeline vandalisation that they will report, what you see cannot 
match the actual consequences of the pollution. Is not that we don’t have environmental 
watch dog, although we have the federal ministry of environment but I can tell you that 
the facilities the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) have are substandard to the 
facilities that are in possession of the oil companies have so the DPR will rely on the 
information given by the oil companies in terms of environmental pollution so how are 
you sure the information is correct and not tampered with.  
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In terms of information control you know that there is an agreement the oil companies 
have about their oils which government may not have, if they give all the information 
they have about destroying the environment, government will sue them. What is the 
guarantee that the information these oil companies give are correct about their operations 
and the environment. If you go to the capital of Delta State to ask for the level of 
temperature you will get information, but if you go to the flow stations and ask them for 
the quantity of gas flared nobody will give you that information and that is why the role 
of the press on this issue is ineffective. There was a bill before the national assembly on 
freedom of assess to information bill but till today the bill has not been passed. There is 
need to have a strong, powerful and independent environmental monitoring agency which 
will give information about the true state of the environment in the oil producing region 
of Nigeria; for now we do not have such agencies, the DPR is not well equipped to 
provide such information. The world health organization have environmental standard, 
and you will remember that in 1988 the federal environmental protection agency was 
established. Although, when Obasanjo came into power in 1999 this ministry came under 
the federal ministry of environment. The mandate given to the federal ministry of 
environment includes the responsibility of making information available on all aspects of 
the environment, not only for the oil industry but with specific reference to the oil 
industry. The bill submitted to the national assembly on access to information which has 
not been passed till now is hindering assess to information from the oil companies 
operating in the Niger Delta. For example, if you go to shell for information, they will tell 
you to get a letter from DPR and when you get the letter, they will tell you the person 
who is qualified to give such information have gone on cross country trip and give you a 
date to return, and when you go back on that date, they give you a different story in order 
not to give information.  
 
Question 5: Would the government move through Amnesty be effective enough to 
end the Niger Delta conflict? 
 
Well, when you talk about amnesty, there are some people who will ask some critical 
questions such as amnesty to who? Who are you giving this amnesty to? What course 
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were these persons fighting? Or, is it now a virtue to be a criminal? And at the end of the 
day government will say for you being a criminal we want to settle you; then there will be 
no end to it. I don’t think that amnesty to some individuals who have been identified as 
criminals will solve the problem of the Niger Delta because the problem of the Niger 
Delta is not the problem of arresting personal poverty; because those people who are 
fighting, they are fighting to enhance their own economic conditions just for themselves 
and not for the entire Niger Delta society. Until the larger question of underdevelopment 
is resolved this problem will continue to surface because if people now know that when 
you carry arms and make so much noise, one day government will identify you and settle 
you, then it becomes a virtue.  
 
Question 6: From management perspective, what are your views on the Niger Delta 
conflict? 
 
Management perspective, in terms of what, is it managing the crisis? Or, managing the 
development crisis? Is it managing the crisis of human suffering? Or, managing the crisis 
of warfare? Or, managing the problem of underdevelopment? Well, first and foremost, I 
believe very strongly that one way or the surest way of solving this problem is to ensure 
that the areas that produce the wealth of the nation they should seize developmental 
facilities. Let there be good roads, twenty-four hours electricity supply, schools, health 
facilities, then those who don’t have jobs and want to be gainfully employed in working 
life, should be supported true soft loans to set up their own business so that the problem 
of unemployment can be drastically solved. Nigeria is still a public sector to be related 
with because of the system and there is so much corruption in the system. If you are able 
to tackle the problem of corruption at all level from federal, to state and to the local 
government the country will be stable.  
 
If you take the local government as the last tier of government, what is the quality of 
human needs who are living there? Do they have any aspirations as to the direction they 
should take in development? Do they have idea of the type of projects that people in other 
places have to sustain their economy? You can actually see at the local level what is 
 270 
happening; they can’t management what they get because the politicians don’t give the 
people what they want instead they provide for themselves with what they want. They 
should manage effectively the little resources that are available to them and make sure 
that the people are part of the role of governance because that is the current path way to 
development. If the people are involved in the governance right from the planning to the 
execution level, the chances are that there will be trust; however, if there is no trust 
development will not be consistent. We have to manage the resources that we have, right 
now we live on oil, there are so many countries in Africa that don’t have oil and even 
with the other natural resources we have in the Niger Delta, we can do away with oil and 
still survive. Look at the coast line of the Niger Delta, if some countries in the world have 
the kind of coast line that we have, tourism alone is enough to sustain the economy. Other 
areas such as agriculture in which we have the condition to grow more than half of the 
food stuff the world needs but nobody is looking at that area, or is it coal, textile, we are 
depending solely on oil sales and yet we complain of under development, the day the oil 
will finish, what are we going to do? We have the natural resources and environment to 
survive as an economy in the Niger Delta.     
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